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Preface
Writing a dissertation while working in business and not being employed in the academic
arena has certainly proved to be an interesting and challenging experience. Interesting,
because it confronted me with a new perspective on business practice that was informed by
scientific conventions and academic rigor. Challenging, because the time and energy neces-
sary for such a project had to be carved out of an already full agenda. Nevertheless, 1 never
regretted the decision to start this dissertation because it allowed me to reflect on aspects of
my work that commanded my interest and aroused my curiosity. That I would finish this dis-
sertation at a time when the business community is facing a fundamental credibility crisis und
when cases of bad corporate governance are being uncovered across the world, is something
that was certainly not expected when I started working on it. The creation of shareholder
value is still of paramount importance for companies. Recent history, however, has brought
sad but convincing proof that this objective can only be achieved when managers adhere to
the highest standards of integrity and business ethics. Although this was not studied in the
context of this dissertation, and is no more than a personal observation lacking any scientific
proof, it does shed a new light on the research that I have performed.
Writing a dissertation is an individual process that cannot be accomplished without the help,
stimulation, support and critical feedback from many. I would like to thank Tjeu Blommaert
in particular for his encouragement and drive that helped me to start working on this disserta-
tion in the first place. His commitment never failed and his busy schedule, after he joined in-
dustry, never stopped him from actively reviewing my work and helping me forward. Willem
Buijink provided his help after the initial idea had already been developed, when the actual
research in the field was being prepared. Without his in-depth knowledge of academic re-
search, I would never have been able to complete this dissertation. He helped me to sharpen
my ideas and challenged many views and assumptions that surfaced in the various drafts of
the dissertation. I am grateful to both promoters for their positive attitude and never-failing
enthusiasm.
Because I was not employed by Maastricht University my presence as a researcher there was
less frequent than that of others, writing their dissertation in combination with working in
academia. Although I was a "vreemde eend in de bijt" in that respect, I was always wel-
comed and supported by the members of the Department of Accounting and Information
Management which was highly appreciated. I would like to thank them all, in particular
Frank Moers, who was a constant sparring partner for both research and practical questions. I
also thank Harold Hassink, Christian Wolffand Eddy Vaassen for their evaluation of the final
manuscript.
All colleagues from Philips need a special mention here for their encouragement during the
years that I was working on this dissertation. They provided me with a pleasant working envi-
ronment, but also with enough room in my calendar to work on my research.
I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and motivation. They helped me
to find the energy to continue and ultimately complete the project. Most off all, I thank Alice
for her love, patience and never failing belief in the successful completion of this journey.
Peter Sampers
Heythuysen, July 2003
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Management Control Systems and Shareholder Value Creation
1.
Introduction
1.1 General
The purpose of this dissertation is to empirically examine the relation between shareholder
value creation and the design of management control systems in companies. The dissertation
looks at listed companies; in this case, companies listed on the Amsterdam l\xchanges. I he
topic and research questions stem from two streams of research, on the one hand research in
the field of management accounting into the characteristics and effectiveness of management
control systems and, on the other hand, research in the field of company strategy and corpo-
rate finance into value creation and value-based management. The focus of the research is on
the question whether there is a relation between the design characteristics of the management
control system of an organization and the creation of value for the shareholders of this or-
ganization.
In this dissertation management control is investigated from three different but related per-
spectives. First we will determine to what extent management of Dutch companies integrates
value-based objectives in the design of management control systems and what the effect of
this is on value creation. In practical terms the research question from this perspective can be
formulated as: Does a value-based focus in management control indeed result in value crea-
tion? Second, we will investigate whether characteristics of management control systems in
themselves explain value creation. Third, we will study the importance of the alignment be-
tween strategy and management control systems for value creation.
This dissertation attempts to contribute empirically to the academic literature on the relation
between the design of management control systems and shareholder value creation. It also
attempts to contribute to the evolving field of management control practice. This field is de-
veloping over time into a field that deals with "the generation or creation of value through the
effective use of resources, through the use of technologies [e.g. work-methods and proce-
dures, comment from the author] which examine the drivers of customer value, shareholder
value, and organizational innovation" (IFAC 1998, see also Ittner & Larcker 2(X)0).
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1.2 Value-based management
Value-based management (VBM) has become an important theme for many companies over
the last two decades, making the creation of shareholder value their central goal. It finds its
origins in traditional economic theory and builds on the residual income concept that was al-
ready introduced in the 19th century (Arnold & Davies 2000). The current attention for
VBM, both from managers and from academics, can be explained by a growing recognition
of the importance of shareholders as corporate stakeholders and by the efforts of a large
community of management consultants who are promoting the concept. Rappaport (1986,
1988) was the first to present a comprehensive study on the importance of the creation of
shareholder value. He singled out the creation of value for shareholders as the most important
strategic objective for American listed companies.
Various definitions of value-based management have been introduced over time. In general
terms, it can be defined as:
. or .vj'.f/ema/ir, a/y?roarA to ma»wxi»g cu/w/wnes to acA/eve /Ae oA/e<7/ve o/
wea/f A cmj//on am/ s/iare/»o/der va/ue over »me'
. 47)
Perhaps the most comprehensive definition of value-based management is provided by Ittner
and Larckcr (2000, p. 3)
TA/.v a/yv«acA /brM.ve.v rw f/) oV/7/i/ng am/ /mp/cmewf/wj? .vrra/e£/e.v /Aa//www/e /Ac A/gA-
t\\7 /»o/i7if*W A>r .vAareAo/rtVr va/ne rreo/zo«; (2J /mp/emeMf/ng /n/brmafion s}\sfem5 ^>-
cw.f«/ on va/u<? craMo« am/ «m/er/i'/n^ "tfWvers" q/"va/we across a company's Aws/View
ww/V.v. /woaWf.v. am/ <-n.vtomtT .vt'^ wt'n/.v: f^ J) a%«m^ mam/^emenr />rr>re.wes. JMCA as
a/«/ rcvowrct" w//o<"a//o«, M'//A va/wc frea//o« afu/. ^ aV.v/jf/J/ng per-
am/ incew/ve compensanow />/a/M /Aa/ re/7ec/ va/ue crea-
rtbw. '
In essence the above definition can also be read as a definition of management control, with
the addition that it focuses on the objective of shareholder value creation. In that respect it
can be argued that VBM is a form of management control that has the creation of value for
shareholders as its central goal.
Over the last decade. VBM has received considerable attention in the Netherlands also. A
Dutch translation of Rappaport's book (1986) was published in 1988 and the subject was ad-
dressed in numerous publications, including those by Lewy (1992, 1998), Cools and Van der
Vcn (1995), Traas (1995\ 1995*. 1996). Van de Poel (1996). Dorsman and Rijken (1998),
Langcndijk et al. (1999). Blij and IX-kker (2000). Bouwens and Van Lent (2000) and Steens
(2000). From anecdotal evidence in the press and disclosures in annual reports we know that
a number of Dutch companies are actively employing value-based management. Research by
KI'NKi Consulting (199*}) showed that 64 % of large organizations in 7 countries across
l-'uropc stated that they apply VBM. Although the Netherlands was not included in the sam-
ple, there is no reason to suppose that the picture here is fundamentally different.
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The attention for EVA. Economic Value Added, a proprietary value-based performance
measure introduced by the consulting firm Stem Stewart, has been one of the main dri\ ing
forces behind the adoption of VBM in the last two decades. EVA received a lot of attention in
the business press. Fortune Magazine was one of the first to start publishing on the subject
(Tully 1993) and introduced an EVA performance ranking. Also in the Netherlands the lead-
ing business newspaper. Het Financieele Dagblad. went on the 1-VA track and published
background articles and a ranking of the IV A performance of Dutch companies.
Most management consultants adopted VBM as a service they could offer to their corporate
clients, a service that often encompassed the introduction of other acronyms for value-based
performance measures. Stem Stewart offered its EVA concept and consulting services to
companies across the world and made sure that successful VBM adopters received a lot of
publicity (e.g. Coca Cola, Toys R Us, and Eli Lilly).
The consultants promoting this new concept did not provide strong empirical evidence in
support of the relation between the adoption of VBM and the creation of value lor sharehold-
ers. Anecdotal evidence from successful companies was used to underpin the importance of
the new management concept.
The question that remains unanswered is whether the incorporation of VBM in a company's
management control system does indeed contribute to the creation of (increased) value for
shareholders. This is the basic question that is posed in this dissertation.
1.3 Management control systems
Thinking about management control has developed over time and is still evolving. This is
best illustrated when we review the definitions of management control that were used by
Robert Anthony, a leading researcher in this field, over time.
In the first edition of his book on planning and control systems that also carried this title, he
defined management control as:
TAe /vocesj Ay w/ricn manage« awi/re /naf resource* are o/>ta//j«/ ana* H.V«/ <$«•//vc/y
in /Ae acrom/>//.5fl/ne«/ o/organiza/ion 'J o/yer/i'ves'
The role of management according to Anthony in this quotation is to control an organization
in such a way that it is assured that people in the organization take decisions and perform ac-
tions that lead to the realization of the organization's objectives. In the first edition of his
book Anthony described a cybernetic concept of control that consisted of four components:
observation, evaluation, modification and communication. These components were contained
in the performance management system that consisted of target setting, measurement, correc-
tive actions and the use of management information for communication and motivation. This
cybernetic view of management control had limitations bee aase of its disregard for two im-
portant considerations. First, management control needs to ensure that people act in accor-
dance with an organization's policies and directives. This means that management control
needs to influence the behavior of people working in organizations to ensure the realization
of objectives. Second, management control cannot accept strategy as a given fact.
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Anthony recognized the first, behavioral, aspect of management control.
He said that:
cow/ro/ « /wHwoW/y o process ybr mor/va/Z/ig a/«/ //i/7t/e/ir/ng peop/e /o / w -
/orm or^aw/zt;//«« «cf/V/f/es /Aaf w/7//wr//ier rAe or#amza//OM '.s
<?f a/.
Anthony also recognised the second aspect in later years. In the 1984 edition of his book he
still started form the premise that strategy was a given fact and stated:
T/ic #oa/s, .Wra/e#/ej am/po/icies ore fcife/i as g/ven /'« /Ae /wa/iage/Hewf cow/ro/ process'
In later editions of his work he widened the scope of management control and recognized
that:
cow/ro/ uf/ür/mr/io/i raw a/50 />rov/</e /Ae Aasw /or fA/wt/wg aAowf wew
Govi'm/c/rq/a/t
These steps sketch the evolution in Anthony's views of management control over time.
The field has also evolved by giving recognition to the importance of human behavior (e.g.
llopwoud (l'>76). Merchant (1985'). Flamholz et al. (1985)). In a further stream of develop-
ments, (he impact of a changing environment and uncertainty on management control was
introduced. This leads to the recognition that management control also has the objective of
determining whether the organization's strategy is still appropriate and valid.
All this developed into a wider definition of management control systems introduced by
Simons:
rr>w//m'.v aw</ /jrwt'<A/ri'.v M.V«/ Ay /nanagers to
mv/ (j<7<vi7it'.v'
Noteworthy in this definition is the inclusion of altering patterns in organizational activities.
Simons justifies this addition by the need for organizations to respond to new strategies that
"emerge in various comers of the organization" (Simons 1994, p. 170). This brings determi-
nation of the appropriateness of the current strategy into the scope of management control.
Although the definition presented by Simons is very instrumental and focused on formal rou-
tines and procedures, he developed a richer model of management control, based on four lev-
ers of control (Simons 1995), that addresses informal processes and behavioral aspects.
It needs to be mentioned at this stage that opinions differ with regard to this strategic aspect
of management control. Some authors (e.g. Anthony et al. 1984 and Merchant 1998) distin-
guish between strategic control, which deals with the question whether the organization's
strategy is still valid, and management control, which concentrates on the question whether
the employees of an organization behave appropriately, in view of the strategy. For the re-
mainder of this dissertation strategic control will not be viewed separately but as a part of a
broadly defined concept of management control, in line w ith the definition and views devel-
oped by Simons, and Anthony in his later work (Anthony & Govindarajan 1998).
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1.4 Organizational strategy
From the preceding section it is clear that management control is necessary to ensure the re-
alization of an organization's objectives: Us mission and goal. How these objectives are to be
attained is determined by the organization's strategy. Strategy has been defined in many
ways. Various schools of thought have developed on the concept of strategy. Mint/berg el al.
(1998) go so far as to describe 10 different schools. However, all schools haw* in common
that the stated objective of organizational strategy is the determination of an organization's
goals and objectives and the road to the achievement of these goals and objectives. This is
already captured in an early definition of strategy introduced by Chandler:
'. /A? <fe/erm/mirion o//Ae fow/r /ong /erm goo/5 antf oA/w/ivej o/<w» enferprar. a/i«/ /Af
o /co i /H« q/'ar/ion ant/ /At' t///<xuf/on o/resources ntt'ejsarv Aw carrying ««/
' (CAanaVer
and is still applied today.
can Ae Aroa</(>' cwiceiv«/ as a course t*/"ac/i«M/«r acA/eWng aw »M>ftfMfe<*//ort '.v
»fi7 <* Afeyer /999. p. 55)
Strategy is usually described on two levels: corporate strategy and business (competitive)
strategy. According to (ioold. Campbell and Alexander (1994), corporate strategy deals with
two primary questions. In what business should the company invest its resources, either
through ownership, minority holdings, joint ventures, or alliances? How should the parent
company influence and relate to the businesses under its control?
Business strategy addresses the question how to create a sustainable and profitable competi-
tive position for a business unit within a specific industry, segment or market (De Kluyvcr
2000, p. 59). In essence it answers the question of how to compete.
Strategy making is the process that leads to the determination of an organization's long-term
goals. This is not a discrete process with a beginning and an end. Starting from the definition
of strategy as a 'a pattern in a stream of decisions' and based on empirical research in a num-
ber of companies, Mintzberg (1978) was able to distinguish between strategies that were in-
tended and strategies that were realized without having been intended. The latter so-called
emergent strategies are not consciously pre-conceived but develop when the organization
adapts to influences from the environment in the implementation of strategy. This leads to the
following distinction by Mintzberg:
afeg/'e? /Aa/ ge/ rea/izeaV /Aese mo)' Ac ca /W aW/Aera/e .v
ab wo/ #e/ rea/Zztt/, /?erAap.? At'cawjc o / w
wv;'rowmew/, or cAawges aW/w^ />np/c?/new/a//o/», /Awe may Ae
ca//ca" •/•irea/zzca' s/ra/eg/ey. /?ea//rea' s/ra/e#/« /Aa/ wwe never in/e/u/e«/, /?erAa/M Ae-
cai/5<? no ,?/ra/eg>' wa.v in/enaVa* a/ /Ae oi//5t'/ or yxvAa/w At'caM.ve', /At' .v/ra/e>3' /Aa/ HWJ /'W-
/enaeJ go/ a"w/>/ac<?a" a/ong /Ae waj, /Ae^e maj.' Ae ca//ea" e/wergen/ i/ra/eg/e5.'
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As was stated before, strategy addresses the determination of an organization's long-term
goals. Both in practice and in theory, more and more recognition is given to the fact that, for
public companies, the creation of value for shareholders should be the most important con-
sideration in the determination of these goals. As a consequence of this, the concept of value-
based management was developed.
1.5 The research questions
Given the above, we have developed three questions that will be the subject of our empirical
work. Evidently, many more questions are possible, but we will concentrate on these three.
The three questions are related to each other because they attempt to obtain a deeper under-
standing of the actions of management that contribute to the creation of value for sharehold-
ers. The questions are (1) whether VBM, setting shareholder value creation as a central goal,
actually contributes to value creation, (2) whether there is a relation between different charac-
teristics of management control systems and value creation, and (3) what the relevance of the
alignment of the management control system to company strategy is for the value creation?
For all three questions a measure for value creation needs to be used. We will measure value
creation directly in the capital market. We will use Relative Total Shareholder Return
(RTSR), i.e. the increase of the share price and dividends, divided by the share price at the
beginning of the measurement period, corrected for the general performance of the market. In
addition, in investigating the first question, we will look at performance in terms of return on
equity and earnings per share, as well as the perception of CFO's with regard to the value
creation performance of their company.
This research is intended to contribute to the literature on, and to our understanding of, man-
agement accounting practice in the three areas that will be investigated. Answering the first
question will provide insight into whether value-based management indeed contributes to
value creation. It can counterbalance the contributions from consultants to the VBM literature
that contain limited verifiable information on the correlation between the application of
value-based management and the actual creation of value for shareholders. The second part of
the empirical work will provide insight into the impact on value creation of the different
characteristics of management control systems. We will test whether characteristics of man-
agement control explain shareholder value creation. This can help practitioners and contribute
to the normative literature on management control system design. In answering the third
question we will contribute to the already considerable literature on elements of alignment
between management control systems and strategy.
The conceptual foundation of the studies originates from three areas: strategy, finance and
management control. Company strategy addresses the question of the determination of the
long-term objectives of an organization. VBM is an approach to management that concen-
trates on a specific objective, the creation of value for shareholders, which is rooted in
finance theory. Management control systems have been described in the management
accounting literature as the tools that management uses to ensure the accomplishment of the
organi/ation's objectives. In companies that apply VBM this can be read as the tools that
management uses to ensure that the creation of value for shareholders is realized. In this
respect VBM can also be interpreted as a form of management control with a specific focus.
Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of these foundations.
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Fifarc 1.1 Conceptual foundations of the studies
1.6 Contents of the dissertation
In the next chapter the notion of management control and the concepts of value-based man-
agement and organizational strategy will be discussed. It also reviews the historical develop-
ment of management control thinking. The third chapter addresses relevant empirical re-
search. In that chapter attention will focus on four important streams of empirical work that
deal with value-based management practice, the effect of value-based management, the rela-
tion between value-based management and certain aspects of management control systems
(notably incentive systems) and the relation between management control and strategy. In
chapter four, the research method, survey, sample and response will be discussed. Some gen-
eral information on the type of companies that responded will also be provided in thai chap-
ter. The three research questions and the development of the relevant hypotheses will be ad-
dressed in the subsequent chapters. Chapter five deals with the question whclher a manage-
ment focus on value creation indeed leads to superior total shareholder returns. RTSR of
companies that have adopted VBM will be compared to companies that have not done so.
The relation between management control practices and value creation will be discussed in
chapter six. We will investigate to what extent characteristics of management control systems
influence the creation of value for shareholders. In chapter seven we will investigate whether
the strategic alignment of management control systems affects value creation. A summary of
our findings and the main conclusions of our research are presented in the last chapter, which
will also provide a number of recommendations for further research and for management ac-
counting practitioners.
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2.
Value-based management, management
control systems, and strategy: conceptual
foundations
2.1 Introduction
The first part of this chapter covers the concept of value-based management (VHM) and the
multitude of value-based performance measures that can be used. It is not the intention to
provide an all-inclusive overview of VBM approaches that have been developed by various
consulting firms. The main focus will be to define what VBM is and to demonstrate how
value-based performance is measured. The roots of value-based performance measures in fi-
nancial theory and residual income concepts will be elaborated.
Then, traditional - normative - characterizations of the concept of management control,
rooted in cybernetics and systems theory, will be discussed that were the foundation of the
early literature on management control. Later additions on human behavior, empowerment
and change will be described and the insights from contingency theory will be addressed,
ending with a discussion of some overall frameworks for management control system design
that have been developed in recent years.
After that we will discuss the concept of strategy. The strategic frameworks that have been
developed to operational ize strategy will be addressed, as well as the distinction between cor-
porate strategy and business strategy.
The interrelation between the above subjects was already recognized by Rappaport (1986)
when he linked value creation, the objective of VBM, to strategy and performance manage-
ment.
A summary of the conceptual foundations discussed will close this chapter.
Chapter 2
2.2 The concept of value-based management
Over the last 20 years value-based management, i.e. setting shareholder value creation as the
overriding corporate objective, has enjoyed a growing popularity in company boardrooms
and management consulting practice. No doubt one of the most important contributions to the
development of this new management paradigm was that of Rappaport (1986). Although not
the first to recognize the relative importance of shareholder value creation as a managerial
objective, Rappaport can be credited with attempting to develop an integrated management
model that would allow companies to ensure value creation. He clearly linked the determina-
tion of value creation to business strategy, performance management and measurement, and
incentive systems. The book was written in view of the increasing interest in value creation in
large industrial companies, mainly in the US. Rappaport explains this growing interest by a
number of considerations:
• '77it' /Am;/ u/cw/wra/e takeovers Ay /Aose see/tmg Mmferva/uec/, wm/er/wawageo'
• /m/vev.v/Ye t'/tt/w.ve/n<?H/ Ay ror/rora/e /««/ers wAt> Aave o</o/7/ec/ /At a/Y?roarA.
• 77/t' jjwH7>fjj r«-o£«/7/V>n /Aa/ /raf//7/o«a/ accoKH//>»# measures 5ucA CM £ f 5 ant/ ÄO/ are
Ac va/we q/"/Ae f om/?am'.s .sAares.
o/rt'/Mmv to .sAart'Ao/a'er.s afowg wj/A o/Aer /Heaswres o/"/>er/örma«ce /« /Ae
Aw.v/wt'.v.v /vw.« ,v»rA as F«r/i/«t''.s an/tt/a/ raM/t/«g o//Ae 500
/I ^»r»u'/«>; rt'c<>^ »M/7/'<>« fA«/ execMfives' /o«g ferm compefwa/io« Meeats to Ae
/«•</ to rc/wrav
Ä5, p.
These considerations are recurring themes of VBM literature. The imperfections of accrual-
based company accounting information are often cited (e.g. Rappaport 1986, Stewart 1991)
as an important reason for failure to create value. In the end the underlying concern of critics
of accounting information is that accounting-based information provides an unreliable proxy
for cash (low information. The idea is that cash flows are key to value creation. From finance
theory (Ross et al. 1996) we know that the value of assets in the capital markets is the dis-
counted value of the free cash flows that will be generated by these assets. This translates into
a causal relationship between the creation of value for shareholders and the creation of (free)
cash flows by organizations.
A second consideration in most work on VBM is that executive compensation arrangements
are a strong tool for companies that strive for value creation.
Chief executive support for value-based management is a third consideration. Well-known
CE()s from highly regarded companies made it their key theme. Some of the most notable
examples in the early days of VBM were Roberto Goizueta, the CEO of Coca-Cola, and
Michael Eisner, the CEO of Walt Disney, both in the US (Black et al. 1998). In the UK,
Boots and Lloyds Bank were among the VBM adopters that have been regularly mentioned
as successful examples (Arnold & Davies 2000).
In the Netherlands, adoption of VBM became a theme for company CEOs in the second half
of the nineties, when among others Joop Jansen of Heijmans, a Dutch construction company,
and Rijkman Ciroenink of ABN AMRO Bank became advocates of VBM (as stated in their
respective annual reports).
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Although Rappaport was one of the first authors to describe an overall approach to value-
based management, he did not use the term VBM as such in his book. We find it in what can
be called the second-generation VBM publications like Copeland et al. (1995) and McTag-
gart ct al. (1994). As a managerial concept VBM is probably best defined by Copeland el al.:
/ y / o mawajtjfmen/ w/jfrf/>v /At' com/xwv'.s o»fro// cu/x'rafio
s. a««" /mi/iajji'iw/»/ /woe«.«.'.» tirt- <i// «//#/«•</ ft» /if//> //if com/xjni' muvimtze
va/i/f />v /ix-i
/995. p. 96;
VBM as an approach to management was developed from the premise that shareholder value
creation is the single most important strategic objective for public, i.e. stock exchange listed,
companies. This premise is supported by corporate finance theory that positions shareholders
as the residual claim holders who bear the ultimate risk of the firm (Bouma 19X0, Weston &
Brigham 1981, Ross et al. 1996). Economists have argued since the days of Adam Smith ihul
maximizing shareholders' wealth is the ultimate objective of public companies (Arnold &
Davies 2000). Other arguments to support the predominance of shareholder value have also
been used, including the fact that maximizing the advantage for shareholders goes hand in
hand with maximizing the value of the linn for other stakeholders (Copeland et al. 1995,
Bughin & Copeland 1997, Baekes-Gellner & Pull 1999, Ogden & Watson 1949). The crea-
tion of shareholder value is also said to be in the long-term interest of corporate managers.
When they fail to satisfy the return requirements of their shareholders they may face a hostile
take-over or a conflict with shareholders that will lead to their replacement at some stage in
time (Rappaport 1986). Agency theory can also be used to explain how value-based man-
agement and value-based performance measures in particular work (Bouwens & Van Lent
2000, Garvey & Milbourn 2000).
To be able to measure their success in creating value for shareholders, organizations need to
apply performance measures that quantify value creation. The development of these measures
has been a cornerstone of VBM. The basic concept for these measures is based on the work
of early economists who developed the notion that return to shareholders is a requirement of
business that should be included as part of the overall cost of capital (Alfred Marshall as
quoted in Arnold & Davies 2000, p. 14). Solomons (1983) made an important contribution to
the development of performance measurement by recognizing that profit is an imperfect per-
formance measure because it is influenced by accounting decisions, and disregards the
amount of capital employed to create the profit. He solved the second shortcoming by pro-
posing residual income as a superior performance measure that quantified the excess of in-
come over the cost of capital employed to generate this income.
Residual income (RI) = Income - (Capital employed x Cost of capital)
Firms in the US, like General Motors and General Electric, have used the RI concept since
the 1920s. General Electric is credited with having invented the name (Bromwhich & Walker
1998).
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The residual income concept together with the understanding of the cost of capital based on
the capital asset pricing model are the two cornerstones of the VBM performance measures
that were developed over the last 20 years. The theoretical underpinning of residual income
as the most appropriate value-based performance measure was strengthened by the recogni-
tion and theoretical proof that maximization of residual income is in fact consistent with
maximization of the net present value of future cash flows (Bromwich & Walker 1998.
Biddlc et al. 1999). However, one of Solomons' objections to traditional income-based per-
formance measures, the reliance on accrual accounting for income determination and distor
tions as a consequence of the use of book values instead of market values for capital em-
ployed, was not solved by the introduction of RI as such.
VBM authors (Rappaport 1986, Stewart 1991, Copeland et al. 1995) recognized this omissioii
and posited that value-based performance measures should be corrected for deficiencies of
accrual accounting. Stern Stewart (Stewart 1991) used up to 164 adjustments to accounting
information to correct for possible measurement errors in the determination of income and
capital employed for the calculation of Economic Value Added (EVA).
Another value-based performance measure is Total Shareholder Return (TSR), the return th;'t
the shareholder obtains from dividends and accretion of the share price. This measure is read-
ily uvuiluMc for ull listed companies and is frequently used when companies are ranked on
value creation performance (e.g. Boston Consulting Group 1999 and 2000). It is also becom-
ing a frequently used parameter for management bonuses (Arnold & Davies 2000).
The development of value based measurement frameworks was of importance for the accep-
tance and dissemination of VBM as a management concept. More recently, the focus in VBM
literature has widened, and integration of value-based performance measures in the total
management process is being addressed. The importance of linking VBM to strategy devel-
opment has been stressed (Day & Fahey 1990, Rappaport 1992). Also the introduction of a
value-based mindset on all decision levels of the organization has been recognized as an im-
portant aspect of VBM. For example McTaggart et al. (1994, p. 10) observed that organiza-
tions need "a set of principles that are understood by all managers and can be used to inform
their judgment about which decisions or choices to make'.
It became more and more clear that VBM influences a wide variety of managerial tasks and
that successful value creation cannot be achieved by simply introducing a value-based per-
formance metric and tying incentive compensation to that metric. Haspcslach et al. (2001)
describe live main elements that distinguish companies that have successfully implemented a
VBM culture:
• explicit commitment to value creation;
• an environment receptive to changes (through training);
• broad-based incentive systems tied to value-based performance;
• w illingness to make major organizational changes;
• broad and inclusive changes introduced to the companies' systems and processes.
That a wide variety of managerial tasks is affected by VBM is illustrated by table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Managerial tasks affected by VBM according to Arnold and Davies (2000)
Strategy selection
Resource allocation
Planning and control systems
Target selling and performance measurement
Managerial reward systems
Culture
Structure
Investor relations
Corporate gov cniancc
The role of the CIO
Mergers and acquisitions
Corporate valuation
Value-based management is described as 'a currently 'hot' topic in practice which is claimed
to be changing financial management at the highest level in some of the world's largest com-
panies' (Bromwhich 1998, p. 387). Indeed VBM is applied by a sizeable number of compa-
nies also in the Netherlands, and its implementation is inter-linked with management control
system design and organizational strategy. But support for it is not unequivocal, ('ritictil
evaluations regularly appear (Zimmerman 1997, Mouritsen 1998, Kennedy 2000, Lev 2000)
and a number of early VBM adopters have abandoned the application of VBM in the mean-
time. This dissertation will attempt to contribute to the evaluation of VBM as an 'approach to
management'.
2.3 Management control concepts
In chapter 1, various definitions of management control have already been presented. Man-
agement control can be described as a cybernetic system consisting of a measurement device,
a steering device, an assessing device, and an information flow. Anthony (1965) used two
building blocks for his approach to management control: the organizational structure and the
control process. Defining responsibility centers in an organization creates structure: units that
are managed by accountable managers. Depending on the responsibility of the manager con-
cerned, these units can be: revenue centers, cost centers, profit centers, or investment centers.
The distinct responsibilities of managers in these centers are summarized in table 2.2.
Table 2.2 Types of responsibility centers
Type of responsibility center
Revenue center
Cost center
Profil center
Investment center
Scope of managers responsibilities
Sales revenue or similar financial output measure
Input in terms of costs, not related to output
Difference between revenue and costs
Profit in relation to capital cmplovcd to generate profit
Adapted from Anthony et al. (1984)
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The control process according to Anthony (1965) consists of four phases, which are: (1) pro
gramming, (2) budgeting, (3) operating and measuring, and (4) reporting and analysis. In the
programming phase, activities are defined that an organization will undertake to realize it'
objectives. They are the translation of the organization's strategy into concrete actions. Bud
geting entails the translation of these plans into financial plans for the immediate future, usu
ally the coming year, in line with the responsibility structure of the organization. In the thin
phase the plans arc actually executed and input and output are measured. The last phase deal
with the distribution of information for performance measurement and the analysis of devia
tions from plans. This phase includes corrective actions by management when the actual per
formancc is not in lint- with plans. This is the cybernetic system approach to managemen
control as defined before.
In the above view of management control. Financial information is a key instrument. This lei
to the development of management control theories that placed high reliance on accounting-
based information. The separation of management control from strategic control and tas.
control further strengthened the accounting focus in early management control literature (e.(.
Anthony 1965). Non-financial information was not addressed, as it was deemed to relate t>
task control only, and external information was not addressed because strategic planning w»
outside of the domain of management control.
Over time, more and more attention was paid to the importance of influencing behavior of
individuals working in organizations as an element of management control. Management
control systems are a tool to guide decisions by individual members of the organization to-
wards the objectives of the organization and to overcome differences between these objec-
tives and the personal objectives of the individuals.
The influence of differences between the personal objectives and the objectives of organiza-
tions was the topic of a number of subsequent empirical studies into management control
(llopwood 1976. Ansari 1977, Ouchi 1977 and 1979, Merchant 1981, Flamholz et al. 1985).
The main focus of these studies was the problem of obtaining cooperation among a collection
of individuals or units who share only partly congruent objectives. Ways to overcome this
problem and to create goal congruence and motivation were the outcome of these studies. It
was established that participation in goal-setting enhanced commitment to achieving these
goals. It was also established that goals should be perceived to be realistic and attainable in
order to provide positive motivation. Both goals that are set at too high a level and goals that
are too easy to achieve, de-motivate. The effectiveness of performance-related rewards was
also addressed. Rewards must be contingent on performance, valued by employees, available
in due time, equitable and based on a fair evaluation process.
Various authors have attempted to define components of management control systems.
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Anthony et al. (1984, p. 58) distinguished formal controls embedded in the organiaatkxuü
structure and processes, informal controls that are based on mutual commitments and group
norms, and individual controls that are related to the intrinsic goals and aspirations of indi-
viduals. A distinction can also be made between output and behavior controls (Ouchi 1977),
the first being based on the observation of the result of the behavior of employees and the
second on the observation of the behavior itself. In a second approach to a classification of
control. Ouchi (1979) distinguished market mechanisms, which are based on the price
mechanism and reciprocity, bureaucratic mechanisms, which arc based on explicit routines of
monitoring and directing, and clan mechanisms, which are rooted in informal structures and
shared values and beliefs. Administrative, social and self-controls are distinguished by Hop-
wood (1976), the first being designed to structure the process of decision-making in large or-
ganizations, the second emerging from shared values and mutual commitments of members
of the organization, and the third coming from the individual motivation and needs ol 'mem-
bers of the organization. A classification introduced by Merchant (1985', 1998) describes re-
sults, action and personnel and cultural controls. Results controls involve rewarding individu-
als for appropriate behavior and good results. Action controls arc designed to ensure that em-
ployees perform actions that are known to be beneficial for the organization. Personnel and
cultural controls ensure that employees control their own or each other's behaviors.
These characterizations of management control systems were developed in a traditional con-
trol framework that relied on the principles of cybernetics and that relied heavily on financial
information and tools such as formal rules, responsibility centers and budgeting systems.
Subsequent authors argued that cybernetics based control systems were too limited to explain
how organizations reacted to changes in business conditions (Otley 1994), empowerment
(Simons 1995'') and strategic change (Simons 1994). They argued that management control
systems have to enable appropriate reactions to changes in circumstances and strategic uncer-
tainties. They argued that this required that empowered employees are able to respond to out-
side influences from a clear understanding of the organization's goals and objectives. Simons
(1990) argued that managers in successful organizations decided continuously about which
controls to use interactively and which to program and delegate to lower levels in the organi-
zation. Interactive controls are those that business managers use actively to monitor and in-
tervene in ongoing decision activities of subordinates. The distinguishing feature of interac-
tive controls is that top managers get personally involved with these controls and signal the
importance of these controls to other members of the organization. Over time Simons (1987',
1987\ 1988, 1990, 1991, 1995*) developed a comprehensive set of characteristics of a man-
agement control system that describes how managers control strategy using four basic levers
of control:
• beliefs systems;
• boundary systems;
• diagnostic control systems; and
• interactive control systems.
These four levers are used to explain how managers apply management control in empow-
ered organizations that operate in highly competitive markets. They are represented in figure
2.1 and described subsequently.
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Figure 2.1 Levers of control
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Beliefs systems and boundary systems demarcate the scope in the search for opportunities in
strategy definition. They are the borders that the organization sets itself and its employees in
the search for new possibilities. Beliefs systems are used to instill an overall sense ol purpose
and direction into the organization: corporate mission statements, presidential credos and
ethical principles are elements ol these systems.
Boundary systems define which risks the organization finds unacceptable and therefore wants
to avoid. Boundary' systems consist of norms that are laid down in codes of conduct, behavior
codes and also in laws and government regulations.
Diagnostic control systems are the cornerstone of traditional management control. They are
the systems that are used to ensure predictable goal achievement. These are the formal infor-
mation systems that managers use to monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations
from predetermined standards of performance (Simons 1 W ). This clearly relates to the cy-
bernetic mechanism described before. For the design of effective diagnostic controls, it is es-
sential that goals are set at levels which are perceived to be realistic and challenging, but also
specific and fair (Simons I W ).
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Interactive control systems are information systems that managers use to involve themselves
regularly and personally in the decision activities of their subordinates, with the objective of
guiding experimentation and learning that are necessary for new autonomous strategic initia-
tives to emerge and be tested in the organisation (Simons I995*). These are needed to enable
the organization to adapt its strategies in view of uncertainties and the need for strategic re-
newal. A study by l-'uskc et al. (1993, p. 275) observed that: "when faced with a crisis, or-
ganizations abandoned both their formal and informal control mechanisms to exert specific,
high intensity forms of control...'. In the case of crisis, interactive control systems apparently
become so important that they override all other control systems.
Simons presents an overall characterization of management control that can be used to cap-
ture (he multi-faceted nature of the concept. We will later use this model as a sturting-point
for the development of our own tool to measure and describe management control systems.
2.4 Strategy
Strategy is about setting long-term goals for an organization and defining ways to achieve
these goals. It is a future-oriented concept. Most definitions of strategy include the process or
actions that are used to realize the goals, since strategy not only defines the final objective but
also the road to get there.
Corporate strategy deals with portfolio choices of companies: the businesses an organization
should be active in, and how to change the composition of the portfolio through acquisitions,
internal diversification and divestments. Corporate strategy also addresses the most appropri-
ate way to control the businesses in a portfolio (Cioold & Campbell 1987, (ioold & (Juinn
1990 and Goold et al. 1994, Nilsson 2000). Business strategy deals with the way businesses
compete in their market, how businesses position themselves in relation to competition. The
majority of the research into the contingency relation between management control and
strategy has focused on business strategy.
Various classifications have been developed to describe business strategy. For our work those
that have been used in contingency studies are the most relevant. In these studies organiza-
tions are grouped on the basis of characteristics of business strategy. One of the best-known
classifications is Porter's (1980) description of three generic competitive strategies: cost lead-
ership, differentiation and focus. His classification is summarized in figure 2.2.
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Flgare 2.2 Porter's generic strategies
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Porter described strategies that were developed from an analysis of the underlying structure
of competition in industries. The choice of the appropriate strategy should allow 'positioning
a business to maximize the value of the capabilities that distinguish it from competitors' (Por-
ter 1980, p. 47). The strategies are easy to understand and therefore appealing. However, two
conceptual weaknesses of the model need to be recognized. The strategies are not collectively
exhaustive. Stuck-in-the- middle strategies, which Porter disqualifies as not being successful
anyway, arc excluded. Also, the model does not leave room to distinguish between broad-
scope companies that use different competitive strategies in different product market combi-
nations and those that do not (C'hrisman et al. 1988).
Miles and Snow (1978) developed a frequently used classification of strategies. They recog-
nized three successful types of business strategies, which they called: defender, prospector
and analyzer. A fourth type, reactor strategies, was also identified but was deemed to be un-
successful and therefore received limited attention both in the original work of Miles and
Snow and in some of the subsequent empirical work that was based on their typology. The
classification was developed from three perspectives: the product portfolio of the business,
the required efficiency level, and the necessary structure. The characteristics are summarized
in table 2.3.
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Table 2- ' Types of organizational hchavior according to Miles and Snow
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Adapted from Miles and Snow (1978).
When we contrast the two archetypes - defenders and prospectors - we find that defenders
compete in a narrow product market domain and excel in cost leadership, while prospectors
develop new market opportunities, thus requiring a wider scope and a more innovative ap-
proach. The typology is based on the level of uncertainty that organizations face. Holh the
external market and the internal structure arc less stable and understood for prospectors; they
need to cope with a higher level of uncertainty. Analyzers combine the characteristics of
prospectors and defenders. In the views developed by Miles and Snow that docs not mean
that they have a combined strategy but that these organizations serve different product market
combinations that allow them to apply both distinctive strategy types in the same organiza-
tion. Empirical validation of the model has been provided in a number of studies (Snow &
Hrebiniak 1980, Hambrick 1983).
Studying the strategic mission of organizations, Gupta and Govindarajan (1984), (also
Govindarajan & Gupta 1985) singled out four types of strategic mission: build, hold, harvest,
and divest. These are seen to be a continuum with, at the one end, businesses that want to in-
crease market share and expand following a build strategy, and at the other end, businesses
that concentrate on maximizing short-term earnings and cash flows following a harvest or
divest strategy. In this classification the group of companies that is applying a stuck-in-the
middle strategy is clearly included with the hold mission. The distinction builds on the trade-
off between expansion, which often pressures short-term income and cash flows, and short-
term performance maximization.
Having listed these three classifications, which all have been used at some stage in contin-
gency research into the relation between strategy and management control systems, the ques-
tion arises: To what extent are these classifications overlapping or mutually exclusive? It is
recommended to see the variables as aspects of business strategics that should be integrated
to fully describe the strategy of a business (Langfield-Smith 1997). Strategy can thus be de-
scribed along three dimensions that do justice to the complexity of the construct: positioning,
mission, and typology. Describing the strategy of a business is selecting a spot for the busi-
ness in the three-dimensional object that is shown in figure 2.3. For our analysis in chapter 7
we will address all three dimensions in accordance with the recommendations of
Langfield-Smith.
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Figure 2.3 Strategy in three aspects
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Strategy development is not a simple-to-deseribe process that organizations execute in their
boardroom. The determination of an organization's strategy is ultimately the responsibility of
the board of management. A standard roadmap for the process is not available. Early strategy
writers paid limited attention to the process and viewed strategy creation as a "creative act"
(Andrews as quoted in Mint/berg et al. 1998). One of the most important insights into strat-
egy development was provided by Mint/berg (1978). who recognized that, in addition to in-
tended strategies that are formally decided upon, there are strategies that emerge without be-
ing planned. These emerging strategies can be seen as organic responses of the organization
to signals from its environment. Organizational strategy can be empirically measured, though
whether one measures intended or emergent strategies it is impossible to say. The main im-
portance for management control is that sufficient room needs to be available for emerging
strategics to develop.
2.5 Summary and conclusions
The growing attention for shareholder value creation both in management accounting re-
search and in business management led to the development of value-based management as a
set of tools to help companies to maximize their value for shareholders. The question whether
the application of these tools has indeed led to increased creation of shareholder value is one
of the key questions for this dissertation.
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Management control theory has developed over time from a cybernetic model into a richer,
multifaceted concept that addresses various aspects of management with ihe ultimate goal of
guiding the decisions and actions of members of an organization towards the realization of
the organization's objectives. Various approaches have been developed to describe manage-
ment control systems, e.g. the four levers of control as defined by Simons (lWS*"). These will
be used to determine characteristics of management control systems and to test whether cer-
tain characteristics influence the creation of value for shareholders.
The existence of a contingency relation between management control system design and
business strategy has been established empirically in a number of studies. Different strategy
classifications have been used in these studies, which hinders the integration ol I he outcome
of the different streams of research. We will use these classifications of business strategy to
investigate the relation between strategy and management control systems design and
whether this relation influences shareholder value creation.
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3.
Shareholder value creation and management
control: empirical evidence
3.1 Introduction
A considerable body of empirical research in management accounting deals with the design
of management control systems. For the purpose of this dissertation an all-inclusive overview
of these studies is not necessary. We will concentrate on the work that has been performed in
relation to value-based management and will cover that extensively in view of the current
lack of overview articles in this area (with the exception of chapter 3 of Arnold & Da vies
2000).
Three types of value-based management related research can be distinguished: I) general
surveys of VBM practice, often performed by management consultants, 2) empirical verifica-
tion of the association between value-based performance measures and stock returns, and
3) investigations into the relation between value creation and management control system de-
sign characteristics.
The first stream of research is exploratory. The second group of studies deals with research
questions similar to those we will address in chapter 5 and is therefore directly relevant to this
dissertation. The third, to date rather limited, group of studies that deals with the relation be-
tween value creation and management control system design is relevant to chapter 6.
In addition, contingency research into the relationship between management control systems
design and strategy is relevant to our study. A large body ofempirical material is available on
the relation between (business) strategy and management control system design, including
high-quality overview articles providing a critical assessment of the field (Dent 1990,
Langfield-Smith 1997, Chenhall 2003). We will refer to these articles and only summarize
the conclusions ofempirical work that is directly related to the hypotheses that will be tested
in chapter 7. We will investigate in that chapter whether the recommendations from these
studies with regard to the alignment of management control systems and strategy contribute
to the explanation of shareholder value creation.
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3.2 Value-based management practice and shareholder value creation
3.2. / KeriW-Aa.v«/ manage
The first publications on value-based management (VBM) had a normative character
(Rappaport 1986, Stewart 1991). Case studies of successes of VBM were often used to sup-
port the new management concept. From the early days, academics and management consult-
ants advocating the use of VBM produced a generally positive stream of publications in
which different methods of VBM were advocated (Rappaport 1986, Stewart 1991,
McTaggart et al. 1994, Lewis Thomas 1994, Copeland et al. 1995, Black et al. 1998,
Donovan et al. 1998, Knight 1998, Nichols 1998). Various management accounting bodies
also contributed to the literature on the subject (IMA 1997, IFAC 1999", IFAC 1999*). Dif-
ferent value-based performance measures like Shareholder Value Added (SVA), Cash Flow
Return on Investment (CFROI), Fxonomic Value Added (EVA), Economic Profit (EP) and
Total Shareholder Return (TSR) were introduced. The literature is full of claims about the
benefits that can be expected from the introduction of value-based management. This can be
illustrated with a reference to Stewart who claimed that:
/if <//m7/y /« i/i/riM.v/V m«rfa7 va/ue o/'a rom/wm' // i.v
IM .v/wl murAcf t'ci/Mf <>/ «MV
/««/ /ig/r/s wp
Descriptive research into the extent and nature of VBM adoption by companies in various
countries has been conducted in the past, usually by management consultants that used these
studies to support their endeavors to promote VBM to their customers. The results were not
published in referced academic journals but in research reports of the consultants. It is re-
markable, in view of their weak methodological foundations, that these reports find their way
into subsequent academic papers (Otley 1999. Inner & Larcker 2000).
An overview of these surveys is provided in table 3.1. The most important conclusions of the
surveys will be summarized arter the overview.
Tahlr 3.1 Research into value-based management practice (VBM)
Stud\
kl'Mli Consulting
Mills ctal. I<W6
Research question
Ho» main organi-
zations manage lor
\ alue. how the>
implement the
concept and \\ hat
the results arc
Determine use of
shareholder value
analysis in \alua-
tion of businesses
for acquisition or
divestment.
Research design
Postal questionnaire of
luropean directors and
executives of "lop or-
ganizations in 1-urope".
limelrame l*>*4.
Iclephone/mail sur\e\
(with additional intcr-
\icws)of250 listed UK
companies
Kinanee Director was
target, limeframc
Response
4hS replies
from an un-
disclosed
sample
40.4 ».(101
companies).
Major conclusions
"0°ool the re-
spondents are
aw i^re of VBM but
onl> 35 */• claim to
use it.
61.4 % of respon-
dents claimed to
useSVA(=VBM)
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Study
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1999
Boston Consulting
Group 1999
Research question
Gather opinions on
the ivsuc of man-
aging lor share-
holder value.
Investigate current
practices with re-
gard to use and
measurement ot
shareholder value.
Discover where
US businesses
were in the transi-
tion from V B M
theory to practice
Discover how
Benelux busi-
nesses thought
about "How we
should manage for
shareholder value".
Gain a comprehen-
sive understanding
of the application
ol' V B M in top
I'uropcan organi-
zations and (he
extent to which it
has changed over
the past five years.
To ascertain how
the best companies
achieved superior
performance in
terms of average
annual TSR.
Research design
Mai l survey of Chair-
men. CI-O& and Finance
Directors of (large)
listed U K and Irish
companies.
Results were tied to TSR
performance o f respon-
dents.
Timeframc 1 9 % .
M a i l survey among f i -
nancial executives o f
1.298 Canadian compa-
nies (o f which 1.063
were listed)
Timciramc spring 1997.
Mai l survcv of Chair-
men. ( f ( ) s a n d l inancc
Directors of I0U0 (large)
listed US companies
Results were lied to I S R
performance of respon-
dents
/VlTIV'lf-dlTlV i ' *W.
Mail survey of Chair-
men. Cl-Os and Finance
Directors of all listed
companies in the Bene-
lux countries.
Results were tied lo TSR
performance of respon-
dents.
Timeframe 1998.
Telephone interviews of
directors and executives
of leading Buropean
companies.
Timeframc 1998.
Study of 5.316 large
quoted companies from
around the world. TSR
performance was ana-
lyzed in relation to coun-
try, industry and internal
proxies for TSR
Timeframe 1993- 1998.
Response
132 replies
from an un-
disclosed
sample.
I3%(I68
companies)
No response
bias ob-
served.
Response not
disclosed.
91 replies
from an un-
disclosed
sample.
435 replies
from an un-
disclosed
sample.
Approx.
80 % of the
total market
capitalization
of the
world's stock
markets in-
cluded.
Major conclusions
9f> ",. ot *oinp,inie\
dclmal sli.in'
holder value as kc>
objective How-
ever mam compa-
nies tailed to trans-
late this into ac-
tions.
50 Sol" listed
companies use
value-bused per-
formance measures
( I V A o r C I R O I )
88 % of companies
defined share-
holder value crea-
tion as a kc> objec-
tive 1 or the rest
similar conclusions
as the earlier UK
.»unrcj.
76 % ol companies
defined share-
holder value crea-
tion as a key objec-
tive lor the rest
similar conclusions
as the earlier UK
survey
64 % of organiza-
tions claim to use
VBM. Adoption
levels differ across
countries and in-
dustries. 33 % of
respondents linked
executive remu-
neration to VBM.
Three levers for
value creation
identified: cash
flow margin, asset
productivity and
gross investments
Growth industries
were found to cre-
ate more value
than restructuring
ones.
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Study
1 nincis &
Minchington 2000
PA Consulting
2001
llaspcslach el al.
2001
Research question
I'xamine the nature
and prevalence of
value-based per-
formance measures
used at divisional
levels.
I'xplore the extent
to which there are
demonstrable
benefits from
adopting VBM.
Find out what dis-
tinguishes success-
ful and less suc-
cessful users of
VBM.
Research design
Postal questionnaire
among a random sample
of 2,331 members of
CIMAin lhcUK.
Timeframe not dis-
closed.
Survey of Chairmen.
Chief F.xecutives and
Finance Directors of
leading listed companies
across the world.
Timeframe 1997-2001.
Survey of 1.826 large
companies in North
America, l-uropc and
Asia. Self-perccivcd
success was validated
against actual TSR per-
formance.
Timeframe I W ) . 2001.
Response
258 replies
(111 %).
493 replies.
Population
not dis-
closed.
271 replies
(14.5%). of
which 117
had actually
adopted
VBM.
Major conclusions
Traditional per-
formance measures
are still dominant
in practice. Low
awareness of
value-based per-
formance meas-
ures.
91 % claim to be
in favor of manag-
ing for shareholder
value.
43 % of respon-
dents had actually
adopted VBM.
5 features identi-
fied that distin-
guished successful
VBM adopters.
ITKOI Cash Flow Return on Investments. FVA - Ivconomic Value Added. SVA ~ Shareholder Value
Added. TSR - Total Shareholder Return
These studies demonstrate that the importance of shareholder value creation is widely recog-
nized and that VBM appears to be actively applied in various countries across the world.
The research performed by PA Consulting is notable due to the fact that it combined re-
sponses from business managers with their companies' performance in the stock market
(measured in terms of TSR). This made it possible to draw conclusions with regard to the ap-
parent success of the implementation of value-based management by these companies. It ap-
peared that knowledge and recognition of the importance of shareholder value creation was
already widespread in the UK and Ireland in 1996, a conclusion that is remarkable when we
compare it to the findings of Francis and Minchington (2000) four years later. They found a
low awareness of value-based performance measures in the UK, which appears to be in con-
trast to the findings of PA Consultants. This may be caused by response bias in the sample
selected bv PA Consultants.
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In the PA study many companies admitted that they failed (in up to 28 •«> of the cases) to
translate their understanding of the importance of shareholder value creation into appropriate
management processes and actions. The research showed that companies that translated VHM
into processes and actions benefited most from the introduction of value-based management
and outperformed the market TSR by 5 % annually over the IW3 - IW6 period. Companies
that paid high attention to bonuses and had low basic salaries demonstrated the best perform-
ance in terms of shareholder value creation. These conclusions were also obtained from simi-
lar surveys in the US and in the Benelux countries, conducted in IW8 Although the trends
that were observed were largely the same, some interesting details surface when we compare
the results of the three Surveys conducted by PA Consultants (IW7, lW8*and IWH""). Most
prominently. UK managers appeared to be more VBM-minded in 1*)% than their US col-
leagues' two years later. This is contrary to the general perception that the US is the cradle of
VBM, and that US corporations were the early adopters of the concept. In view of the fuel
that all three surveys used the same questions a comparison of the scores is interesting, it is
provided in table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Three studies b\ PA Consultants compared
Tif US ArnWtu
Managing for shareholder value is ke\ objective 96 % 88 % 76 S
Principles have not been translated into requisite actions SO % 42 % 48 V.
TSR out-performance for companies that fully employ VBM (annual surplus
TSR compared to market average) + 5 % + 9 % < 7%
Effect of agreeing on VBM-based bonus system on annual TSR performance + 32 % + 14 % • 2 %
Effect of a VBM-based planning approach on annual TSR + 29 */• n.a. t 8 Vo
Based on the outcome of these surveys, PA Consultants concluded that companies are able to
improve shareholder value creation by concentrating on two quick-hit areas, namely compen-
sation and business planning. Companies that applied VBM concepts in these two areas were
more successful in creating shareholder value than their peers. It was also concluded that ad-
ditional benefits were to be obtained by those companies that applied VBM in full, meaning
that a set of VBM principles was agreed to by senior management (beliefs systems), proc-
esses were installed that ensured that the principles were communicated and understood
throughout the organization and that it was ensured that actions in the organization were fully
congruent with VBM principles. In a follow-up study published in 2001 the conclusions
drawn by PA Consulting remained more or less the same. The level of support had not
grown, but this could not be expected in view of the high adoption level that was found ini-
tially.
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That VBM needs to be applied throughout the organization, in all management processes,
was also recognized in the studies performed by KPMG. In fact they concluded that 'the
more broadly and deeply VBM is used, the greater the perceived benefits are to the organiza-
tion' (KPMCi Consulting 1996, p. 5). The most interesting feature of the KPMG study was
the fact that it was replicated 4 years later in order to be able to determine the trend in VBM
adoption in l-uropc. The number of companies actually applying VBM nearly doubled from
35 % in 1994 to 64 % in 1998. These figures need to be interpreted with caution in view of
the fact that the country and industry composition of the survey response was not the same in
both surveys, e.g. the first survey had a larger participation from the UK and the Netherlands
compared to the second survey. In the second survey KPMG Consulting (1999) found that
only 33 % of the respondents linked value-based performance to executive remuneration (an
increase from 20 % in the previous study). This is in contrast with the advice of PA Consult-
ing, identifying remuneration as one of the quick hit areas.
The work of the Boston Consulting Group, often referred to in the financial press, provides a
limited contribution to our understanding of value-based management. It lacks insight into
the intent of the management of the companies involved and is not based on the testing of
hypotheses that are derived from a model for value-based management. The studies report
TSR performance of companies over a certain period, but do not offer a fundamental expla-
nation of this performance.
71W- auu- j-»*" >inUu'~hn>uu< ,rv*rfniTnanrr measure»; was addressed in manv of the surveys listed
above. Contrary to VBM theory, traditional accounting measures still play an important role
in all companies thai were investigated. Buhr and Desjardins (199K) included Return on
Mqiüty (ROI-!) and Return on Net Assets (RONA) among their shareholder value metrics and
found that these are used by S6 % and 57 % of the listed companies in their sample. Only
45 % of these companies claimed to use economic profit (a residual income concept) and
33 % cash How return on investments (CKRO1). For the UK, similar results were found by
Francis and Minchington (2000). 31 % percent of their respondents used some kind of eco-
nomic profit measure (liVA, SVA or RI). Also KPMG (1999) found that many companies
subscribe to the VBM concept but a large group still refers to accounting-based performance
measures for executive remuneration and only one-third actually applies shareholder value
added or economic profit for this purpose. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that Francis
and Minchinglon (2000) found that 26 % of the members of the Chartered Institute of Man-
agement Accountants (CIMA) in the UK, who responded to their survey, were not aware of
I:VA.
The adoption of value-based performance measures is increasing but traditional accounting-
based measures appear to remain dominant. Francis and Minchington (2000) offer a number
of explanations for this (s)low adoption: lack of awareness, difficulty to translate to lower
levels of the organization, and cost and effort related to accounting adjustments.
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The research by Haspeslagh et al. (2001) is interesting because it focused on successful VBM
adopters and tried to identify the explanation for their success. Starting from the observation
that half the companies that adopted a VBM metric have met with mediocre success' (p. 66),
the authors were interested in the drivers of success in VBM implementations. They identi-
fied the five mam elements as: an explicit commitment to shareholder value, extensive train-
ing, incentive systems tied to VBM performance, willingness to make organizational
changes, and broad and inclusive changes introduced to company processes. Successful com-
panies were found to avoid accounting complexity, identify value drivers, integrale budgeting
with strategic planning and execute heavy investments in information technology. Successful
companies were selected on the basis of their own perception and on the basis of their TSR
performance. This contributes to the internal validity of the study. On a global scale, actual
application of VBM still remains limited to 4.1 % of the respondents, which is considerably
lower than the 64 % adoption found by KMlHi Consulting (1999).
All in all, these studies provide some insight into the application of VBM in organizations
across the world. Interpretation of the results of the studies is hampered by the fact that full
statistical analysis is not disclosed; internal validity is either lacking or only demonstrated
superficially (PA Consulting 1997. 1998, 2001 and Haspeslagh et al. 2001). The reliability of
the findings is therefore difficult to determine. Still, it can be concluded that a si/cablc group
of companies across the world actually employs value-based management with different de-
grees of success and with differences in the actual implementation. The surveys produced so
far provide some, but only limited, insight into the determinants of success and the dilfer-
ences in application. Case studies can add to our understanding of management practice and
are a second source for empirical data. To date, only a limited number of these studies are
available (Arnold & Davies 2000, p. 51, mention 3 studies).
As was described before, the actual application of value-based performance measures is not
as widespread as would be expected on the basis of the universal critique of accounting-based
performance measures by VBM theorists. Understanding whether this critique is indeed justi-
fied and whether value-based performance measures are more reliable predictors of future
stock returns is the subject of research that we will address next.
i.2.2
A cornerstone of VBM implementation is of course the measurement of value. The measure
to be used should not be based on accounting conventions according to most authors (e.g.
Rappaport 1986, Stewart 1991, Copeland et al. 1996). These authors do not provide proof of
the claimed superiority of value-based performance measures over traditional accounting-
based performance measures. This has been the subject of a number of empirical studies that
were published over the last 7 years. In table 3.3 an overview of these studies is provided.
Subsequently the most important conclusions are summarized.
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Table 3.3 Research into the association between value-based performance measures and stock returns
Study
O'Uvrnc 1996
Bucidorc el al.
1997
Diddle el al
1997
C'hen&IXidd
1997
Diddle el al
1999
Research question
Show thai EVA pro-
vides the operating
performance measure
that is consistent with
DCF and provides
valuation multiples
that are highly predic-
tive
Empirical analysis of
the ability of EVA to
predict abnormal re-
turns. In addilion. Re-
fined Economic Value
Added (REVA) is
introduced and the
same question is in-
vestigated.
To test whether EVA
is more highly associ-
ated with stock return
and linn values than
accrual earnings
Is the correlation be-
tween EVA and stock
returns as perfect as
claimed by 1-VA ad-
vocates, how does
EVA compare to ac-
counting profits and
docs EVA provide
more information than
Rl?
1 AsBiddlectal
| W .uid
2. Determine whether
residual income based
compensation plans
motivate managers to
take actions consistent
with increasing share-
holder value.
Research design
Stock market dala
for companies in the
1993 Stern Stewart
Performance 1000.
Outliers excluded.
Remaining sample
of 6,551 company
years for the period
1983- 1993.
Random sample
from the Stem
Stewart 1000 data-
base for the period
1982- 1992.
600 firms selected.
Relative informa-
tion content tests.
I'eriod
June 1983-May
1994. 219 US firms
with outliers ex-
cluded providing
6.174 firm-year
observations. EVA
data from Stem
Stewart database.
Companies selected
from the 1992 Stern
Stewart 1000 data-
base. I'eriod 1983 -
1992 566 US firms
selected as usable
sample, perform-
ance measures cal-
culated as 10-ycar
averages.
1 As Riddle et al
1997 and
2 Based on
Wallace 1997.
Refer to paragraph
3 4
Measurement
method
Regression of
market value
against perform-
ance measures
(EVA, earnings
and free cash
flows). Adjust-
ments to the re-
gression model for
positive EVA and
capital employed.
Regression analy-
sis of abnormal
returns on combi-
nations of EVA
and REVA meas-
ures.
Measurement of
abnormal or unex-
pected returns as a
function of a given
(accounting) per-
formance measure
(cash flow, earn-
ings. Rl or KVA).
Regression of
stock market re-
turns on each per-
formance metric.
Regression analy-
sis for various per-
formance meas-
ures with annual-
i/cd TSR as de-
pendent variable.
Incremental in-
formation content
analyzed.
1 AsBiddlcetal
1997 and
2 Based on
Wallace 1997
Major conclu-
sions
Changes in EVA
explain more of
the variation in
10-year stock
returns than
changes in earn-
ings. EVA pro-
vides a better
predictor once an
adjusted regres-
sion model is
used.
Both EVA and
REVA are posi-
tively related to
abnormal returns.
REVA statisti-
cally outperforms
EVA as predictor
of shareholder
value creation.
In the explana-
tion ol stock re-
turns, earnings
outperform Rl.
Rl outperforms
EVA and EVA
outperforms cash
flow from opera-
tions.
EVA variables
are related to
stock returns but
far from perfect.
EVA adds infor-
mation value
beyond account-
ing measures. Rl
brings the same
benefits as EVA
at lower costs
1. As Riddle el
al 199-and
2 Managers
respond to
Rl-based
incentives
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Mark«
rhomas 1998
Chen&Dodd
2001
Research question
Kmpincally investi-
gate the cross-
sectional links be-
tween Rl measures of
performance and mar-
ket value.
Determine relative and
incremental informa-
tion content of Rl and
KVA over operating
income.
Research design
1-inane ul data tor
UK firms for the
period 1990- 1994
Sample cleaned for
extreme observa-
tions and financial
institutions. 3.576
firm year observa-
tions available.
Companies selected
from the 1992 Slcrn
Stewart 1000 data-
base Period 1981-
1992Outliers were
eliminated. ITte
final data set con-
sisted of 6,683 firm
years.
Measurement
method
Simple linear re-
gression of market
value against earn-
ings and Rl With
corrections for
R&D expenditures
and firm size
(book value).
Simple linear re-
gression of annual
slock rclums
againsl operating
income. Rl and
I V A Hoth pooled
cross-sectional and
intcrtemporul (all
years) sample and
individual year
cross-sectional
sample.
Major conclu-
sions
Rl h.iN.i vli.Mi.cei
.INM'V l.lllKIl \ \ l l l \
market value, in
conjunclion vv ith
R&l ) expendi-
tures and opening
and closing hook
value than earn-
ings in con|unc-
lion with R&l )
expenditures and
closing hook
value
Data do nol sup-
port the assertion
Ihat I-VA is the
best measure for
valuation pur-
poses ()l hus the
highest informa-
tion conlenl lol-
lovvcd by Rl und
than I-VA. Rl
measures contain
significant in-
cremental infor-
mation conlenl
compared lo ()l
l)CF = Discounted Cash How. I-VA = Keonomie Value Added. Rl VA Refined I conomic Value Added.
Rl = Residual Income. Ol = Operating Income, TSR = Total Shareholder Return.
The first study (O'Byrne 1996) on the relation between KVA and market value found strong
support for the new performance measure. This support in favor of KVA was only available
when two additional variables were added to the original regression models. Without these
two variables the explanatory power of earnings (Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOI'AT))
and EVA were about the same. One variable that was added differentiated between compa-
nies with positive and negative EVA on the grounds that 'investors typically capitalize posi-
tive EVA at more than its perpetuity value' and 'the expectation of a turnaround implies that
negative EVA should be valued at less than its perpetuity value' (O'Byrne 1996, p. 121). To
adjust for differences in size, total assets was added as another variable in the regression
model. The last adjustment is regularly applied and theoretically supported (sec e.g. Cools &
Van Praag 2000"). However, neither a theoretical model nor other empirical results support
the arguments for the first adjustment. Subsequent work by Biddle et al. (1997 and 1999)
clearly raised doubts with regard to the purported superiority of EVA over traditional ac-
counting based performance measures. Perhaps the final conclusion in this area is provided
by Chen and Dodd (2001), who used the most important conclusions of previous work to di-
rect their research questions. They came to the conclusion that EVA has value relevance but
that it ranks only third after operating income and residual income in this respect. In addition
they found that residual income had significant incremental value relevance (Biddle et al.
1995) over operating income, which was only marginally the case for EVA.
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All in all, this leads Chen and Dodd (2001) to the suggestion that the benefits of introducing
EVA may not be large enough to justify the extra cost involved in comparison to simple re-
sidual income without adjustments to financial statements. The proposed refinements to the
EVA model and the introduction of Refined Economic Value Added (REVA), as proposed by
Bacidore et al. (1997), have to be judged against the above considerations. They propose to
base the measurement of the capital base on market values instead of (adjusted) book values,
which is in line with modern finance theory. Their analysis shows that REVA outperforms
EVA as a predictor of shareholder value creation. However, the analysis only compared these
two performance measures and did not include either residual income or traditional account-
ing earnings.
Outside the US only limited research into the relation between value-based performance
measures and market value has been published. A notable exception is the study of Stark and
Thomas (1998), who found additional information content in residual income performance
measures in comparison to earnings, for companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.
Their results are in line with the conclusions of Chen and Dodd (2001). However, EVA was
not addressed in this study and therefore the question whether the increased complexity of
EVA performance measures, compared to straightforward residual income measures, offers
additional information content was not dealt with.
To summarize, the empirical evidence available today provides an answer to the following
question raised by ()' Hanlon and Peasnell (1998, p. 441): "It is necessarily true that the pre-
sent value of expected future EVA's, together with current book value, is related to current
market value; but it is an open question whether current EVA is more closely correlated with
share price than current reported earnings numbers'. So far the answer must be that this is not
the case. ()ne may therefore question whether EVA adds any value as a tool of management.
As many have observed (Zimmerman 1997, O'Hanlon & Peasnell 1998 and Biddle et al.
1999), the best performance measure is one that provides managers with an incentive to take
actions that increase the value of the firm. That question has not been addressed in the studies
discussed so far.
3.3 The relation between management control system design and value creation
Numerous empirical studies into the design of management control systems have been pub-
lished to date. Early studies (e.g. Merchant 1985*. Simons 1987 )^ sought to explain economic
success by certain management control characteristics in combination with the strategy of the
business concerned. They are part of the extensive body of contingency-based studies into
management control system design (an overview is provided in Chenhall 2003). From our
research focus, studies that attempt to explain shareholder value creation by management
control system characteristics are the most relevant. Returning to Anthony's statement that
'the central function of a management control system is motivation" (1965, p. 113), the an-
swer to the question whether EVA as a performance measure induces managers to take ac-
tions that increase the value of the firm can be understood as studying the importance of EVA
as a tool for management control. Tins has been investigated by Wallace (1997, 1998) and
llogan and lewis (199«)). and promoted in the VBM literature (Stewart 1991, Goldberg 1999.
Rappaport 1999). The results ol the empirical work are summarized in the following table.
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TaMc 3.4 Research into the relation between shareholder value creation and (aspects of) management control
Stud>
Wallace 1 « *
Wallace 1998
Hogan & Lewis
1999
Research ques-
tion
Determine
whether compen-
sation plans
based on residual
income change
managers' behav -
ior
Compare deci-
sions made and
actions taken in
relation to the
adoption of
KVA-type per-
formance meas-
ures.
[Examine whether
compensation
plans based on
economic profits
do in fact pro-
duce better in-
vestment deci-
sions.
Research design
Sample of 40 I S
firms that adopted
compensation con-
tracts w ith residual
income-based per-
formance measures,
compared to a
matched-pairs con-
trol sample
Information ob-
tained from public
databases.
Timeframe 1984-
1994
Same sample as
Wallace 1997 but
now a questionnaire
»as used to collect
additional informa-
tion
14 (.15%) com-
pleted question-
naires received.
Sample of 51 US
firms that adopted
economic profit
plans between 1986
and 1994.
A matched sample
of non-adopting
comparison firms
was developed on
the basis of indus-
try, size and operat-
ing performance.
Information ob-
tained from public
databases.
Measurement
method
Interrupted lime-
series design
Changes in man-
agement actions
between pre- and
post-adoption
periods imcsti-
gated using Ol S
rcgrevsions w ith
two control vari-
ables. Investing,
financing and
operating deci-
sions were stud-
ied
Changes in deci-
sions as a result of
the adoption of an
I V A framework
were investigated
on the busis of the
perception ol the
responding man-
agers. The results
were compared
with the earlier
findings of Wal-
lace 1997.
Interrupted time
series design.
Long-run stock
return and operat-
ing performance
compared o\ er 4
year-periods prior
to and following
adoption of I P
plans Long run
stock returns in-
vestigated using
the procedure of
l.oughran and
Ritter (1995).
Major conclusions
Kcl.itivc to the con-
trol group, linns that
adopted Rl- per-
formance measures
decreased invest-
ments, increased
share repurchases
and used avscts more
intensive!) Weak
ev idence was found
for a positive capital
market response to
the adoption ol Rl-
based compensation
plans
Consistent with Wal-
lace (1997). respon-
dents appear to be
concerned not onh
with bottom-line
earnings this is es-
pecially true tor
firms that have more
lull) embraced 1 VA
and included it in
management com-
pensation.
Significant im-
provements in oper-
ating performance,
subsequent to adop-
tion are found but
control sample of
non-adopting
matched linns shows
similar improve-
ments. 1 riey con-
clude that I I ' plans
do not provide a new
and different way to
motivate managers
I:P = Economic Profit. LVA = Economic Value Added. Rl - Residual Income.
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To date, the research investigating the relation between management control systems and
shareholder value creation is limited and narrowly focused. The studies mentioned all took
incentive systems that applied VBM performance measures as a distinguishing feature and
compared the results of firms that adopted these incentive systems with a matched group of
non-adopters. The focus on incentive systems can be explained, on the one hand, by the
strong advocacy of value-based incentives in the VBM literature, and on the other hand by
the research design. Both Wallace (1997) and Hogan and Lewis (1999) use publicly available
information and therefore have limited access to characteristics of management control sys-
tems. Incentive plans could be studied due to the disclosure requirement on these plans under
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. The only study that attempted to obtain richer
data from an additional questionnaire was Wallace (1998). Interpretation ofthat study is
hampered by the limited number of responses that were received (14 questionnaires were re-
ceived back from the 40 firms that were investigated in Wallace 1997).
The results of these studies show some startling contrasts that warrant further investigation.
All conclude that the adoption of value-based performance measures leads to managerial de-
cisions that can be expected to improve shareholder value. Investments are decreased, shares
arc repurchased, assets are used more intensively (Wallace 1997) and operating performance
improves (Hogan & Lewis 1999). Further scrutiny of the results raises doubts, however. The
theoretical argument to support the contention that lower investments are beneficial for
shareholders is weak. Where investment opportunities exist that have a higher return than the
cost of capital, increased investments are beneficial for shareholders, which is in contrast
with the behavior found by Wallace (1997, 1998). Furthermore, the performance improve-
ment that was found by Hogan and Lewis (1999) was similar for firms adopting value-based
performance measures and for the matched sample of non-adopters, raising doubt as to the
cuusality. The contrast between the studies is remarkable in this area and leads the authors to
divergent conclusions. Hogan & Lewis (1999) conclude from their work that 'economic
profit plans are no better than traditional plans that provide a blend of earnings-based bonuses
and stock-based compensation in terms of their ability to create shareholder wealth". Wallace
(1998) concludes that 'LVA performance measures appear to help align the interest of man-
ugement with those of the firm's shareholders'.
34
Management Control Systems and Shareholder Value Creation
An explanation for the conflicting results may be that the scope of the research is too limited
to come to a clear conclusion with regard to the effect of implementing VBM. As was stated
in chapter 2, introducing value-based management in\olves more than the simple introduc-
tion of value-based incentive systems, llaspeslach ct al. (2001) find that value-based incen-
tives are only one of the five main elements that distinguish companies that successfully im-
plemented a VBM culture. By concentrating on incentives only, the above studies are unable
to determine whether companies that were selected actually implemented a VBM culture or
only a new incentive system, which may explain the conflicting conclusions. It is only possi-
ble to solve this issue when other research methods are used. The creation of a VBM culture
and the introduction of VBM in all elements of management control are not captured in pub-
licly available information. Hither case studies or surveys need to be used to enhance the in-
formation that is publicly available. We therefore argue that further research into the relation
between management control and shareholder value creation needs to apply a mixed research
design that uses both publicly available information, with regard to operating and stock mar-
ket performance, and insight into the design characteristics of management control as per-
ceived and intended by the companies' management. In addition, this research needs to take
into account that a number of contingency factors have been identified to mlluencc the design
of management control systems. Business strategy is an important factor in this respect and
we will address this field of research next.
3.4 Alignment of management control systems, strategy and value creation
Contrary to the previous paragraphs, the discussion of the empirical research into the rela-
tionship between management control systems and business strategy will be limited to the
discussion of the most important findings of a selected group of studies. Only the studies that
produced results that have direct relevance to the research questions in chapter 7 are pre-
sented here.
Excellent review articles (Dent 1990, Chapman 1997, Langfield-Smith 1997, Chenhall 2003)
have been published covering the complete field of research into (specific aspects of) man-
agement control systems and their relationship with strategy. That this relationship warrants
further research is a conclusion that is confirmed in this literature. Langfield-Smith (1997, p.
207) writes 'that our knowledge of the relationship between management control systems and
strategy is limited'. In line with the recommendations of Langfield-Smith, strategy can be
approached as a multi faceted concept that comprises strategic positioning, strategic typology
and strategic mission (see also section 2.4 of this dissertation).
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The basic notion of contingency theory is that management control systems should be modi-
fied in accordance with the business strategy of the firm. This notion has been tested empiri-
cally in a number of studies. Simons (1987*') investigated differences in accounting control
systems between prospector and defender firms and found evidence of differentiation be-
tween the two. Notably, he found that defenders appear to use their control systems less in-
tensively than prospectors. That Simons finds differences is a confirmation of the expected
contingency relationship. The directions of the differences are surprising in view of the fact
that they are in contrast with the findings of Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter (1980). Both
Dent (1990, p. 13) and Langfield-Smith (1997, p. 218) suggest that the scope of Simons'
study - it only investigated differences in accounting control systems - may be too limited to
properly describe the management control systems in all their facets and therefore capture the
relevant differences. Dent's (1990, p. 13) conclusion in this respect is still valid today:
'Broader strategic and operational planning activities and non-financial performance meas-
urement arc not dealt with in any depth. Little, beyond hypothesis, is known of how these
systems are actually used and what significance they are afforded in each type' (of strategy).
Still some correlation between areas of management control and strategy has been estab-
lished.
Both Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter (1980) came to the conclusion that defender/cost
leadership strategies require strong reliance on cost controls. Karly work by Khandwalla
(1972) found that the type of competition in an industry was relevant to control and that more
intense competition resulted in greater reliance on formal control systems. Strategy as such
was not the object of this study and could therefore not be used to explain the observed dif-
ferences. Looking at two different strategic types, entrepreneurial and conservative firms, the
first resembling prospectors and the second defenders. Miller and Friessen (1982) found that
the strategic type intluenced how management controls were used. In entrepreneurial firms
they were used to curb innovative excess, whereas in conservative firms they were used to
indicate opportunities and areas where innovation was required. In an exploratory study
Merchant (1985 ) found differences in the level of discretionary decision-making between
firms that followed a rapid growth strategy and firms that followed other strategies. This can
be interpreted as an indication that empowerment may be related to strategy.
The direct question whether a management control system that is properly aligned to strategy
produces better economic results has not been tested to date, no doubt because an overall
model of management control systems is not available. Various studies have approached this
question for a limited area of management controls, most notably incentive systems. Results
in this area are fairly consistent. Finns following defender/harvest type strategies were found
to benefit from reward systems that are based on objective performance criteria (Govindara-
jan & Gupta 1985, Simons I987*\ Govindarajan 1988). Firms following prospector/build
strategies were found to rely on subjective, behavior-oriented, long-run performance evalua-
tion criteria. This is in line with the higher uncertainty that can be expected from these strate-
gies (Govindarajan & Gupta 1985, Govindarajan 1988, Govindarajan & Fisher 1990). Study-
ing accounting information systems, Abemethy and Guthrie (1994) found that broad scope
information systems were more effective in prospector firms than in defender firms. In their
study of the relation between control systems, resource sharing and strategy. Govindarajan
and Fisher (1990) found that output control and high resource sharing were more effective for
low-cost strategies and behavior control and high resource sharing for differentiation strate-
gies. They also found that low cost strategies were associated with a high level of resource
sharing whereas differentiation strategies »ere associated with a wider range of levels of re-
source sharing (Govindarajan & Fisher 1990, p. 279).
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An overview of the empirical studies discussed above is provided in table 3.5.
T(Mc 3.5 Research into the relation between management control systems and straie«\
Stud)
Merchant
1985"
(iovindarajan &
(iupta 1485
Research question
lxplorc how discre-
tionary program
decisions are con-
trolled in decentral-
ized firms.
Fxaminc linkages
between strategy.
incentive bonus
systems and eflec-
tiveness at SBU
level within 8 di-
versified firms.
Research design
Questionnaire
survc) among
profit center man-
agers of one US
firm. 5"* responses
(95 H ) »ere ana-
lyzed.
Questionnaire
survey among
SHI I general
managers with 58
usable responses
(85 %) . Out of
this group 46
SBU's with bonus
entitlement of
more than 20 %
of basic salary
were investigated.
Measurement method
.SVF-II/I'JJV \\ .is measured
using firm's own Icr-
minologs (harvest,
maintain, selective
growth, rapid growth).
Five different <«n/rn/.i
over discretionary pro-
gram decisions were
measured (income tar-
gets, budget expense
targets, hcadcount con-
trols, procedural con-
trols and meetings)
/uimiimii /vr/lrvmuncc
measured from manug-
crs' perception.
.V/r<i/t'jjv measured in
terms of mission
(build, hold, harvest
and divest) using one
single question.
(Wi/ro/.v measured in
terms of importance of
performance criteria for
bonus determination
and reliance on formal
versus subjective crite-
ria.
Economic /ner/formanm
measured by compari-
son of actual perform-
ance and a priori ex-
pectations of managers
(effectiveness index).
Major conclu-
sions
Decisions are
influenced h\
controls (fleets
of controls \ar>
with characteris-
tics of profit cen-
ter situation like
strategy ami re-
cent perform-
ance.
Controls were
perccixed to have
a stronger effect
on decision-
muking in profit
center» (hat were
planning to grow
more rapidly
Reliance on long-
run criteria und
subjective ap-
proaches to bo-
nus determination
arc beneficial for
build strategics
and detrimental
in case of harvest
strategics.
The relationship
between reliance
on short-run cri-
teria and elfec-
livcness is virtu-
ally independent
of strategy
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Study
Simons 1987*'
Ciovindurojun
1488
Research question
Investigation of the
relationship be-
tween business
strategy and ac-
counting based per-
formance control
systems.
Mulching adminis-
trative mechanisms
with strategy is
likcl) to be associ-
ated with superior
performance.
Research design
Questionnaire
developed from
interviews and
previous work
was distributed
among senior
managers of 261
Canadian manu-
facturing firms.
Data from 76
Prospector and
Defender firms
were used for the
analysis.
Data were col-
lected from SBl 1
general managers
of 24 US firms A
questionnaire was
used for data col-
lection 121(84
%) usable replies
were analyzed
and validated
against responses
of superior man-
agers (N=75).
Measurement method
S/ru/t'K»- type (prospec-
tor and defender only)
measured on the basis
of expert ratings cross-
validated against man-
agers' self-typing.
C'on/r«/ .sy.tfi'm attrib-
utes were measured
through 33 questions
that were grouped with
factor analysis into 10
groups (tights budget
goals, external scan-
ning, reporting fre-
quencies and others).
Industry dynamism
was used as control
variable.
Etvwwmir /Jt"r/»rmuncf
measured as mean ROI
over three years.
S/ruftxv was measured
in terms of Porter's
definitions of position
(cost leader or differ-
entiator).
Three orfm/n/j/ru/hv
miv/icinwmA were iden-
tified: budget evalua-
tion style, decentralisa-
tion and locus of con-
trol.
£c»n<>m/c" /vr/ormiinft"
was measured using the
effectiveness index
described by
Ciovindarajan & (iupla
1985
Major conclu-
sions
Firms following
different strate-
gies employ ac-
counting control
systems in differ-
ent ways.
High performing
prospectors at-
tach great impor-
tance to forecast
data, tight budget
goals and moni-
toring of outputs.
Defenders, par-
ticularly large
ones, use their
control system
less intensively.
Negative rela-
tions were found
between the per-
formance of these
defenders and
tight budget goals
and output moni-
toring. Defenders
emphasized bo-
nus remuneration
based on budget
targets.
High managerial
internal locus of
control and low
emphasis on
meeting a budget
arc associated
with high per-
formance for
differentiators.
The expected
interaction be-
tween SBU strat-
egy, decentraliza-
tion and effec-
tiveness could
not be confirmed.
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Slud>
CioN indarajan &
Fisher 1990
Abemethy &
Guthrie 1994
ln\ estimation of the
relationships among
control s\ stems.
resource sharing.
and competitive
strategics and their
interactive cITecls
on SBU perform-
ance.
To examine the
differences in de-
sign of management
information sys-
tems in firms adopt-
ing different strate-
gic priorities.
Research design
Data collected
from SBU general
mangers of 24 US
firms. 121 (84%)
usable responses
were obtained.
A sample of 49
business unit gen-
eral managers
from two compa-
nies based in Aus-
tralia was used.
Questionnaires
were used for data
collection.
Measurement method
.sVj/ixv was measured
in terms of Porter's
definitions of position
(cost leader or differ-
entiator)
(>uf/>ur I«K / rk'AaWty
lonnW.t were sepa-
rated. In addition re-
source sharing between
SBU's was measured.
£t iwiomii- /H'r^orimjniv
was measured using the
effectiveness index as
described for
Govindarajan & Gupta
1985.
Sfr«/fi'jjy type (prospec-
tor and defender only)
measured on the basis
of expert ratings cross-
validated against man-
agers' self-typing.
/n/»rmu/i«>i was stud-
ied in terms of focus
(in- or external), quan-
tification and lime ho-
rizon. On this basis
narrow (internal, his-
torical, financial) scope
and broad (external.
future oriented and
non-financial) scope
information systems
were distinguished.
Economic /7<?r/«rmuncv
was measured using the
effectiveness index
((iovindarajan & Gupta
1985).
Major conclu-
sions
Output control
combined \\ ith
high resource
sharing is associ-
ated with in-
creased effec-
tiveness for low-
cost SHI Is
For differentia-
tion SHI <s with
high (low) re-
source sharing.
behavior (output)
control is associ-
ated with in-
creased cticc-
livencss. The
highest clicctivc-
ncss lor differen-
tiation SHI N re-
sults when be-
havior controls
arc combined
with high re-
source sharing
lilYcclivcncss of
business units is
dependent on the
match between
the design of in-
formation sys-
tems and the stra-
tegic posture.
Broad-scope in-
formation sys-
tems arc more
effective for
prospectors.
ROI = Return on Investment, SBU = Strategic Business Unit
39
Chapter 3
For our research the key question remains whether management control systems that are
properly aligned to strategy explain economic success. From our research perspective success
will be defined in terms of shareholder value creation. Contrary to earlier studies an attempt
will be made to use an overall model of management control to investigate the answer to this
question.
3.5 Summary and conclusions
A considerable body of literature on the application of value-based management has been
produced that provides insight into practices around the world and shows that the recognition
of shareholder value creation as an important objective is widespread and that companies
have actively implemented VBM in recent history. Most studies in this area have been pro-
duced by consultants and lack a strong conceptual foundation and empirical validation. They
only provide limited understanding of the basic advantages obtained from applying VBM.
The association between stock returns and value-based performance measures has been in-
vestigated in more detail resulting in the insight that value-based performance measures in-
deed provide additional value relevance but do not outperform traditional accounting based
performance measures in this respect. This raises the question whether application of these
value-based performance measures can contribute to improved creation of value for share-
holders, which will be investigated in chapter 5.
The impact of certain management controls on the creation of value for shareholders has re-
ceived only limited attention in empirical work to dale. Furthermore, this attention has been
focused on a specific aspect of management control, namely incentive systems. There is evi-
dence that incentive systems using value-based performance measures influence managerial
behavior, though it remains unclear whether this results in improved creation of value for the
shareholder. In chapter 6 the relation between management control and shareholder value
creation will be investigated further.
1'iiipirical research into the aspects of management control systems and their relationship
with strategy has shown that control system tightness, reliance on cost controls, empower-
ment and the use of objective or subjective performance evaluation criteria are contingent on
the strategy pursued by a business. In these studies different dimensions of strategy have been
used as point of departure: positioning, typology and mission. The understanding of the
causal relationship between strategy and management control remains limited and conclusive
evidence of a beneficial impact on economic performance of certain management controls for
specific strategies is missing. In chapter 7 we will attempt to obtain a better understanding of
this relationship when we investigate whether management control systems that are aligned to
strategy explain the creation of value for shareholders.
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4.
Research method and sample
4.1 Introduction
The hypotheses that we want to test all relate to the relationship between shareholder value
creation and the design of management control systems.
In the previous chapter it already became clear that this research would benefit from an ap-
proach that uses publicly available information with respect to the financial performance of
organizations, and information from those organizations themselves with respect to the de-
sign and use of their management control system. This latter information should also provide
insight into how VBM was applied by these organizations.
To gather the required information it was decided to use a questionnaire that would be mailed
to the CFOs of all companies listed on the Amsterdam Kxchanges at the end of the year 2000.
The questionnaire was not anonymous and therefore the results of the companies that partici-
pated could be related to the performance of their shares on the Amsterdam market and to
publicly available information about these companies.
This chapter describes the target audience, the design of the research instrument, the testing
of the research instrument, the execution of the survey, the response received and the tests
that have been performed to determine whether response bias was present. It was clear from
the outset that target respondents were not an easy audience that could be expected to provide
a high response rate. Typically the CFOs of listed companies have very limited time for re-
sponding to questionnaires.
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4.2 The target audience
It was decided to limit the scope of the investigation to Dutch companies listed on the Am-
sterdam Exchanges. Using a wider geographical sample would no doubt be interesting but it
would also make interpretation of the final outcome of the investigation much more difficult.
It has been established that management control systems differ between countries and cul-
tures (Daniel & Reitsperger 1992. Chow et al. 1999, Wijerwardena & De Zoysa 1999), and
these differences would create difficulty in judging any outcome of a survey that was spread
over more than one country.
A second reason for limiting the research to the Netherlands is simply practical: the compa-
nies concerned are more easily contacted, the cost of contacting them is limited, and they can
be expected to know the Universiteit Maastricht and will therefore be more likely to respond
than foreign companies. Based on these considerations, it was decided to conduct the re-
search among the companies that were listed in Amsterdam as at the end of 2000.
A list was obtained from the Amsterdam Exchanges that contained all the companies listed as
at December 20, 2000. In view of the fact that no new listings or de-listings occurred between
the moment that the list was compiled and the end of the year, this group was taken as the
starting point.
In accordance with the decision to research the management control systems of Dutch com-
panies, six listed companies were removed from the list because they were essentially for-
eign. These were companies that have a large majority of their activities outside the Nether-
lands and have an operational head office that is also located abroad. In addition, 11 financial
institutions were removed from the list in view of the limited comparability of these organiza-
tions to the remainder of the listed companies. Finally, two companies were removed from
the list due to the fact that they went into receivership early in 2001, which made it impossi-
ble to obtain responses from these companies. After these eliminations a group of 169 com-
panies remained that was invited to co-operate in the research. In Appendix I, 'Target audi-
ence and response', an overview is provided of the companies listed as at the end of 2000, the
names of the companies that were eliminated with the reason for their elimination and the
final audience for the survey. The build-up of the target audience is summarized in table 4.1
Tabk 4.1 l.irget Audience
Total numher of companies listed per the end of 2000 188
Excluded foreign companies - 6
Kxcludcd financial institutions • 11
Bankruptcies carl> 2001 -2
Tarnet audience 169
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To ensure that the replies to the questionnaire referred to the management control system of
the whole organization and not to individual businesses or subsidiaries of the listed compa-
nies, it was decided to send the instrument to the CFO/Fmance Director (henceforth referred
to as CFO) of the companies. In line with Dillman's (1978. 2000) recommendations, the cov-
ering letter should preferably be addressed to the CFO personally. This made it necessary to
obtain a file with the names of the CFOs. Such a file was not available and needed to be as-
sembled as part of the research. Based on the 'Jaarboek van Ncderlandse Ondcmcmingcn
2000' (Tijd Beursmedia 2000). a provisional and incomplete list was prepared. In a number
of cases missing names could be added from internet-searches. All companies were contacted
in January/February 2001. either to verify the name and address details of the CIO, or to ob-
tain his or her name in case this was not yet available. Ultimately, it »as possible to identify
the CFO for 168 out of the 169 companies that were to be mailed. Only for l-!mha Tcchnick
NV was it not possible to obtain information, and it had to be decided to address all corre-
spondence to 'the Finance Director'.
4.3 The research instruments
<. i / A/a/iO£em<v»/ ow/ro/ .vvsfem r/iarar/ori.vf/c.v
An instrument that captures the overall composition of the management control system of an
organization is not readily available.
A two-step approach was used to develop the instrument to capture the management control
system design. Based on a review of the relevant literature and empirical work, a list of 15
elements was developed, which were expected to provide a total description of the manage-
ment control system of an organization. The list was grouped along the lines of the four lev-
ers of control developed by Simons (1994, 1995", 1995*), to be able to relate the results of
subsequent fieldwork to these levers. The list of topics in itself was generic and was expected
to include all relevant aspects of management control.
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An expert panel was subsequently used to validate and order the list. The expert panel con-
sisted of 13 professors teaching management accounting at Dutch universities, who were
asked to express their opinion on the 15 elements of management control system design, in a
questionnaire that contained a provisional ordering of these elements along the levers of con-
trol. They were asked to select 9 characteristics that they found the most important to de-
scribe management control systems. Definitions of all 15 elements were provided to avoid
interpretation differences. The instrument was sent by e-mail to all participants on June 27,
2000. K-mail was selected in view of the speed and ease of access to the recipients. The ini-
tial response was 4 returned reply forms and one reply indicating disagreement with the pro-
posed ranking. The last respondent was interviewed on July 13 to better understand his opin-
ion. On July 17 a fax-reminder was sent to 8 participants. Subsequently 2 additional replies
were received. In view of the summer holiday, the next reminder was only sent on August 29.
In the interim period, the chance of contacting the respondents was considered to be too low.
The complete questionnaire with an appropriate final request was sent to the 6 participants
that had not yet replied by August. One additional reply was received after that. On Septem-
ber 15 the missing respondents were contacted by phone. Two could be reached. One ex-
plained that he felt unable to respond because he did not agree with the design of the ques-
tionnaire. He explained his views in a 30-minute telephone interview. The other participant
requested a new copy of the instrument and replied by September 27. An additional reply was
received on October 10.
All in all, this resulted in 9 replies and 2 additional interviews. One respondent returned the
reply form with a selection of the elements he found important without ranking them as he
i6eh'RA/taY'J/7jwMswfc>l'\l/\/ty> .»vb;l'\.->.,iicc«wA cefwon/ien', orovi/leH.^. rankjjjc bijte^oresse/i se-
rious reservations with regard to its validity. This was not a major concern because the rank-
ing in itself was of secondary importance. The prime reason to consult the expert panel was
to select the most relevant areas to be covered in the research instrument and to obtain input
on any areas that might be missing in the provisional list. Missing elements were not identi-
fied, and a consensus among the members of the expert panel emerged on 10 elements. These
«re presented in table 4.2, including an allocation to the levers of control. The table lists the
number of respondents that selected a characteristic as important and their percentage out of
the total group of 9 respondents. The allocation to the levers of control was not used in the
subsequent development of the research instrument. Separate research questions were devel-
oped for all 10 characteristics.
Table 4.2 Summary of export panel questionnaire
Beliefs systems
Boundary systems
Diagnostic control
S> stems
Diagnostic control or
belief s\slem "
Company culture
Management sly le
Mission statement or credo
Codes of conduct
Internal controls
Organizational structure
Balanced scorecard and non-financial
performance measures
Budgeting s\ stem
lost and variance analysis
Incentive system
9
8
5
8
7
5
6
6
6
6
100%
89 %
55%
89%
78%
55%
67%
67%
67%
67%
h l'he replies with regard to incentives were mived. three times they »ere mentioned as diagnostic controls
and also three times as beliefs SN stems
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In the table only three out of the four levers of control are mentioned because interactive con-
trol systems were excluded from the questionnaire (with an explanation in (he accompanying
letter). The reason for this exclusion was that interactive controls can be any type of control;
it is the interactive use of these controls by management that distinguishes them, not the type
of control itself.
For the above 10 management control system characteristics, research questions were devel-
oped. Based on the input from the expert panel one element, balanced scorecards and non-
financial performance measures was split into two elements: importance attached to financial
performance measures and importance attached to non-financial performance measures. In
addition to general questions asking the C'KOs to indicate the importance they attached to
these characteristics of management control systems, support questions were developed to
obtain further insight into how management control actually worked.
The CFOs were asked to rank the importance of all 11 characteristics on a 7 - point Likcrt-
like scale that was anchored at three points (not important - average importance - very impor-
tant).
4. J . /?o/c «/~arr»wnr/>?£ m/brmarjon ant/ /eve/ o/"</e/cj?ufi>>«
Additional questions were included to measure the role of accounting information and the
level of delegation to be able to obtain a richer understanding of the way that management
control was performed by the companies in the sample. For these two elements existing re-
search instruments were used. The role of accounting information was measured in accor-
dance with the instrument developed by Abcmelhy and Urownell (1997) and the level of
delegation in accordance with Chow et al. (1999). These measures were not used for the re-
search that is discussed in this dissertation and remain available for future work.
4. J.
To obtain insight into the application of value-based management, a second part of the ques-
tionnaire was developed. As already described in paragraph 3.2, various surveys are available
in this area. It was decided to replicate the research of Buhr and Dcsjardins (1998) as far as
possible. The reasons for this choice were: 1) it is one of the few independent surveys ad-
dressing VBM practice, 2) the full research instrument has been published, 3) responses have
been published in detail, and 4) the responses represented a broad cross-section of companies
in a certain country (although both listed and unlisted companies were included, an aspect
that differs from our research design). Using these questions would allow us to validate the
results obtained for the Netherlands.
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4. J.
The three strategy dimensions that we needed to investigate have been previously researched
and established research instruments are available. The questions have been based on Snow
and Hrebeniak (1980) for strategic type, Govindarajan and Gupta (1985) for strategic mission
and Govindarajan (1988) for strategic positioning. In addition, the degree of diversity in the
portfolio of an organization was asked for, using an instrument developed by Christie et al.
(2003). The reason for this additional question was the fact that the questionnaire would be
addressed to the CFOs of the companies. Therefore, the replies to the strategy questions
would not necessarily reflect the individual business strategies of business units in multi-
divisional firms. The instruments to be used to research strategy have been used before at the
strategic business unit level. To be able to analyze whether the replies received deviate from
previous studies as a result of this difference in vantage point (group level or strategic busi-
ness unit level), portfolio diversity was measured.
4. i. 5 77w overa// (/«ev/w
The questionnaire comprising the various research instruments that was ultimately used is
summarized in Appendix 2. Cross-references, relating those questions that were replications
back to the original research, have also been included in that appendix. An overview of the
research questions and the constructs they measure, including references to the origin of rep-
licated questions, is provided in table 4.3. The order of the individual questions in the ques-
tionnaire was determined on the basis of the recommendations of Dillman (1978, 2000).
Table 4 J Overview of the research questions
Subjccl
( K'IK'I.II nitrmluctinn
Application ol \aluc-bascd management
Background information on value-based manage-
ment
Management control system characteristics
Background on management style
Role of accounting information
Level of dcccnlruli/iition
Additional information on management control sys-
tem
Business strategy
Question number
1
5" , 33" , 34,
IX" , 19", 35, 4 0 " . 41. 4 2 " . 4 3 " . 4 4 " . 45 " . 4 6 " .
4 7 " , 4 8 "
2.6, 12. 15. 16, 17.25,26.29.36
27.28
4"
3 7 ' "
3 .7 .8 .9 . 10. I I . 13. 14.20.21.22.23.24,30.31.
32" . 38. 39
49*. 50 " . 5 1 * " . 5 2 " "
• Ahernclh) & Rrownell I W
• • Huhr& Dcsjardins 1998
• • • I'how et ul. 1999
# (iovindarajan A Gupta I98S
## Stum & llrchiniak 1980
*#« (iovindarujun 1988
#### Christie et al. 2003
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The questionnaire was not translated into Dutch. The consideration underlying the decision to
opt for an English language instrument was twofold. A number of CFOs of listed companies
in the Netherlands were in fact not Dutch and could not be expected to be familiar with the
language. This would mean that either two versions of the instrument were needed or that
part of the target audience could not be reached. A second consideration Mas that translation
of a number typical VBM terms is impossible. For example, there is no Dutch translation for
EVA and introducing one would simply cause confusion. Furthermore, use of an English lan-
guage instrument would facilitate replication of the research in other countries. Due to the
open character of the Dutch economy it could bo anticipated that all CFOs would be able to
answer an English language instrument. In view of the fact that questions came from \ arums
sources, including a number that were developed by the researcher, a translator was asked to
review the draft instrument, and his recommendations were incorporated in the questionnaire
before Held testing.
4.4 Testing the questionnaire
The questionnaire was reviewed and commented upon by an experienced accounting re-
searcher at Maastricht University. Simultaneously, all questions in the instrument were
checked against the recommendations from Dillman's Tailored Design Method (Dillman
2000). In view of Dillman's (p. 92) advice to start a questionnaire with a first question that
applies to everyone, is easy to answer, short, not open-ended and interesting; the first ques-
tion was added to the instrument. It was not directly needed for the subsequent analysis but
was simply meant to give the respondents an easy start into the questionnaire.
On the basis of these inputs a second draft of the questionnaire was produced for a test in the
field. For this purpose three business controllers, working at the Product Division or Business
Unit level in Royal Philips Electronics N.V., were invited to fill out the questionnaire in the
presence of the researcher. They were subsequently interviewed to obtain insight into areas of
unclarity or interpretation difficulties they had when they answered the questions. Interview
protocols were written to keep track of their comments. In addition, the time they needed was
established. In view of the fact that these controllers were responsible for businesses that
- individually - were at least of the size of a medium-sized company listed in Amsterdam,
they were assumed to be a good proxy for the target audience. Some questions could not be
answered directly by the respondents because their business had no traded shares. They were
asked to answer these questions as if they were the C'FO of Royal Philips Electronics NV, to
ensure that the complete instrument was actually tested. Based on the input from these tests,
the wording of a number of questions was altered to make them more-clear and less open to
interpretation.
The graphic design of the instrument was developed using experience with previous account-
ing research instruments developed at Maastricht University, and the recommendations of
Dillman's Total Design Method (1978) and Tailored Design Method (2000). In the end 275
copies of a booklet of twenty-four A4-format pages were printed on high-quality paper.
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4.5 Distribution and follow-up
From the outset it was clear that the target audience would be a challenge with regard to the
response that could be expected. CFOs tend to have a busy schedule and are not necessarily
strong advocates of academic research. In addition, it is known that they are inundated with
surveys and requests for research co-operation. In view of this, the execution of the research
was carefully planned and, to the extent possible, the recommendations of the Total/Tailored
Design Method (TDM) were followed. It was decided to apply various communication for-
mats to contact the target audience (letter, postcard, telephone-calls, e-mail messages). The
total process of conducting the survey consisted of six steps that were taken in accordance
with the TDM. As a first conclusion, it can be stated that the target audience is considerably
more difficult to elicit a response from than the populations that Dillman usually addresses.
Although Dillman states that 'repeated tests of this one-size-fits-all approach [the TDM]
showed that response rates of 70 % could be produced consistently for general public popula-
tions, and higher rates were feasible for more specialized populations the method has
consistently produced higher response rates than are traditionally expected from mail sur-
veys', rigorous application of all his recommendations resulted in 68 returned questionnaires
from the total of 169 that were mailed-out, a response rate of 40.2 %. The questionnaire was
not anonymous, a factor that was considered beforehand to potentially reduce the willingness
of some CFOs to participate. This last aspect was not confirmed in the execution of the sur-
vey. In 32 cases the CFO responded at some stage that he or she would not participate in the
survey, in all these cases the reason mentioned was either lack of time or a company policy
not to participate in surveys. Sensitivity of the information as such was not given as a reason
for not responding. In the later phase of the survey, CFOs were called or e-mailed with a final
request for co-operation. In these contacts, sensitivity of the information was never men-
tioned as an objection either.
It needs to be recognized that in 10 cases the response rate was positively influenced by the
fact that the CFOs had an additional incentive to respond because they either knew the re-
searcher personally or because they were asked by a member of their company's Supervisory
Hoard to participate in the project. Out of these 10 companies, 8 have responded. An over-
view ol the target audience and the response is presented in Appendix 1.
The total process of conducting the survey consisted of six steps. A letter explaining the pur-
pose of the research and announcing the survey was sent to all participants on March 9, 2001.
This letter and all subsequent letters were personally addressed to the CFO and signed by
hand.
The survey was mailed with a second letter to the participants on March 16. The mail-out
package contained the letter, the printed questionnaire, a stamped self-addressed return enve-
lope and a mmi-coinset of the Netherlands, as a token of appreciation. Based on the TDM, a
small gift was used to encourage the response. The choice of a gift was not obvious. Money
that is often given in the IIS. was felt to be inappropriate with respect to the target audience,
while gifts like a pen were not expected to attract sufficient attention. The coinsct provided a
suitable in-between solution in this respect.
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Three weeks after sending the package, on April 6, a postcard was sent to all recipients thank-
ing them for returning the questionnaire or reminding them to do so. This card was also
signed by hand and addressed to the CFOs personally. In view of the TDM advice to vary the
form of communication, a postcard was preferred to a letter in this case. Those who had not
replied by April 20 received a new letter on that date with a new questionnaire and a new
self-addressed return envelope. In this case the return envelope was not stamped, and a post-
age paid ("antwoordnummer") envelope was used instead. On June I. a last effort was nude
to increase the response. All companies that had not responded by that date were called, with
the objective of reminding the CFO once more of the questionnaire. As was expected, only a
limited number of CFOs could be contacted in person either on that day or at an agreed time
in the subsequent week. For the others, e-mail addresses were obtained. They received an e-
mail on June 5 reminding them of the survey and once again asking for a reply. In 6 cases this
resulted in a request to re-submit the questionnaire, which was promptly dealt with (together
with a postage paid return envelope). In June and early July the last replies were received
which, in the end. resulted in 68 questionnaires that were returned. 40.2 % of the target audi-
ence. Although 40.2 % is not high in relation to the standards applied by Dillmann (1978,
2000), it certainly compares favorably with other survey research in the Netherlands that ad-
dressed a similar audience. In his research into capital budgeting practices Verbeelen (2001)
obtained a response of 26.9 % from the CFOs of 704 large organizations he addressed, llerst
et al. (1998) obtained a 21 % response to their inquiry into investment decision-making. I "he
response rate also compares favorably to the studies into value-based management practice
quoted in chapter 3.
While the survey was being conducted, the questionnaires that were returned were registered
in the software that was going to be used for the statistical analysis, SPSS. This revealed five
cases where the respondent had not filled out one or more pages of the questionnaire. On
May I, these five respondents were asked by fax to complete their input with ihe missing in-
formation. All five replied to the request. Although it is suggested that missing data can be an
indication of inappropriateness of the instrument for the recipient (llartmann 1997, Moers
2001), it can be assumed that this was not applicable in these instances. The recipients had
clearly missed one or more pages and, due to the fact that the instruments covered a number
of areas, they could not be expected to spot their mistake easily, while filling out the ques-
tionnaire. Based on this consideration it was decided to include their additional replies in the
subsequent analysis.
4.6 Response: representativeness and bias
4.6. / /represew/a/iYenes.s
With 68 returned questionnaires available for analysis, the replies represented slightly more
than 40 % of the relevant Amsterdam market. The representativeness of the response group
for the total population needed analysis. In addition, due to the fact that the response was be-
low 100 %, it needed to be established whether non-response bias was present. Various
analyses were performed to determine the match between the response group and the market.
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An industry comparison was performed comparing the response group to the target audience;
the total group of companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges at the end of 2000 exclud-
ing financial institutions and foreign companies. All companies in the target audience were
ranked into 12 industry categories, as distinguished in the 'Handboek Nederlandse Beurs-
fondscn 1999' (Het Financieele Dagblad 1999). The resulting distribution is provided in table
4.4 and figure 4.1.
Table 4.4 Industry distribution of target audience and response group
1. Information technology/software
2. Services
3. Retail
4. Metal and capital goods
5. Construction
6. Wholesale
7. Media and entertainment
8. Transport
9. Papcr/tcxtiles/plastics
10.1 (KKI and beverages
11. Mlcctronics/hardware
12. t'hcmicals/cncrgy/pharmaccuticals
Total
Number
29
13
8
18
16
15
9
8
15
8
19
11
%
17%
8%
5%
11 %
9%
9%
5%
5%
9%
5%
II %
6%
Number
10
6
4
8
6
5
4
5
4
4
5
7
•/.
15%
9%
6%
12%
9%
7%
6%
7%
6%
6%
7%
10%
100% 6X 100%
Figure 4.1 Industry distribution of target audience and response group (in %).
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The table and graph clearly show that the response group covers all industries. The distribu-
tion of the response group over the individual industry categories closely mirrors the distribu-
tion that was found for the market as a whole. From this analysis we concluded (hat the re-
sponse group provides a fair representation of the industry distribution of the total market and
is representative in this respect.
To determine the extent to which the response group was a fair reflection of the total popula-
tion of companies listed on the Amsterdam Hxchanges as at the end of 2000 we also analyzed
whether size and economic characteristics of companies in both groups were similar. For this
purpose a number of accounting characteristics of both groups were compared. The informa-
tion was obtained from Reach' and completed with information from (he annual reports of
companies that were not (or no longer) available in Reach. The comparison was based on the
annual reports for 2000. For companies that had an accounting year that differed from the
calendar year, the annual report for the year that was closed during the calendar year 2000
was used. In 3 cases annual reports for 2000 could not be obtained because (he company ci-
ther went bankrupt early in 2001 or was taken over by, or merged with, another company. In
these cases the 1999 figures were used. In view of the limited number of companies con-
cerned, it is assumed that this does not distort the results. After these 3 companies were re-
moved from the target audience, the comparison led to virtually the same results, which con-
firms that assumption. The means and averages of a number of accounting measures that re-
flect both size and profitability of both groups were compared. The information is provided in
table 4.5
Table 4.5 Comparison of accounting information for response group and (he target group for 2000
Size Target Responie Target Reiponte
Sales (NI.G 1.0 million)
Total Assets (NI.G 1.0 million)
Equity (NLG 1,0 million)
Number of employees (1.000)
Return
664
500
175
1.649
1,749
965
242
3,958
6.057
5.262
1.916
13.081
11,975
8.394
3.370
25.969
Net income (NLG 1,0 million)
Return on average equity
Return on total assets
19
x "„
57
17%
340
13%
K%
727
17%
7%
' Reach is a database owned by Elsevier Publishers. It includes accounting information of
Dutch companies.
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From the comparison between the response group and the target audience, it can be con-
cluded that the companies that responded were larger in all size aspects than the aver-
age/median of the total market. In that respect the response group may not be a fair represen-
tation of the total group of companies listed as at the end of 2000. In view of the fact that
Philips Flectronics, Royal Dutch and Unilever were all included in the response group, there
is a likelihood that the comparison is strongly biased by the presence of these three large mul-
tinationals. Excluding the three biggest companies from both the target audience and the re-
sponse group leads to results that are in line with those presented in the table above. The con-
clusion remains that large companies are over-represented in the response group, even when
we exclude the big three from the comparison. What is important is that any conclusion that
we will draw in the remainder of this dissertation may be biased towards the practices of lar-
ger listed companies. Where appropriate, we will use size of the organizations involved as a
control variable in our analysis to determine whether there are indications that the results are
influenced by size. Annual sales will be used as a proxy for company size, among other rea-
sons because this is an area where the observed differences between the response group and
the target audience are the largest.
Table 4.5 shows that the response group does represent the target audience in terms of ac-
counting returns. Kor both accounting performance measures the median and average per-
formance of the response group is similar to that of the market over 2000. Again, in absolute
profit amounts, the response group has a higher profitability but in relative terms the per-
formances of both groups are very alike. For these return measures the exclusion of Philips
Hlcctronics. Koyul Dutch and Unilever from the comparison did not lead to different conclu-
sions.
It should he noted that the response group contains a number of companies that obtained a
listing during the years IW7 2000, the period that will be covered in this dissertation. For
these companies u complete set of accounting information is available but obviously capital
market based data like shareholder returns are only available for the period that the company
was listed. In the analysis in the next chapters the number of companies that were analyzed
(N) is always mentioned in view of the fact that this number may be lower than 68 in a num-
ber of eases, due to the absence of the required data.
¥. ft. 2 /JC.V/WW.YC' /»KM <rn<j/v.vu
Since the response to the survey was not 100%, we had to take into consideration that re-
sponse bias might be present in the empirical data that were obtained. A number of possible
approaches to test for non-response bias arc available. Additional information can be ob-
tained with regard to the companies that did not respond to the questionnaire or responses of
the early and late respondents for the variables that are critical for the study can be compared
(Wallace & Mellor 198K, Brownell 1W5). The first possibility has been used to some extent
in the preceding part, where we compared the accounting and return characteristics of the re-
spondents to those of the full target audience. This showed that large companies, in terms of
accounting measures of si/.e. were over-represented in the response group. Any conclusions
we draw are therefore more likely to apply to larger companies than to small listed compa-
nies. Attitude towards value creation and design of management control systems cannot be
derived from the analysis presented before. Obtaining additional information in this respect
would only be possible through interviews or a second questionnaire, which was not feasible.
Companies that had not responded in the first place could not be expected to invest the time
in a second attempt to obtain the relevant information.
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Therefore the second approach was used, and the mean scores of the first 27 and last 28 re-
spondents, on the relevant variables, were compared. As the responses were collected in
batches, splitting the response group at the mean, a method often applied for these compari-
sons, was not exactly possible. Instead the group of 13 companies whose replies were re-
ceived between the first and the last group were removed from the comparison. When no sig-
nificant differences are found between the early and late respondents this suggests the ab-
sence of non-response bias, based on the assumption that the replies from late respondents
approximate to those of non-respondents and therefore, if these are not significantly different
from the early respondents, the same can be expected to apply for non-respondents. This ap-
proach is especially relevant in our research design in view of the fact that, for a number of
companies that replied late, the response level was improved by having Supervisory Hoard
members or other senior managers of companies, who were personally known to the re-
searcher, ask the CFO to participate in the survey. It can be argued that these companies
would not have participated if this action had not been taken and therefore that they represent
the non-respondents. The mean scores on the important research variables for the first and
last respondents are listed in the following table, together with the result of an independent
samples t-test for the differences in the respective means.
Tiblc 4.6 Test lor non-response bias (t-tcst)
Importance of financial performance measures
Importance of non-financial performance measures
Importance of budgeting
Importance of codes of conduct
Importance of company culture
Importance of cost and variance analysis
Importance of incentives
Importance of internal controls
Importance of management style
Importance of mission statement
Importance of organizational structure
Decentralization
Mission
Strategy type
Positioning
Relatedness
Value-based management (ves/no)
604
5.22
6.26
4.48
5.37
5.15
5.56
5.48
5.30
472
5.70
39.68
0.11
2.59
4.65
2.59
1.52
5.86
5.3V
6.18
4.64
5.39
5.54
5.44
5.82
5.75
4.26
5.82
42.65
0.14
2.30
4.64
3.00
1.43
MW/W
0828
-0.553
0.983
-0.437
-0.071
-1.100
0.389
-1.341
-1.653
-0.097
-0.418
-1.628
-0.407
1.087
0.110
-1.522
0.658
.Vfeft.
0 411
0.583
0.330
0.664
0.944
0.276
0.699
0.186
0.104
0.923
0.678
0.110
0.686
0.282
0.991
0.134
0.513
The t-test that was performed confirms that equal variances arc present in both groups, and
therefore there is no indication for non-response bias in the replies that were received. The 11
questions asking the CFOs for the importance they attached to certain aspects of management
control were asked for the end of the year 2000 and 4 years earlier. The replies as at the end
of the year 2000 are reported in table 4.5. Similar results were obtained when the replies for 4
years earlier were analyzed. These tests corroborate anecdotal evidence that was collected
during the execution of the survey. At various stages information was obtained from the
companies that did not cooperate with respect to their motives for not doing so. The reasons
mentioned were either a company policy not to spend time on research like this or a lack of
time. These reasons were not related to the opinion of the CFOs with regard to the subject of
our investigation.
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4.7 Summary and conclusions
In this study value-based management, management control systems and company strategy
are investigated for companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange as at the end of the
year 2000. A questionnaire was developed and submitted to the CFOs of these companies
during the spring of 2001. The questionnaire was pre-tested before actual use. Part of the in-
strument was newly developed for this study and part of it was based on previous work by
other researchers. Dillman's (1978, 2000) Tailored/Total Design Method was applied for the
preparation and execution of the field study.
Out of the 169 companies listed in Amsterdam at the end of 2000, 68 returned the question-
naire. The 40.2 % response rate compares favorably with other management accounting re-
search directed at similar audiences. The industry distribution in the response group matched
that of the total market. In terms of size the respondents were larger than the average of the
companies listed as at the end of 2000. In terms of accounting return, the performance of the
response group was in line with the total market.
The presence of response bias was investigated. There were no significant differences be-
tween the replies from early and late respondents. It could therefore be concluded that a bias
from non-response was not present in the empirical material.
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5.
Value creation as central goal: does a
value-based management focus create value?
5.1 Introduction
Many management-consulting firms are advising clients to apply value-based management
(VBM, see section 3.2). Krom research by PA Consulting (IWS*) discussed in chapter 3. we
know that these developments have not gone unnoticed by Dutch companies. Anecdotal evi-
dence of the adoption of value-based management as a key strategic objective is available for
Dutch companies. Royal Philips Electronics NV and Hcijmans NV are two examples of com-
panies that have publicly stated that they introduced value-based management and have con-
firmed this in their respective annual reports.
What benefits Dutch companies obtain from VBM application has not been investigated em-
pirically. This issue will be addressed in this chapter. To do this we develop and test hypothe-
ses that build on research questions proposed by Inner and Larcker (1998, p. 211) and others.
The stock market performance of companies that responded to the survey distributed among
companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges as at the end of the year 2000 is investigated
to determine whether there is evidence that the adoption of value-based management by a
company actually contributes to the creation of shareholder value. Creation of shareholder
value is measured in terms of Relative Total Shareholder Return (RTSR) realized.
In this chapter we first develop a number of hypotheses starting from the assumptions that are
the theoretical basis of value-based management concepts. After that, the empirical material
used and the variables measured will be described. The hypotheses will be tested and the re-
sults will be discussed. The chapter is concluded with a summary of the findings and some
suggestions for future research.
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5.2 Previous research and the development of hypotheses
The primary purpose of applying value-based management as a managerial approach is the
creation of long-term shareholder wealth as was already explained in chapters 2 and 3. The
systems, strategy, analytical techniques, performance measurement and culture of a firm that
applies VBM have shareholder wealth creation as their guiding objective (Arnold et al. 2000,
p. 9). Applying value-based management is more than using a value-based performance
metric to measure value creation. It also includes singling out value creation and realization
as key corporate objectives and translating these into company values and decision-making
processes. Companies that apply VBM are expected to use value-based performance meas-
ures internally and to have selected and communicated value creation as a key corporate ob-
jective internally.
Underlying our research in this chapter is the intuition that, when value-based management
leads to the desired result, the companies that apply it will have a better stock market per-
formance (value created) than their peers who have not (yet) introduced value-based man-
agement.
Performance in this respect can be measured on three levels: 1) actual stock market perform-
ance that benefits from the outcome of better decisions taken by management as a conse-
quence of value-based management, 2) improvement in accounting based performance meas-
ures, and 3) self-reported perception of senior management with regard to the value-creating
perjprnxw.ee of their organizations.
Some evidence of superior stock market performance for companies that apply residual in-
come-based compensation plans was found by Wallace (1W8) and is also claimed to exist in
a number of studies by management consultants discussed in section 3.2.
Based upon the responses to the survey, we test whether there is evidence in the Netherlands
of better stock market performance, improvements in accounting performance measures, and
improvements in the reported perception of CFOs with respect to value creation, for compa-
nies that apply VBM.
We define companies that apply VBM as those that have selected value creation as a key cor-
porate objective and use a value-based performance metric internally. In essence these com-
panies have selected value creation as a central goal. We divide companies into those that
have adopted VBM and those that have not (yet) done so. We will test the following hypothe-
sis:
/A«/ a</o/)/e</ K/JAY i.v A»£Aer fAa« /?7S/? o/Yom/wmes
Known factors that impact RTSR will be included in the analysis to control for influences
that are not related to the adoption of VBM. notably firm size, price/book ratio and beta.
These have been found to be rele\ant to the explanation of RTSR in the Amsterdam market
in earlier research (Cools & Van Praag 2000*"''').
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Additionally, empirical work by Chen and Dodd (1997. 2001) demonstrated that traditional
accounting performance measures can be a reliable proxy for value creation. To the extent
that this is true, the assumed relationship between VBM adoption and organizational per-
formance should also hold for traditional, accounting-based, performance measures.
We will test this for two accounting-based performance measures: Return on l-quity (ROK)
and Earnings per Share (KPS). This leads to two additional hypotheses that are related to HI
but apply to accounting-based performance measures. These two additional hypotheses are:
#2 Ä 0 £ o / rom/xmies fAaf <Wo/>/eJ »7?A/ « Aig/ier /Aaw Ät>£ o/<ompü»w.v /A«r torn* MO/
//i. £/*S o/'rom/wmes f/w/ £K/op/e</ I'SAY w AigAir /A<JM £P5 O/ t'<>ityKim« /A«/ Aaw »of
To ensure that conclusions we arrived at were not affected by short-term performance fluc-
tuations, the measurement period for RISK and the accounting performance measures was
the annual performance in the three-year period from the beginning of I998 up to the end of
2000.
In addition to looking at stock market performance and performance in terms of accounting
measures, the question can be asked how management judges the success of VBM implemen-
tation and whether they perceive it as contributing to the creation of value for shareholders.
This is in line with earlier research of Buhr and Desjardins (1998, and also Dcsjardins 1998)
in Canada. From the survey instrument we know the perception of management with regard
to the success of their organization in creating value for its shareholders. It can be expected
that CFOs of companies that introduced VBM, when they recognize this introduction as hav-
ing been successful, will be more satisfied with the performance of their organization with
regard to value creation than the CFOs of companies that have not done so. This is expressed
in the following hypothesis:
//•f CFO.v o/co/n/ttjw/'e.s fAaf Aave atAYJ/eJ KflA/are more .va//.v//«/ H'»/A //»?/>
/'w 'crea/wig iAure/io/t/er va/ue' f/ta/i f/ie/r coZ/eagues /'« co/w/w/i/e.v //w/ /i</vf
5.3 Data and measurement of variables
5J
In the survey we conducted in early 2001, we obtained detailed insight into the value-based
management practices of 68 listed Dutch companies. As was already described in chapter 4,
the companies that replied were larger than the average of the market in terms of siz.e.
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Companies were classified as applying VBM when they reported the use of value-based per-
formance measures in question 5b of the questionnaire and also stated that "creating share-
holder value" was a key corporate objective in question 33b (see Appendix 2). These two
questions were used to ensure that value creation was the explicitly communicated central
goal internally (question 33b). We also asked whether this goal was communicated externally
in question 33a, but that was not relevant to the classification. For the objective to be part of
management control it needs to be communicated within the company, hence question 33b
was used, and not 33a. To avoid including in the group of VBM adopters those companies
that only paid lip service to the concept without actually applying it, the condition was added
that value-based performance measures needed to be applied. This was reported in question
5b.
The year of introduction of value-based management was reported in question 34, permitting
us to classify the respondents according to the year of introduction.
Our results show that 35 companies applied VBM by the end of 2000 representing 51.5 % of
the total of 68. These companies indicated that they applied value-based performance meas-
ures in question 5b and answered yes to question 33b. Our outcome is similar to the results
obtained by Buhr and Desjardins (1998), who found that 50 % of their sample of listed Cana-
dian companies applied value-based performance measures. The level of VBM application in
the Netherlands appears to be lower than what was found by Mills et al. (1996) for the UK
(61.4 %) and KI'M(i Consulting (1999) for a cross-section of European companies (64 %)
(see uhaptur 3).
From information on the year of VBM introduction we can conclude that value-based man-
agement became popular in the Netherlands in the second half of the nineties, more than 10
years aüer Kappaport (1986, 1988) started to publish on the subject. Before 1996 adoption of
VBM and actual implementation in the Netherlands must have been exceptional. For the 35
companies that introduced VBM an overview of the years of introduction is provided in table
5.1.
Table S.I Year of VBM introduction
)>ar u/ I JJ1/ mfroi/urriiin (/V - J.ty YumAfr o /
Before IW5
I W
I »NO
I W 7
1»N8
|<><N
;ooo
I «ml o loov.
4
1
5
6
7
6
6
12%
3 %
U S
17%
20%
17%
17%
58
Management Control Systems and Shareholder Value Creation
By way of digression, an interesting question is how many of the 68 companies actually
stated to have selected shareholder value creation as a key corporate objective that has been
communicated externally, in question 33a. This has frequently been measured in studies by
management consultants. In the total response group 44 companies (64.7 °o) mention the
creation of shareholder value as a key corporate objective in external communications. This
percentage appears to be lower than the recognition of shareholder value as a key objective
found in other studies. The most striking difference is with the results obtained by PA Con-
sulting (1998^), who found a much higher acceptance of shareholder value as a key objective,
for example 76 % for the Benelav companies that participated in their 1998 study. In Canada
the number of companies that mention creating shareholder value as a key corporate objec-
tive is 90 % (Buhr & Desjardins 1998). The only comparison for (he Netherlands is available
in Cools and Van Praag (2000", p. 11), who report that 28 % of the companies, in their sam-
ple of 36 companies mention shareholder value as a company goal and steering objective in
1997 (compared to II % in 1993). Our data suggest that the increase in the adoption of
shareholder value targets, observed by Cools and Van Praag (2000*). has continued over the
subsequent 3 years.
From these first comparisons a tentative conclusion must be that value-based management is
not as widely applied in the Netherlands as it is in the United Kingdom or Canada. With other
European countries a comparison is more difficult due to the limited data available.
5.
To measure the creation of shareholder value, RTSR was used as dependent variable. For the
companies in the response group, share price and dividend information was obtained from
Datastream to determine TSR (Total Shareholder Return). To detemiine company-specific
wealth creation we correct for the general price movement of the Amsterdam Exchange, an-
nual TSR was corrected for the changes in the CBS-herbeleggingsindex for non-financial
companies (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek 1999, 2000) to arrive at RTSR per company.
This index was used because it is expected to provide a suitable proxy for the general price
movement of the stock exchange for the companies that responded. The AKX-index was not
used as it is heavily biased towards large listed companies (Ilet Financicele Dagblad 1999)
and therefore was not suitable for our purposes. Our approach is similar to that of Cools and
Van Praag (2000* ""*'), who used the total market (index) return to determine RTSR.
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Similarly to Cools and Van Praag, we applied the following formulas to determine RTSR:
TSRj = (P,-P,, + D,)/Po (1)
TSR™ = (CBS,-CBSo)/CBSo (2)
RTSR = ((1 +TSRi)/(l+TSR„,))-l (3)
P» = Share price end of year 0
P, = Share price end of year t
D, = Dividend paid in year t
CBSo = CBS-herbeleggingsindex for non-financial
companies per the end of year 0
CBS, = CBS-herbeleggingsindex for non-financial
companies per the end of year t
TSR, = Total shareholder return of company i
= Total shareholder return of the market
Contrary to Cools and Van Praag (2000" ""*'"), we did not apply a 6 months' time lag in
measuring RTSR. This was deemed not to be necessary in view of the fact that we are not
measuring the announcement effect of the adoption of VBM on the share price but the reflec-
tion of improved performance in the share price. TSR data were obtained from Datastream.
Return on l-'quity (ROF) data were obtained from the Reach database and were based on the
definition used by Reach. Farnings per Share (FPS) data were obtained from Datastream.
Where necessary these two sources were supplemented with information from annual reports.
.V.? i CFf} /vrre/tf/««
The other variable that is relevant to the analysis in this chapter is the perception of the CFOs
with regard to their companies' performance in terms of value creation. This was measured in
question 47 of the research instrument that allowed the CFOs to express their satisfaction
with the performance of their company in creating shareholder value. This was scored on a
fully anchored 5-point scale that ranged from very satisfied (I) to very dissatisfied (5). This
question was a direct replication of the research of Buhr and Desjardins (1998) in Canada.
5. i. •/ CVwwW vunYiWr.v
From earlier studies (among others Cools & Van Praag 2000 * ""•') it is known that RTSR
differences between firms are explained by company characteristics like size, relative risk
and valuation. These characteristics are used as control variables. Company beta's (BETA)
and market "book (MB) data were all obtained from Datastream. The market-to-book ratio is
determined in Datastream by dividing the share price by the net tangible assets per share.
This results in negative market-to-book ratios for some companies in certain years. These
negative ratios were retained.
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Additional accounting information on the companies in the response group was available
from Reach, the "Handbock Nederlandse Beurslondsen" (Het Fmanciecle Dagblad I*>«W and
2001) and the 'Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondememingen 2000' (Tijd Beursmedia 2000).
From these sources annual sales for the companies in our sample were obtained. For further
analysis the natural logarithm of annual sales in the year 2(KH) w a.s determined and coded
LNSALES. This was used as a proxy for firm size in our further analysis. In view of the fact
that the sales levels did not change substantially over the period under investigation, it was
decided not to use the information for each individual year but to rely on the l.NSALF.S for
the year 2000 for all subsequent analysis. How the response group relates to the Amsterdam
Stock Market in total has been discussed in section 4.6.
5.4 Results
An overview of the mean and median values of the variables in the years that were analywd
is provided in table 5.2. For companies that were newly listed during the period under inves-
tigation, stock market prices are not available for all three years and therefore RISK. MH and
BFTA are not available for all 68 companies in all years.
In \ iew of the distinction between companies that apply value-based management and com-
panies that do not, which will be used in our subsequent analysis, we also present the data for
both groups separately in the table.
Tible 5.2 Dependent and control variables
KOT
2000
1999
1998
RTSR
EPS(Euro)
ROE
CFO perc.
MB
BETA
LNSALES
RTSR
EPS(Euro)
ROE
MB
BETA
RTSR
EPS (Euro)
ROE
MB
BETA
JV
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
28
29
29
29
28
22
23
23
23
• > • >
,4pp/> >
Afa»f
0.44
1.77
19.47
2.91
0.36
0.79
14.85
-0.18
1.32
23.67
7.49
0.76
-0.21
1.39
26.49
5.16
0.76
A M
Mrrf/an
0.48
1.82
18.99
3.00
1.66
0.79
15.55
-0.28
1.06
19.13
2.69
0.81
-0.29
1.43
19.73
241
081
iV
30
33
33
33
33
30
33
30
39
39
35
30
30
45
45
35
30
0.30
1.72
14.40
3.15
3.60
0.65
12.88
-0.19
1 63
20.83
5.71
0.75
-0.22
1.75
37.75
6.84
056
W
A M / « *
0.29
I I I
13.73
3.00
1.69
0.56
13.12
-0.29
1.32
16.06
1.80
0.75
-0.27
1.16
21.06
293
066
/V
65
68
68
68
68
65
68
58
68
68
64
58
52
68
68
58
52
Tora/
tfAM
0.38
1.74
17.01
3.03
1.93
0.72
13.89
-0.19
1.50
22.04
6.52
0.76
-0.22
1.63
33 94
6.17
064
0.39
1.44
17.36
300
1 68
0.70
14.34
-0.28
1.19
18.21
2.55
0.80
-0.27
1.17
2102
2.75
0.71
The results we obtained on the satisfaction of CFOs with their organization's performance in
term of value creation was a replication of the research by Buhr and Dcsjardins (1998), which
allowed us to compare the scores obtained in the Netherlands with the results that were found
among listed Canadian companies. Further validation of the measurement was not possible as
it was only measured in one question using a single scale. The level of satisfaction is reported
in the next table.
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Table 5.3 Satisfaction of CFOs with their organization's performance in creating shareholder value
Very satisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Very dissatisfied
No response
1 dl.il
com
Number
12
17
12
11
16
68
pan««
%
17.6%
25.0 %
17.6%
16.2%
23.5 %
100.0%
Canarf/a/i r,
<* Drya
Number
36
30
9
20
14
2
III
rrfif»', /99«>
%
32.5 %
27.0 %
8.1 %
18.0%
12.6%
1.8 %
100.0%
Clearly, satisfaction of the Dutch CFOs was lower than that of their Canadian colleagues two
years earlier. Unfortunately an in-depth analysis of this difference is impossible. A tentative
explanation could be the disappointing performance of the stock market in the year 2000. Af-
ter a number of years of strong growth, the year 2000 was the first to see a reversal of the
trend, with the CBS all-share index actually dropping. This may have influenced the percep-
tion of the CFOs and therefore their ranking. The Canadian survey was done in the middle of
the bull market in the second half of the nineties, which possibly explains a more positive
judgment.
5.4. .2 1/mwriare ret«//.? am/cwww«to
5.4.2/ / /v/w/Aiw«/
The dependent variable of interest for our first hypothesis is RTSR for the years 1998, 1999
and 2000. The response group was divided into two subgroups for further analysis: those
companies that used VBM and those that had not implemented VBM by the respective year.
As can be seen in table 5.4. the companies that applied VBM had a higher RTSR in all three
years compared to the group of companies that did not apply VBM. However the difference
in the years 1998 and 1999 is very small, and only in 2000 a notable advantage appears to be
present.
To determine whether the differences between the two groups were significant, both paramet-
ric and non-parametric tests were performed. As the expected direction of the relationship is
known, I-tailed significance levels could be applied for the tests.
Table 5.4 Test of the difference in RTSR between companies that applied VBM and companies that did not
(t-lesO
0 /
20«) 0.4404
-0 1S40
-0.2124
0.3031
-0.1883
-0 2211
63
56
50
1.080
0.038
0 113
0 142
0.485
0.455
For the non-parametric analysis the Mann-Whitney test was used, which resulted in outcomes
that were similar to those reported above for the t-test.
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The number of cases analyzed was lower than the total number of respondents as a conse-
quence of the fact that some companies were only listed for part of the relevant period. In
fact, three companies were only introduced on the Amsterdam market during 2000 and con-
sequently no RTSR for these three could be established.
In all three years the group of companies that adopted VRM did show a better performance
than the companies that did not do so, but the differences between the two groups were not
significant. Therefore we have to reject hypothesis HI. There is no significant dill'crcnce in
terms of RTSR between the two groups of companies in any of the three years that were in-
vestigated.
A possible explanation for the fact that HI cannot be confirmed may be that the success of
VRM does not appear immediately on adoption. It is possible that a certain learning period is
required before the benefits of VBM actually occur. To determine whether this is the case we
performed the same analysis discussed above with a one and two-year time lag between
VBM adoption and RTSR measurement. In other words, we compared the RTSR in the year
2000 for the companies that had adopted VBM in 1999 with that of the companies that had
not yet adopted VBM (one-year lag). Similarly we compared RTSR in 2000 for the compa-
nies that had adopted VBM in 1998 with the companies that had nol done so (2-year lag).
Both t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests were performed, but these did nol confirm the existence
of significant differences. Consequently, hypothesis HI has to be rejected also on the basis of
the lagged comparison.
5.4.2.2
In section 5.2, two additional hypotheses were developed that are related to HI but use ac-
counting-based performance measures instead of market based performance. These measures
have not been corrected for the influence of the average performance of the market: we com-
pare the absolute measures per company. As before, both a t-test and a Mann-Whitney test
were performed.
From table 5.2 we know that the adopters of value-based management outperformed non-
adopters in terms of ROE in 2000 and 1999, which is in accordance with hypothesis H2.
However, in 1998 the non-adopters clearly achieved higher ROE, which is contrary to our
expectations. The results of the tests that were performed to determine the significance of the
observed differences are reported in table 5.5.
Table 5.5 Test of the difference in ROE between companies that applied VBM and companies thai did not
(t-lcst)
:ooo
1999
19.4669
23.6655
26.4878
144085
20.8338
37.7484
66
66
66
0.542
0.366
-0.597
0 2 %
0.358
0.276
Again the differences are not significant between both groups in all three years, which was
also the case for the Mann-Whitney test, and therefore we have to reject hypothesis H2.
Additional analysis comparing ROE for companies that had adopted VBM I or 2 years prior
to the year of measurement and those that had not adopted VBM produced similar results.
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EPS performance of the companies in the response group contradicts the assumption in hy-
pothesis H3 in two out of three years, where EPS of VBM companies are actually below
those of non-VBM companies. Only in 2000 are the expected higher EPS actually observed.
The significance levels for the observed differences are reported in the table below.
Table 5.6 lest of the di (Terence in EPS between companies that applied VBM and companies that did not
(1-lesl).
2000
1999
I«WH _ J
Significant elTccts arc in bold
Although we find a significant and dircctionally correct relationship between EPS and VBM
adoption in the year 2000 in the parametric analysis, this is not confirmed by the non-
parametric test (Mann-Whitney test). The observed differences in 1999 and 1998 were direc-
tionally incorrect, although not significant, which further supports that we have to reject hy-
pothesis 113 for our sample. This conclusion was reconfirmed when we analyzed the per-
formance I and 2 years after VBM introduction, to take possible learning requirements into
1.766
1 323
1 391
1.720
1.627
1.752
66
66
66
0.095
-0.763
-1.097
0.023
0.224
0.139
In order to learn how satisfied CFOs of the companies in the response group were with re-
spect to the value creation within their own organization, H4 stated that CFOs of VBM com-
panies are more satisfied with the value creation of their companies than CFOs of non-VBM
companies. In view of the fact that a positive relation between the adoption of VBM and a
superior market performance could not be established from our empirical material, the rele-
vance of this research question is increased. If the CFOs actually realize that the expected
positive relation docs not hold, it is unlikely that there is confirmation for 114 in our sample.
The response group was split between companies that actually applied VBM by the end of
2000 and companies that did not. CFOs were asked to rate their satisfaction with the value-
based performance of their organization on an anchored 5-point scale that ranged from very
satisfied (o very dissatisfied with neither satisfied nor dissatisfied as a midpoint. The scores
were recoded on a scale of I (= very satisfied) to 5 (= very dissatisfied) to ease interpretation.
These scores represent ordinal measures, and therefore non-parametric statistics were used
for the interpretation of these scores. The scores of the two groups concerned are compared in
table S.7.
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Table 5.7 CFO's satisfaction with their organization's performance in creating shareholder \;ilue (measured at
the end of 2000)
JV
Very satisfied
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Ver> dissatisfied
No response
Total
Mean score
SP
9
8
3
7
8
35
2.91
1 5ft
25.7 H
22.9%
8.6 S
20.0%
22.9%
100.0%
3
9
9
4
8
33
3.15
1 u
9.1%
27.3%
27.3%
12.1%
24.2%
100.0%
From the table it is clear that the dispersion of the answers is much greater for the VBM
companies. On average the CFOs of these companies appear to be more satisfied with the
performance of their companies in terms of shareholder value creation. The Mann-Whitney
test that was performed confirmed this conclusion. It showed that the mean rank for VBM
companies was actually, but not significantly, better than that of non-VBM companies.
Table 5.8 lest of the difference in CFO's satisfaction with companies performance in shareholder vuluc crea-
tion (Mann-Whitnc) test)
2000 32.74 36.36 68 -0.772 0.220
A further analysis of the responses from companies that adopted VBM between 199K and
2000 showed that their CFOs were less satisfied with the performance of these companies
than their colleagues in companies that had not adopted VBM at all. When we removed this
group from our analysis, the ranking of the remaining two groups confirmed hypothesis 114,
to the extent that the CFOs of the companies that adopted VBM before 1998 were more satis-
fied with the performance of their organization in terms of "creating shareholder value" than
their colleagues in companies that did not apply VBM. The z-statistic was 1.71 in this case
and the one tailed significance 0.044. This allows us to conclude that H4 is supported when
we compare the opinions of CFOs in companies that adopted VBM before 199K with the
opinion of CFOs of companies that had not adopted VBM at all.
5.4. j A/u/nvor/'a/c resi///.v
The previous univariate analysis did not support the claims of the supporters of VBM that led
us to expect a beneficial impact of application of VBM on the creation of value for share-
holders. There was no significant difference in value creation, measured in terms of RISK,
between Dutch companies that applied value-based management and those that did not. As a
last step, regression analysis was used to test for a relationship. It is known from earlier work
by Cools and Van Praag (2000'' *™*') for the Amsterdam market, and from various studies
based on US data (e.g. Fama & French 1992) that size of the company, BKTA, and market-
to-book ratios are relevant to the explanation of return differences between companies. Cools
and Van Praag (2000") also tested for industry segment and diversification as explanatory
variables for differences in stock returns, which proved to be insignificant for companies
listed in Amsterdam. In the regression analysis we controlled the effect of VBM on value
creation for the first three factors mentioned.
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The regression analysis was only performed for RTSR and not for the accounting-based per-
formance measures and CFO perception. Although the other performance measures and per-
ception are of interest as well, they are not the prime objective for companies that introduce
VBM. The ultimate goal of VBM adoption is the creation of value for shareholders and that
is measured by RTSR. We have therefore limited our analysis to this dependent variable.
For the three years 1998, 1999 and 2000 we estimated the following regression equation:
RTSR, - ßo + ß, VBM, + ß;LNSALES + ß,MB,+ ß4BETA, + e
The independent variables were defined as follows:
VBM,: dummy variable that equaled 1 for companies that applied VBM in year t,
otherwise the value was 0.
LNSALES: the natural logarithm of the sales realized in the year 2000.
MBi: the price book ratio for the year concerned as provided by Datastream.
BETA,: the monthly average of the share BETA for the year concerned as provided by
Datastream.
Analysis of the correlation between the independent variables showed that multicollinearity
did not pose a problem. To remain concise these results are not reported here.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 5.9.
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Table 5.* Muhivariale results with annual RTSR as dependent variable
RTSR 2000
Constant
VBM
LNSA1.ES
MB
BETA
0.4214
0.2003
0.0097
00061
-«.4136
0306
0.125
0022
0 005
0.114
1 376
1.606
0436
1.105
-3.624
0 174
0 113
0664
0.274
0.001
R = 0 148. N=64. 4dl. F=3.774. Sign, two-tailed = 0 008 Significant ctlccf. arc in hold
RTSR 1999
KasfeMr tiprrlri/j/jr« (or/jtfWriif •SAuufarrf rrror f-tWft* S%M.
caVur
Constant
VBM
LNSALES
MB
BIT A
R 0.070. N-56. 4df, F-0.983, Sign, two-tailed - 0.425.
RTSR I
-0.2097
0.0557
•0 0114
00056
0.1344
0.262
0.102
0018
0004
0 118
-0.802
0.545
-0638
1 534
1.134
0.426
0.588
0526
0 131
0262
£.v/vi7«"«/ W/j« (<x/yi< if/i/ SVoni/ari/iTror r-ta/ur
Constant
VBM
I.NSALES
MB
BETA
•0.4806
0.0200
0.0108
0.0213
-0.0131
0.149
0.062
0.011
0.625
0063
-3.218
0.322
1.016
5.448
-0.207
0.002
0.749
0.315
o.ooo
0.837
R- = 0.377, N=50, 4df. F=8.577, Sign two-tailed = 0.000. Significant effects are in bold
For all three years it can be concluded that the adoption of VBM does not contribute signifi-
cantly to the explanation of RTSR, which is similar to the outcome of the univariate tests in
the previous section. These results do not confirm the assumed positive relationship between
the adoption of VBM and the creation of shareholder value in terms of RTSR. Similar regres-
sion analyses were also performed for the relation between the RTSR and VBM adoption I or
2 years prior to the measurement of RTSR, which confirmed this observation. Hence, the
univariate and multivariate analysis lead to the rejection of HI.
5.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter we discussed our findings with regard to the impact, in our sample of 68 listed
Dutch companies, of the application of value-based management on the creation of share-
holder value in terms of RTSR and on certain accounting based performance measures. The
first part of the chapter described the development of the hypotheses from value-based man-
agement theory and the variables that were used for the empirical study. In the second part of
the chapter the testing of the hypotheses against the empirical material obtained from ques-
tionnaires and from external databases with stock price and annual report information was
described.
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Slightly more than 50 % of the companies in the response group actually applied VBM by the
year 2000. This means that the adoption of VBM in the Netherlands was lower than in the
major Anglo-Saxon economies (Canada, UK and US). Large companies were more than pro-
portionally represented in the group of VBM adopters. All conclusions with respect to VBM
in this chapter arc therefore biased towards companies that are large in size, measured in fi-
nancial terms.
The hypotheses that were tested did not provide confirmation of the expected beneficial im-
pact of VBM on the stock market performance of the companies in the response group. The
expected positive impact of VBM on RTSR (HI), ROK (112) and EPS (H3) could not be
found in the empirical material. A number of explanations are possible. It may be that com-
panies did not properly apply VBM or that a certain learning period is needed before VBM
application actually results in improved value creation. This last aspect was tested by the in-
vestigation of the performance 1 and 2 years after the adoption of VBM. Again no significant
influence from VBM could be found. There was only partial evidence that the CFOs of VBM
companies were more satisfied with the value-creating performance of their companies than
the CFOs of non-VBM companies (114). Therefore, both management perception and stock
market performance do not provide conclusive confirmation that the VBM companies in the
Netherlands actually realized superior returns for their shareholders as a result of applying
VBM. A possible explanation of this can be that companies pay lip-service to the concept but
do not apply it widely across all business processes to obtain a true VBM culture. A more
Straightforward conclusion can be that superior stock market performance does not depend on
the adoption of VBM but on other factors. That possibility will be further investigated in the
next two chapters. V^  v ;;
An additional urea for further investigation is the relation between value-based and account-
ing-based performance measures. Previous studies, suggest that accounting-based perform-
ance measures are a reliable proxy for value creation, which is an area that can be explored
further. Furthermore, longitudal studies over a longer time frame may be needed to find an
impact of VBM on stock market performance, certainly when learning and deployment re-
quire time before VBM becomes effective. In that respect it can be interesting to study the
performance of the companies that had adopted VBM by the year 2000 in subsequent years.
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6.
Do management control system characteristics
explain value creation?
6 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n • . • - • - •• • • • • • ; . • • . , • • ; • - , r . ^ 3 r r ':••*-.;.,:.• " . < . « . : . • ' - • • • -.,••:. • •;. , • . . - •
In the preceding chapter we discussed the relation between selecting the creation of value for
shareholders as an overall goal and the creation of Relative Total Shareholder Return
(RTSR), for companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges. It was not possible to explain
the creation of value by the application of value-based management. This leads to our next
research question.
As was already stated in section 2.3 of this dissertation, management control systems are a
tool to guide decisions by individual members of the organization towards the objectives of
the organization. As mentioned in 5.3.1, the majority (64.7 %) of the companies that partici-
pated in our survey mentioned the creation of shareholder value as a key corporate objective.
We may therefore expect that management control is used by these companies to direct indi-
vidual members of the organization towards the creation of value. This assumption is further
supported by the fact that the target audience for our enquiry comprised publicly listed com-
panies that have a fiduciary duty to create value for their shareholders. In this chapter the
question will be addressed whether differences in the importance ratings for selected man-
agement controls by CFOs provide an explanation for the creation of shareholder value.
Contingency theory suggests there is no universally applicable management control system;
the choice of management controls must be based upon the circumstances a specific
organization operates in and the environment that it operates in (see chapters 2 and 3). In
accordance with contingency theory we should not expect to find one set of controls that is
beneficial to all organizations. Depending on the circumstances and environment of
organizations, certain controls can be expected to be more or less important. One of the
contingency factors, company strategy, will be discussed in the next chapter. We exclude it
from our analysis at this stage. Other contingency factors that have been found to impact
management control system design are technology, competition, environmental uncertainty
and size (Otley 1980, Chow et al. 1999, Chenhall 2003).
Chapter 6
The remainder of this chapter starts with the development of hypotheses that are derived from
management control theory and previous research. The focus is on which management con-
trols are judged to be important by the CFOs of the companies in our sample. Subsequently,
the data that were obtained and their measurement will be discussed. The outcome of the tests
of the hypotheses will be presented and a summary with main conclusions is provided at the
end of the chapter.
6.2 Previous research and the development of hypotheses
As stated in chapter 2, management control is a multi-faceted concept that comprises many
techniques and procedures that can be applied by organizations. The design of management
control systems is highly contextual and situation-dependent. This makes it virtually impossi-
ble to define clear boundaries that determine what belongs to management control and what
is outside the scope of this concept. As was explained in chapter 4, 11 elements of manage-
ment control systems have been identified, based on the extant literature and an expert panel
validation. These elements provide the cornerstone for the analysis in this chapter. In addition
to the importance attached by management to each individual element, further information on
the way in which the various controls were applied has been obtained. Exploratory factor
analysis has been used to determine whether there are clusters of variables that best describe
management control systems in the empirical material obtained.
The creation of value for shareholders, measured in terms of RTSR, is again used as the
measure of success. The basic question that underlies the hypotheses is whether the creation
of value for shareholders can be explained from the importance attached to (certain) man-
agement controls and from a focus on value-based management (VBM). For the first part of
this investigation no distinction was made between companies that applied VBM and compa-
nies that did not do so. The management control systems of all respondents in our sample
were investigated and related to the RTSR performance of the companies. The value rele-
vance of management control systems is the overarching theme for our enquiry in this part.
We investigate what differences exist in the importance attached to various management con-
trols between companies that were successful in creating value for their shareholders and
companies that were not. VBM theory does not offer generally accepted recommendations
with regard to the optimal design of a management control system, geared towards value re-
alization. Therefore the investigation of this relationship cannot start from a preset assump-
tion with regard to the type of controls that benefit value creation. Consequently the first hy-
pothesis has an exploratory character and reads:
/ / / AYC.V c7»«r«{7fri'.vfic\v </i0tv /HTMIW» r<»m/ximtf5 /Atrt «re more swa-ess/i// J/J rrea/i'wg va/w*
/«r //iWr .v/ftj/v/io/i/rr.v. mmvu/Vf/1« /ITW.V w/ÄfS/?, ««</rrwimmle f/ia/
The combination of our enquiry in chapter 5 with the above research question leads to an ad-
ditional area for research. If continuation of hypothesis HI is found, it can be expected that
companies (hat apply value-based management attach high importance to certain controls that
are associated with the creation of value. The companies that do so should be more successful
in realizing value for their shareholders.
//<?: AÄ7S cAarorfmsfirt </#far tefuee/i co/w/wm« fAu/ */o/>/«/ KÄA/ rom/xzrerf to com/w-
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6 J Data and measurement of variables
6 i /
Detailed insight into the importance that CFOs attach to elements of management control,
and into the application of various controls by listed companies in the Netherlands, was ob-
tained through our survey. There is only limited information available about existing man-
agement control practices in the Netherlands (with the exception of the excellent but dated
study of Hofstede (1970)). The only recent broad scope study on the subject was published by
KPMG (Van Leeuwen & Wemmenhove 1999). The drawback ofthat study is that it focuses
on trends over time and less on the actual set-up of management control. The material that we
collected provides insight into a number of developments that have received attention in lit-
erature and appear to be of practical relevance. We will discuss our findings with regard to
the importance attached to various management controls first, to contribute to the understand-
ing of management control as practiced in the Netherlands and of the data that will be used
for our subsequent analysis.
To obtain an overall impression of the design of management control systems in the organiza-
tions under review, we used 11 purpose-developed questions that asked CFOs how important
they found individual elements of control systems for management control in their company.
The development of this set of questions has already been discussed in chapter 4. The CFOs
were asked to rate the importance of the different elements on a 7 - point l.ikert-like scale
that was anchored at three points (not important - average importance very important).
Each question was twofold asking the CFO to rank both the current importance, which was
explained to be as at the end of the year 2000 (the survey was conducted early 2001), and 4
years earlier, which was as at the end of 1996. The Cronbach alpha for both sets of 11 ques-
tions, describing the current importance and the importance 4 years earlier, was acceptable
(Nunnally & Bernstein 1994, p. 265, Chow et al. 1999, p. 452): with values of 0.71 (year
2000) and 0.82 (year 1996) respectively. The outcomes obtained on the 11 questions arc
listed below.
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Table 6.1 Importance of management control elements
Importance of financial performance measures
£>IM.'.</;'»/I 2 u
Importance of non-financial performance measures
f WCT/WH 2. />
Importance of budgeting
(Jitt'.«/i»*i A
Importance of codes of conduct
{*«'i/iV)rt /2
Importance of company culture
(Jui'.t//un /.5
Importance of cost and variance analysis
(M-.vr/un /ft
Importance of incentives
O<-v//»n / 7
Importance of internal controls
(>U«'.V/«I>I 2.^
Importance of managemenl style
(Aic'.i//un 2ft
Importance of mission statement
y«c-.»//(in 29
Importance of organizational structure
2000
5.99
(N = 68)
5.29
(N = 68)
6.18
(N = 68)
4.63
(N = 68)
5.38
(N = 68)
5.29
(N - 68)
5.54
(N = 67)
5.62
(N = 68)
5.57
(N = 68)
4.31
(N-67
5.76
2000
6.00
5.00
6.00
5.00
600
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
4.00
6.00
SO
2000
0.801
1.147
0.880
1.424
1.159
1.305
1.064
0.993
0.997
1.500
1.038
7996
5.39
(N = 67)
3.97
(N = 67)
5.62
(N = 67)
4.00
(N = 67)
4.64
(N = 67)
4.43
(N=67)
4.71
(N = 66)
4.90
(N = 67)
5.18
(N = 67)
3.65
(N = 66)
5.12
Motion
7996
6.00
4.00
6.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.00
4.00
5.00
SO
/99«
1.660
1.487
1.465
1.576
1.377
1.559
1.298
1.269
1.230
1.409
1.462
A general observation with regard to the table is that the three elements that CFOs found
most important lor management control were financial performance measures, budgeting and
organizational structure. In this respect, organizational structure referred to the accountability
in the organization and to the use of responsibility centers. Three cornerstones of traditional
management control system design, as originally described by Anthony (1965, see also Chap-
ter 2), were therefore still of predominant importance in the minds of the CFOs by the end of
the year 2000. The most noticeable change over the preceding 4 years was the growing im-
portance of non-financial performance measures. It is remarkable that the mean score for all
variables is higher in 2000 compared to 4 years earlier, and that the standard deviations are
lower in all but one case. A possible explanation for this occurrence can be that recollection
of the recent past is stronger in people's minds, which leads to higher ratings (Dillman 2000).
For further analysis we used the mean score of the importance ranking for the 11 elements of
management control per company. This variable provides a proxy for the description of the
management control system in the 4-year period under investigation and can be related to the
RTSR of the companies over the same period. Per company the scores for importance at-
tached to each element of management control as at the end of the year 2000 and 4 years ear-
lier were added and averaged. This new variable was used in the subsequent analysis.
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TaMc 6 J Mean and median importance ot management control elements ktved im I**»« and 2
Importance ot financial performance measures
(fet-J'iu» - <*
Importance of non-financial performance measures
ffeesfiufl.? 6
Importance of budgeting
Importance of codes of conduct
Importance of company culture
pufjftnn /.<
Importance of cost and variance analysis
(>ut'.ir»>n /A
Importance of incentives
(fefjuun / 7
Importance of internal controls
t>uc.«x»n .M
Importance of management sty le
(M-.t/wm .'A
Importance ol mission statement
Importance of organizational structure
tV«"»" JA
M r «
5.69
(N-68)
4.65
(N-*8)
5.89
4.32
(N-68)
5.01
(N-68)
4.87
(N-68)
5.12
(N-67)
5.26
(N-68)
538
(N-68)
3.99
(N-67)
545
(N-68)
6.00
5.00
600
400
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.50
5.50
4 00
5 50
AD
1.069
1.143
1 065
1 411
1.165
1.329
1 056
1 009
0982
1 358
1 140
Again financial performance measures, budgeting and organizational structure are the three
most important elements of management control in the opinion of the t'FOs that participated
in our survey.
To enhance understanding of the importance attached to various elements of management
control, factor analysis was employed on the mean scores for the importance of the 11 man-
agement control characteristics. The purpose of this enquiry was exploratory. The various
characteristics were all part of the multi-facetted concept we call management control. Or-
thogonal factor analysis with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization produced four fac-
tors with eigenvalues greater than 1, which explained 64.9 % of the total variance in the re-
plies. The composition of the factors with the loading of the individual management control
characteristics on the factors is presented in table 6.3.
Table 6 J Factor analysis on importance attached to management control system elements
fartor /(cms /oaoVfrg > 0.5
exp/afara'
Financial performance measures
Budgeting
Organizational structure
Mission statement
Non-financial performance measures
Codes of conduct
Organizational structure
Management sty le
Incentives
Companv culture
0.823
0.754
0.624
0,721
0.686
0.672
0.619
0.899
0.795
0.509
3.723
1.282
1,129
1.002
33.8 %
11.7 V.
10.3%
9,1 %
0.73
0 50
0.50
0.34
Cronbach alpha for the items comprising the respective factors.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was above 0.6, the Barlett test of
sphericity was significant, and all 11 measures of sampling adequacy were above 0.5. Thus
the factorability of the items was confirmed (Coakes & Steed 1999, p. 166). The low Cron-
bach alpha of factor 4 leads to caution with respect to the interpretation of this factor. The
eigenvalue of factor 1 was above 3.0. This factor clearly dominated the other factors that had
eigenvalues close to 1.0. Importance attached to internal controls and cost and variance
analysis did not produce loadings in excess of 0.5 on any of the four factors. Therefore they
are not included in the four factors. The earlier observation that traditional elements of man-
agement control arc still regarded as very important by CFOs is confirmed by the factor
analysis and by the high percentage of the total variance explained by factor 1 controls (fi-
nancial performance measures, budgeting and organizational structure).
Although the factor analysis produced statistically relevant outcomes, the interpretation of the
four factors that emerged was not very clear. What is clear from a first inspection is that there
is no obvious relation between the factors and the levers of control as defined by Simons
(1994, 1995", 1995", 1999'. 1999*) and described in section 4.3. For instance, factor 1 com-
prises two elements that were categorized as diagnostic controls and one that was categorized
as boundary system (organizational structure). The factor analysis appears to contradict
Simon's conclusion that four distinct levers of control can be distinguished. However, an al-
ternative interpretation is also possible. Hxecuting management control can also be seen as a
balancing act that encompasses applying a combination of controls that best suits a company
(Simons !99S\ p. 12H). In that respect each factor would represent a balanced set of com-
plementing controls. How to relate these factors to the four levers of control defined by
Simons is an area that warrants further investigation.
rt. i. 2.9AoreAf>/</rr va/ue rrea/icn
Not the annual RTSR that was discussed in section 5.3.2, but cumulative RTSR for the four
years 1997 2000 was used for analyses in this chapter. This provides a performance meas-
ure that is aligned to the period covered by the importance scores for management control
characteristics. Similarly to section 5.3.2, cumulative RTSR (coded RTSR00-97) was deter-
mined, using the following formulas:
TSR,,K).97= (Poo - P*. + DOO.»TV P«, (1)
TSR,,«..«7= (CBSoo-CBS^VCBS*. (2)
-l (3)
Po •= Share price end of year 0
Pi • Share price end of year t
Di • Dividend paid in years
CBSo *• CBS-herbeleggingsindex for non-financial
companies per the end of year 0
CBS, = CBS-herbeleggmgsindex for non-financial
companies per the end of year t
TSRj •• Total shareholder return of company i
TSR«, • Total shareholder return of the market
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Only 47 companies that responded were actually listed over the full period of 4 years and
RTSR«».«^  could only be determined for these companies. The dividends o\er the four years
were added to determine IX» «-. Alternative specifications of this measure were considered
but not used in view of the fact that other researchers have found that such alternatives do no«
materially affect long-interval returns (O'Manlon & Pope 1999, p. 467). The values that were
found are reported in the following table.
TaMc 6.4
RTSR»»- 0.0083 -0.2786 T2S2
(N-47)
The differences between the mean and the median are unexpected. One would ulso assume a
positive median when the mean performance exceeds the market. We found the opposite. A
review of the data shows that three companies that had an outstanding perfomiance in the pe-
riod under review and realized a RTSR considerably exceeding UK) %, positively influenced
the mean.
6. J. J Cwtfro/ var/aMes
In accordance with our focus on cumulative RTSR over the years 1997 2000 in this chapter,
the control variables used to measure relative risk and valuation - stock beta and market/book
ratio - were aligned to the measurement period. For both measures the un-weighted average
for the 4-year period was determined and coded BKTAno.o? and MIW«?. As explained in
chapter 5, the natural logarithm of annual sales for the year 2000, LNSALI-S, was used as a
proxy for company size.
Having described the information that was obtained from the response group we now turn to
testing the hypotheses that were developed.
6.4 Results
6.4. / {/mvar/a/e resw/te and com/we«te
6.</./. /
To test hypothesis HI we first split the response group in two on the basis of the median cu-
mulative RTSR over the four-year period 1997 - 2000. This median RTSR<M,M7 showed a
negative performance of 27.9 % over the period. The resulting two groups of 24 companies
with a performance equal to or above the median, and 23 with a performance below the me-
dian, were coded as companies successful in value creation, with RTSRoo-«? ranging from -
27.9 % to + 760.4 %, and companies not successful in creating value, with RTSRoo w ranging
between - 72.9 % and - 28.7.
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When comparing the importance attached to the 11 elements of management control between
successful value creators (RTSR00.97 equal or above the median) and companies that were
less successful, we found that C'FOs of successful value creators attach a significantly higher
importance to budgeting, company culture and internal controls compared to their colleagues
in companies that were not successful in creating value (below median RTSR00-97). The re-
sults of the independent samples t-test, that was performed to determine whether significant
differences existed between the two groups, are reported in the following table.
Table 6.5 Test of (he difference in importance attached to elements of management control systems between
companies with below median and equal or above median RISR (t-test. N = 47)
£^ua/ or /-rui
oftoir
nnfian
Mean importance of financial performance measures
Mean importance of non-financial performance measures
Mean importance of budgeting
Mean importance of codes of conduct
Mean importance of company culture
Mean importance of cost and variance analysis
Mean importance of incentives
Mean importance of internal controls
Mean importance ol management style
Mean importance of mission statement
Mean importance ol organizational structure
5.67
4.41
S.76
4.17
4.54
4.78
4 %
4.98
5.33
3.89
5.43
5.94
4.67
6.25
4.54
5.13
4.98
5.17
5.56
5.44
3.92
5.65
-0.941
-0.789
-1.719
-0.864
-1.871
-0.503
-0.671
-2.154
-0.382
-0.063
-0.694
0.35
0.43
0.09
0.39
0.07
0.62
0.51
0.04
0.70
0.95
0.49
Significant values arc in bold
A conclusion that may be derived from the table above is that the item where the most sig-
nificant dilTerence existed between both groups of companies was the importance attached to
internal controls. A similar pattern emerged when the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test was
performed. In that case the two-tailed significance for both the importance of budgeting and
the importance of internal controls moved above a significance level of 0.10, but the differ-
ence in importance attached to company culture remained significant. Both tests confirm that
there are significant differences in importance attached to certain management controls be-
tween companies that are successful in creating value for their shareholders and companies
that are not. We find support for hypothesis HI in our data.
It is also interesting to note that successful value creators attach a higher importance to man-
agement control in general, judging from the fact that they give a higher mean importance to
all 11 elements, as can be read in table 6.5.
An alternative analysis on the basis of the four factors developed in section 6.3.1 produced
significant differences on the score for factor 4 controls, as presented in table 6.6. This might
be expected from the fact that company culture was part of that factor.
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Table *.* Test of the difference in importance attached to management control system factors between
companies with below and equal or above median RTSR (t-tcst, NM7)
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
«Wo»
»«•rfw«
«re«
$.62
4.64
5.38
4.75
/Tyiui/ or
«Amy
m <•</(«*
«re«
$04
4.88
5 54
5.15
f-lil/ur
-1.4 JO
-0032
-0 645
-I.WU
.V4r».
0.16
0 36
052
0.10
Significant values arc in bold.
Again this provides confirmation of hypothesis HI and shows a higher importance Tor alt four
factors in value-creating companies.
That importance attached to company culture is a distinguishing feature for companies that
are successful in value creation, can possibly be explained from the fact that the t'FOs of the
successful companies realize that culture and beliefs arc important tools to ensure thut all em-
ployees act in the interest of the company and, through that, also in the interest of the share-
holders. It may indicate that these companies arc able to create a value-based management
culture as defined by Haspeslach et al. (2001). In this respect it is important to reiterate that
the companies were not selected on the basis of their actual application of value-based man-
agement but on their performance. Some of the successful companies have not made the crea-
tion of value for their shareholders their central goal. However, they are managed in such a
way that this objective is realized. It may be the case that VBM-principles are part of normal
management behavior and that successful managers apply them unconsciously.
To test the second hypothesis the importance attached to the 11 elements of management con-
trol was compared between companies applying value-based management and companies not
doing so. For the companies that applied value-based management in the year 2000, the im-
portance attached to the various elements of management control as at the end of that year
showed no significant differences, except for the importance attached to incentives and or-
ganizational structure. For this first element VBM companies rated the importance signifi-
cantly higher than non-VBM companies (t = 1.922, two-tailed significance = 0.059). This can
probably be explained from the high importance that is generally attached to incentives in the
literature on value-based management. The second element, importance of organizational
structure, was also rated higher by VBM companies (t = 1.715, two-tailed significance
= 0.091).
The scores for the four management control system factors were also compared between
companies that applied VBM by the end of 2000 and companies that did not do so. No sig-
nificant differences were found for any of the four factors using either the t-test or the Mann-
Whitney test.
We therefore only find very weak evidence for hypothesis H2.
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A second approach to testing hypothesis H2 could also be used based upon our findings with
respect hypothesis HI. We found that value creation is related to differences in management
control focus and this means that companies trying to create value for their shareholders can
work towards this objective by focusing on the appropriate management controls. To be able
to judge whether this is actually done, we investigated the sample on the basis of two separate
variables. The creation of value for shareholders in terms of RTSR00.97 and the application of
VBM, in accordance with the criteria denned in the previous chapter. Again the companies
that applied VBM in the year 2000 were distinguished from those that did not do so. Based
on the results obtained in testing for hypothesis HI, we can expect that companies applying
VHM attach significantly more importance to budgeting, company culture and internal con-
trols, respectively to factor 4 management controls.
To investigate this relationship, univariate analysis of the differences in mean scores for the
respective importance rankings was performed. In all four cases no significant influence of
the interaction term or of the application of VBM on the importance attached to the respec-
tive management controls could be found. The importance attached to each individual control
was used as a dependent variable for this analysis and the adoption of VBM and the creation
of value for shareholders were used to allocate companies to the 4 groups being compared
(fixed factors). The importance attached to the respective management controls as at the end
of the year 2000 was used for analysis to be in line with the measurement date for the appli-
cation of value-based management. The relevant results are summarized in table 6.7.
Table 6.7 I Inivuriulc analysis of variance tor importance attached to selected elements of management control
with L real mil ol Kl.tK and application 01 VI1M a.s nxcü iaclurMIN^-4/)
/•'iv«//ai-/orj /m/>«r/umc <»/ /m/><»r/am <• 0/ /mporfanrr 0/ /m/x»rro/ii <•«/
/w<*rna/ co/ifrofa /inc/or ¥ cow/rob
J[ Sig. f Sit; f_ Sig. f Sig.
Value creation
VBM year 2000
Interaction li*mi
0.986
0.043
1.457
0.33
0 84
0.23
3.270
1.727
0.566
0.08
0.20
0.46
6.123
0.074
0.452
0.02
0.79
0.51
1 694
0.095
2.474
0.20
0.76
0.12
Significant values arc in bold.
These results are surprising. They suggest that the companies applying VBM fail to translate
their adoption of value creation as an overriding goal into an appropriate focus in their man-
agement control system. From the fact that a high importance attached to these elements of
management control is beneficial for value creation, we would expect to find a significant
and positive interaction term. The absence of the expected relation may provide an explana-
tion for the fact that no confirmation of a beneficial impact of the application of VBM on the
creation of RTSR could be found in chapter 5.
/Jv Ay/x>/Atw;.« /
To be able to gain a richer understanding of the relationship between management control
and value creation, linear regression analysis was performed, both for the mean importance
rankings on the 11 elements of management control and for the 4 factors developed in section
6.3.1. Again, cumulative RTSR over the four-year period 1997 - 2000 was used as a depend-
ent variable.
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6 < 2 / Miraci£eme/ir ro/ifro/ 5\-5/em e/e/wn/.t
To investigate the relation between the importance attached by the CFOs to the 11 elements
of management control and the creation of value for shareholders, we estimated the following
regression equation:
RTSRoo-97 = ßo+ ßi MIMPMCI ,, + ß,;LNSALES + ßuMBoo-«? + ßuBETAoo-«7 + e
The new independent variable was defined as:
IMPMCi ii: importance attached by the CFO to each of the 11 individual elements of man-
agement control (average of 2000 and 1996 scores)
The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 6.8.
Table 6.8 Multivanate results with mean importance of control system elements as independent variables and
cumulative R TSR as dependent variable
tw/nr
Constant
Mean importance of financial performance
measures
Mean importance of non-financial
performance measures
Mean importance of budgeting
Mean importance of codes of conduct
Mean importance of company culture
Mean importance of cost and variance
analysis
Mean importance of incentives
Mean importance of internal controls
Mean importance of management style
Mean importance of mission statement
Mean importance of organizational structure
LNSALES
-3.7276
0.5538
1.556
0.218
-2.399
2.538
0.024
0.017
BETA,,,.»
-0.0629
0 1653
0 1643
0.2647
-0.2170
-0.5348
0.0307
0.0097
-0.1008
-0.0519
0.0692
0.0467
1.1437
0.196
0.224
0.184
0.205
0.127
0.162
0.214
0.180
0.131
0.181
0.056
0.029
0.436
-0.320
0.738
0.894
1.293
-1.714
-3.307
0.143
0.054
-0.772
-0.287
1.241
1 604
2.623
0.751
0.467
0.379
0.207
0.09K
0.003
0.887
0.957
0.446
0.776
0.225
0 120
0.014
R" = 0.514. N=42. 14df. F=4.178. Sign, two-tailed = 0.001. Significant effects are in bold.
Again we find that systematic risk measured in terms of stock BKTA is relevant to the expla-
nation of cumulative RTSR differences across companies. Also, differences in importance
attached to certain management controls are significant. This provides further confirmation
for hypothesis HI. The controls that are relevant differ from those that were found in the pre-
vious section, which can be a consequence of the more refined analysis at this stage. That a
focus on financial performance measures is significant can be a consequence of a focus on
value-based performance measures like residual income. The significant, but negative, con-
tribution of importance attached to incentives is contrary to the recommendations of the
value-based management literature. Next, we present the results for the four management
control system factors.
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6. ¥. 2.2 A/ana#e/He«f ro/»/ro/ .system /actors
The regression equation that was tested reads:
RTSRoiM* = ßo+ ßiFactorl + ß:Factor2+ ß,Factor3+ p4Factor4 + ß,LNSALES +
ß,, MB«,,.*, + ß7 BETA«,..* + e
And produced the following results:
Table 6.9 Multivariatc results with control system factors as independent variables and RTSR as dependent
variable
Constant
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
LNSAI.I-.S
MH,,,«
M l A«,.«,
t.V/7«7f</ V/tf/l
(?)
(?)
(7)
(7)
(?)
( • )
('•')
f >«•///</>/»*
-4.4590
0.6056
0.3325
-0.1195
-0.2217
0.0268
0.0810
0 6186
.S/a/u/ari/ rrrnr
1.596
0.303
0.245
0.303
0.241
0.058
0.032
0479
-2.795
2.001
1.359
-0 394
-0.919
0.458
2.569
1.292
0.008
0.053
0.183
0.696
0.364
0650
0.015
0.205
R 0.102. N 42. 7(11. I .1 600. Sign two-lailed 0 005 Significant effects arc in bold
In this case factor I controls and valuation in terms of the market-to-book ratio are relevant to
the explanation of RTSR. Again this provides confirmation for 111. These results are in line
with those obtained in the previous section. Factor I controls comprise financial performance
measures, which were found to be significant in the previous section, together with budgeting
and organization^ structure. It would appear that attaching high importance to traditional
management controls explains, part of, the realization of value for shareholders.
6.5 Summary and conclusions
To explain successful value creation from management control system characteristics was the
purpose of this chapter. We tested 2 hypotheses, using empirical data provided by the CFOs
of 6K Dutch companies listed on the Amsterdam Exchanges. The information obtained
showed that Dutch CFOs focus on traditional management control concepts like budgeting,
financial performance measures and responsibility centers.
Management control system characteristics were found to be different for companies that
were successful in realizing value for their shareholders. Most notably, successful value crea-
tors attached greater importance to company culture, budgeting and internal controls. The
importance of the three controls should not be judged in isolation. Factor analysis provided
evidence that four different groups of controls could be identified. It produced four factors
that together explained 61.5 % of the variation in management control systems. Companies
that were successful in creating value for their shareholders scored significantly higher on
one of these factors, in comparison to companies that were less successful. An area for future
research is the question whether and. if so. how the four factors that were found relate to the
four levers of control defined by Simons (I W4. IW5\ ^ ^
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When control variables were introduced in the analysis, the primary conclusions were cor-
roborated. It emerged that differences in importance attached to certain management controls
contributed to the explanation of differences in the creation of shareholder value in terms of
cumulative RTSR, notably differences in importance attached to financial performance
measures and incentives. We established that characteristics of management control systems
help to explain the creation of value for shareholders in Dutch listed companies (HI) but that
they only explain part of the differences between companies in value creation.
We also found that companies applying value-based management do not differentiate their
management control system to place additional focus on those controls that appear to support
value creation (H2). A possible explanation for the apparent lack of success of value-based
management implementations that was found in chapter 5 can therefore be that companies
applying VBM fail to translate this into an appropriate focus in their management control sys-
tem.
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7.
Does alignment of management control
system and strategy explain shareholder value
creation?
7.1 Introduction
The suggestion that management control systems should be aligned explicitly with the strat-
egy of a business to create competitive advantage and thus superior performance (Langlield-
Smith 1997, p. 207) has been voiced by various authors (Simons 1987*\ 1990, Govindarajan
1988, Dent 1990, Abernethy & Guthrie 1994) and is acknowledged in today's textbooks on
management control (Merchant 1998, Anthony & Govindarajan 1998, Simons 1999^). This
relationship is documented in contingency studies into the relation between organizational
performance and the appropriate alignment between environment, strategy and internal struc-
tures (Gordon & Narayanan 1984, Govindarajan & Gupta 1985, Govindarajan 1988, Govin-
darajan & Fisher 1990). To obtain a full understanding of the interaction between the creation
of value for shareholders and a company's management control system, we have to address
this contingent relationship.
In the preceding chapter we already found that certain characteristics of management control
contribute to the explanation of value creation. Our objective in this chapter is to investigate
whether the alignment of business strategy and management control system design supports
value creation and therefore allows us to explain the difference in the creation of value for
shareholders between companies better. We will also investigate whether a value creation fo-
cus in management control is associated with certain strategies. Successful performance will
again be measured in terms of the relative total shareholder return (RTSR) generated by the
companies in our sample.
83
Chapter 7
Over time, numerous ways to describe and distinguish company strategy have been proposed
and tested empirically. In line with the recommendations of Langfield-Smith (1997). we treat
strategy as a multifaceted concept and investigate three aspects of the concept in our research:
strategic position, strategic typology and strategic mission. The notion of strategic positioning
builds on Porter's (1980) distinction between cost leadership and differentiation strategies.
Strategic typologies have been developed by Miles and Snow (1978), who introduced de-
fender, prospector, analy/cr and reactor strategies. The objectives of business strategies have
led (iupta and (iovindarajan (1984) to differentiate build, hold, harvest and divest missions.
Information about these three aspects of strategy has been obtained from the companies that
participated in our survey.
As was explained in chapter 2, a distinction is usually made between business strategy and
corporate strategy. The latter concept addresses portfolio choices of companies and the rela-
tion between the head office and the strategic business units (SBUs). Business strategy
describes how a business unit operates within its competitive environment. The three strategy
concepts mentioned above all address business strategy. Because our target audience con-
tained both single SHU firms and conglomerates, comprising large numbers of distinct SBUs,
it was decided to focus on SBU strategy in the research instrument. This was the common
denominator that applied to all companies in the target audience. The fact that the CFOs were
requested to reply to the questionnaire could be expected to result in replies that described the
"average" SBU strategy for multi-business firms and not necessarily the individual SBU
strategics within these firms. This was an inevitable consequence of the research design. It is
not uncommon for this type of research to obtain information from top management for the
strulcgy classification, as top management can be expected to be most knowledgeable about
strategies, market emphasis and planning processes, according to ShorteII & Zajac (1990). In
this respect our research design is similar to earlier studies that obtained strategy classifica-
tions from self-typing by the C'l-O (Snow & llrebiniak 1980, Shortell & Zajac 1990). To be
able to identify whether certain strategy data were possibly impacted by portfolio diversity,
this lust aspect was measured separately, and used as a control variable.
In the next section we present the hypotheses that will be tested and explain their foundation
in previous empirical work and literature. Subsequently, the empirical material used and the
new variables introduced in this chapter will be described. Kxploratory material is included
that provides descriptive statistics of the variables that were reported by the 68 companies in
our sample. The results of the tests of the hypotheses are subsequently presented. The last
section of the chapter provides the mam conclusions.
7.2 Previous research and the development of hypotheses
Similarly to Simons (1987*), Abemethy and Guthrie (1994) and Chenhall and Langfield-
Smith (1998). the first question in this section is whether management control systems differ
between linns with different strategic priorities. Firms with control systems that are better
aligned to their strategy are expected to have a superior performance in terms of RTSR. This
question is interesting because Simons' conclusions in this area are still controversial (Dent
1990. p. 13, liray 1990. Langfield-Smith 1997. p. 218). Notably his findings that high-
performing prospectors attached high importance to controls like forecasting data, tight
budget goals and careful monitoring of outputs, and gave little attention to cost control. De-
fenders, particularly large defenders, were found to use control systems less intensively.
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The conceptual model underlying the research in this chapter is shown in figure 7.1.
Fig«r« 7.1 Conceptual model of the contingent:) relationship
Management
Control
System
Design
i
r
Com/jam'
Strategy
TV/*'
A/«.NOrt
Performance
In characterizing management control system design both the value-based management
(VBM) focus in management control (chapter 5) and characteristics of management control
(chapter 6) will be used.
Three approaches to analyzing data under a contingency approach have been suggested by
Van de Ven and Drazin (1985): the selection, interaction and systems approach. The selection
and the interaction approach will be used in our analysis.
Prior research into the relation between strategy and management control system design was
frequently based on the assumption that management control systems would be different be-
tween prospector and defender firms (Govindarajan & Gupta 1985, Simons 1987 , Govinda-
rajan 1988, Abernethy & Gunthrie 1994). Due to the fact that inconclusive evidence exists for
the assumed differences and taking into account that similarities can be expected to exist be-
tween control system characteristics of defenders, hold missions and cost leaders on the one
hand and prospectors, build missions and differentiators on the other (Langfield-Smith 1997,
Inner et al. 1997), we will first test whether this differentiation actually exists. The hypothesis
to be tested reads:
/ / / : fro/ 5>'5/em cAaracteraZ/cr aV e^r
//'on ^wi'/d. prospector) OMO* a cosf /coder pojiVio/t (Ao/</ /»«S/'OH,
co/w/ram'es w/YA a
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An additional enquiry, that relates the research question of chapter 5 to strategy, was
developed building on Lovata and Costigan (2002), who posited that the adoption of EVA as
a performance measurement system is less likely for companies pursuing a prospector strat-
egy than for companies pursuing a defender strategy. They derive this assumption from the
notion that non-financial performance measures are more important for companies that pur-
sue an innovation-oriented strategy (Ittner et al. 1997, p. 231). Lovata and Costigan find em-
pirical support for their assumption. In line with their reasoning we can expect that a VBM
focus in management control is more likely for cost leaders (hold missions, defender types)
than for differentiators. As a next step in our analysis we will therefore test the following hy-
pothesis.
//»a/ ^wrswe a ccwf /ea</er pojf/ion f/io/a" m£j-
.«<««. «tyi'm/fr />yvj <ww/wira/ /o rom/?art/es //»a/ pursue a d7j9<»r«j/ia//on müs/on ^u</</ m«-
Alignment between management control systems and strategy has been investigated in a
number of empirical studies, as was already discussed in section 3.5. In summary it can be
stated that strategies that entail a high level of uncertainty make certain management control
characteristics desirable. This is illustrated by the work of Miles and Snow (1978) and
(iovindarajan (I98K), who argued thut prospector and build strategies encompassed a high
degree of uncertainty and therefore warranted a lower focus on budget goals. Similarly Gupta
(1987) stated that differentiation positions resulted in a higher degree of uncertainty, which is
not supported by objective performance evaluation and reward systems. A contradiction in
this respect is that Merchant (1985*) and Simons (1987**) found that the emphasis on account-
ing mioimaiion was greater in companies aubpuiig ouiiu'or prospector strategies, wiiercas
(iovindarajan (1988) found that such companies place lower emphasis on accounting infor-
mation.
According to Simons (1987*\ p. 360), the assumption in most accounting research into the
relation between management control system characteristics and strategy is that control sys-
tem design contributes to the successful operation and profitability of the company. Therefore
it is usually assumed that control system attributes and economic performance are different
for companies following different strategies. We measure economic performance by RTSR of
the companies in our sample. Three dilTerenl dimensions of the strategy construct were inves-
tigated and the assumed relation can thus be studied for strategic mission, type and position-
ing. The theoretical foundations for these relationships are still unclear (see also Dent 1990,
Langfield-Smith 1997). Therefore it is premature to specify which differences are to be ex-
pected and which direction the differences will take. The assumed impact on performance
from differences in control system attributes, in relation to business strategy, will be investi-
gated by testing the following hypothesis, which is related to the research questions addressed
in chapter 6:
//.*: FAf rc/a/io« /wfwww im/wnam-f a/taoA«/ to certain mawagemenf cowfro/
aw/ m>wom»r per/önwa«ce. measure«/ »« /ermjt o/ Ä7SÄ, is
fAaf />M/\.VMC a
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7J Data and measurement of variables
7.3. /
In our survey we obtained information on three aspects of strategy. These were measured us-
ing established research questions that have been used successfully in previous empirical
studies. In addition, we measured the degree of portfolio diversity of the companies in our
sample. Due to the fact that the information obtained relates to the strategy of the companies
as a whole, our measurements do not necessarily reflect individual business unit strategies.
The three strategy dimensions were measured at the end of the year 2(KH). It is assumed that
these provide an appropriate proxy for the strategy in earlier years also, because we expect
strategy to be relatively stable over time. Previous research in this area usually focused on
strategic business unit (SBU) strategies, making results not directly comparable to the infor-
mation we obtained. To be able to explain possible deviations from previous studies, the
additional measure for portfolio diversity was added.
To measure strategic mission, question 49 was included in our survey instrument. The ques-
tion is a replication of the original research instrument used by (iovindarajan and (iupta
(1985) and has been used in many subsequent studies. The CKOs of the companies in our
sample were asked to indicate the percentage of their company sales that was accounted for
by products that represented a certain mission, (iovindarajan and (iupta (19K5) introduced a
distinction between build, hold, harvest and divest missions. 61 companies provided informa-
tion on their strategic mission, which is close to the number of observations used by
Govindarajan and Gupta (N = 58). Where they found that only 12 (21 %) companies reported
%) reporting that between 2 % and 55 % of their sales are generated by products that are to
be liquidated or sold (Govindarajan and Gupta found a range of between 2 % and 13 %). In
the response group 5 companies reported part or all of their sales as 'Others', a category that
was also available in the original study but not used by respondents then. A review of the
companies concerned shows that some new economy businesses and research ventures re-
ported their sales in the category 'Others'. Because new economy and research are associated
with build strategies it was decided to include the sales under that strategic mission for our
analysis. In line with the original study, we developed a weighted average strategy index by
coding the reported sales percentages with: + 1 for build, 0 for hold, - 1 for harvest and - 2
for divest. Because sales for new economy activities were reported as 'Others', these were
also coded + 1 to reflect a build strategy. The overall measures obtained are presented in ta-
ble 7.1.
Table 7.1 Strategic mission
Strategic mission. (N=61) 0.122 0.370 -1.1 1.0
Scores obtained by Govindarajan & Gupta (1985). (N=S8) 0 018 0.478 -IX) 1.0
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To facilitate further analysis, the response group was subsequently divided into three sub-
groups on the basis of strategic mission. Companies with a mission index between 0.1 and 1.0
were classified as build (25), those with an index between 0 and 0.06 as having a hold mis-
sion (25) and those with a negative index as having a harvest/divest mission (11). This re-
sulted in two subgroups that consisted of 25 companies each with build and hold missions
and a third group of 11 companies with harvest/divest missions. This distribution is similar to
the one that Verbceten (2001) found in his sample of 175 large organizations in the Nether-
lands (91 build, 74 hold, 10 harvest), which lends support for the appropriateness of the allo-
cation.
Snow and llrcbiniak (1980) developed a measurement instrument for the strategic typologies
that were originally introduced by Miles and Snow (1978). The instrument is a fairly crude
measure because the respondents are simply asked to rank their company on the basis of de-
scriptions of the four strategy types described by Miles and Snow: defender, prospector, ana-
lyzer or reactor. Question 50 in our survey instrument replicated Snow and Hrcbiniak (1980)
with one alteration. The description of type 4, reactor strategies, in the original instrument
had a strong negative connotation, which was expected to result in bias against choosing this
type of strategy. We rephrased this description and removed negative references like: "or-
ganization does not appear to have a consistent product-market orientation'. The companies
in our sample reported the following strategy types:
Table 7.2 Strategic typology
Number of companies
%ol total, (N=M>)
Scores obtained by Snow & llrcbiniak (1980). number
% of total. (N 247)
15
80
32%
IX
j!7 "/o
75
30%
23
27
II %
Äca<7<v
10
50
15%
As table 7.2 clearly shows, the results obtained from companies in the Netherlands at the end
of 2000 deviate substantially from the results Snow and llrebiniak obtained in the United
Stales more than 20 years earlier. In view of the time that has elapsed between both studies,
this is far from surprising. The high percentage of companies claiming to have an analyzer
strategy is the most remarkable contrast. The time lag and the difference in countries in which
both surveys were conducted make it difficult to draw any conclusions from the comparison.
The reason to make the comparison is to detect potential measurement errors. The structure
of the question combined with the discrepancies with previous empirical research gives con-
cern with regard to the reliability of the allocation to the four strategic typologies. To address
these concerns, further cross validations have been performed that will be discussed in the
next section.
For subsequent analysis the variable was recoded into a new range starting with 1 for pros-
pector, 2 for analy/er. 3 for defender and 4 for reactor strategies. This order differs from the
structure of the survey question and from the use of the classification by other authors. In ac-
cordance with the original work of Miles and Snow (1978), we bring prospector and defender
strategies to the extremes of the scale with analyzers in-between. Reactor strategies are
deemed to be unsuccessful strategies by Miles and Snow and are therefore coded at the out-
side of the scale. Doing so ensures that the structure of the scales for mission, type and posi-
tion is the same and that inferences can be made with regard to the similarity of the results
that were found for the three strategy measures.
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Strategic positioning was measured in question 51 using the research questions originally de-
veloped by Govindarajan (1988). CFOs were asked to rank six characteristics of their compa-
nies' products in comparison to competitors on 7-point Likert scales. The responses to the six
questions were added and subsequently divided by 6 to obtain an overall score. In 5 cases in-
dividual scores on one of the 6 questions were missing and were replaced by the question
mean of the total population for that question. High values for the overall score signify differ-
entiation and low values signify cost leadership, as strategic position for the company. The
measurement scale proved to be reliable with a Cronbach alpha of 0.75. which is both above
the acceptable level indicated by Nunnally and Bernstein and others (Nunnally & Bernstein
1994, p. 265. Chow et al. 1999. p. 452). and above the level found by (iovindarajan (1988) in
the initial use of the instrument. The empirical data obtained on strategic positioning arc
summarized in table 7.3.
TiMc 7 J Strategic position
Score on differentiation or cost leadership strategy
(1-cos t leadership. 7=difl'crenliation) (N=«7) 4.64 0.75 3 - 7 0.7S
Scores obtained h> (loundarajan 11988). (N^I2I> 4_61 0 7«) 0.68
7. i 2 /W/CT/W/ <• «M.W.V/IWV «/ /At* .v/raffjjy
The reliable measurement of business strategy can encounter theoretical and methodical
problems (Snow & llambrick 1980) that caused us to crosscheck the data that were obtained.
A number of consistency checks were performed on the basis of hypothesized correlations
between the three classifications suggested by Langfield-Smith (1997, p. 213). There is a
general consensus that differentiation position, prospector typology and build missions are
conceptually similar. Likewise harvest mission, defender type and cost leadership position
are expected to be related (Chrisman et al. 1988, Shortell & Zajac 1990, Abernethy & (iuthrie
1994, Ittner et al. 1997, Langfield-Smith 1997). Overall the scores for mission and lype
should be highly correlated and both should have a negative correlation with the score for
position according to Langfield-Smith (1997).
Before addressing these relationships, an overview of the scores that were obtained for the 4
constructs is provided in figure 7.2.
89
Chapter 7
Figure 7.2 Variables measured
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Significant negative correlation was found between the scores for strategy type and position
(I'curson correlation coefficient -0.325, I-tailed significance 0.004). This indicated that pros-
pector and differentiation strategies on the one hand and defender/reactor and cost leadership
strategies on the other hand were related, which is in accordance with expectation. Contrary
to expectations, significant correlation between mission and strategy type or position scores
was not found. With regard to the individual categories, the expected differentiation focus for
prospectors was confirmed, as well as the cost leadership focus for defenders, in line with the
overall correlation between the scores on type and positioning. The expectation that prospec-
tors would have a build mission and defenders a hold/harvest mission was not confirmed.
It emerges that the reliability of the mission data we obtained is questionable and that any in-
ferences related to mission need to be made with caution. The use of the original measure-
ment instrument produced these results. Why the expected correlation between mission and
the other two strategy-constructs cannot be found remains unclear, and is an area for further
future research.
For the remainder of this chapter positioning will be the strategic variable that is used.
7. J. J SA<jrc/r<i/«/tT \w/ui' rrairiora
In accordance with our analysis in the previous chapter, the cumulative RTSR for the years
from 1997 up to and including 2(HK) was used as the measure for financial performance. The
measure is abbreviated as RTSRoo.«*. The specification and values for the measure are re-
ported in section 6..V2. In addition the annual RTSR for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 was
used for a number of regression analyses (see chapter 5).
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7.3 V Con/ro/ vw/tf/)/«
The reason to measure diversity in the product portfolio of the companies in the sample was
explained in the introduction to this chapter. Diversity will influence the interdependence of
various businesses in the portfolio of multi-business firms. It is not a strategic variable as
such but it can be used as a control variable to signal the likelihood that (he overall strategy
that we measure is in fact composed of multiple, possibly divergent, business strategics.
To measure diversity we used a classification developed by Runic 11 (1474) and later used by
Vancil (1979) and Chnstie et al. (2003). The classification distinguishes single business,
dominant business, related business and unrelated business firms. The CF()s were asked to
choose one of these categories for their company, based on a short definition of each in ques-
tion 52. The answers obtained were coded 1 for single business, 2 for dominant business. 3
for related business and 4 for unrelated business. Consequently a high score signifies a high
degree of diversity in the portfolio and limited dependencies between the underlying busi-
nesses. Similarly to strategic typology, the measure represents the self-rating of the CKO. us-
ing a single-point measurement. The internal consistency of the measurement scale cannot be
determined; reliability of the measurement can only be verified against empirical dalu ob-
tained in other studies. How the CFOs in our sample classified their company is reported in
the following table.
T«bl« 7.4 Portfolio di\crsit>
Sing/r
Number of companies per category
% of total. <N=65. 2000 data)
Scores obtained by Christie et al. (2003). number
% of" total. (N= 121. 1987 data)
Scores obtained by Vancil (1979). number
% of total. (N=29|. 1975 data)
Comparison with the data obtained by Christie et al. and Vancil, both for the United States,
suggests that Dutch companies are more diverse. A shift from single and dominant business
firms towards related and unrelated businesses is apparent in the data reported above. Obvi-
ously the difference can be affected by country-specific industry characteristics that can be
different between the United States and the Netherlands. Christie et al. (2003) confirmed that
the measurement scale used is robust to different ways of measuring diversity. This is ex-
pected to be the case in the Netherlands also.
Additional control variables used in the analysis of RTSR: BETA, market-to-book ratio and
size measured in terms of sales, have already been discussed in the preceding chapters.
II
16%
35
29%
58
20 %
14
21%
28
23%
82
28%
22
32 H
33
27%
64
22%
18
27 %
25
21%
87
30 %
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7.4 Discussion of results
7.4.
7.4././
For the investigation of expected difTerences in control system characteristics, as a function
of strategic mission, type, and position, the 11 importance rankings for management control
elements and the 4 factors, both described in chapter 6, were used. Independent sample t-tests
were performed It) determine whether management control system characteristics were dif-
ferent for different strategies.
To determine whether companies with different strategic position had difTerences in man-
agement controls, as posited in the hypothesis III, the response group was split at the median
score for position and the companies with a score below the median (cost leaders) were com-
pared to the companies that had a score above the median (differentiators). The continuous
measurement scale used for position made this possible.
The score on diversity was not significantly different between the groups that were compared.
Therefore there is no reason to assume that the outcome of the analysis is influenced by dif-
ferences in the level of diversity.
The comparison of the importance attached to the 11 elements of management control by
companies with different strategic positions is reported in table 7.5.
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Table 7.5 Test of the difference in importance attached to elements of management control systems between
differentiators and cost leaders (t-test)
(7ur
Mean importance of financial performance measures
Mean importance of non-financial performance measures
Mean importance of budgeting
Mean importance of codes of conduct
Mean importance of compan) culture
Mean importance of cost and variance analysis
Mean importance of incentives
Mean importance of internal controls
Mean importance of management style
Mean importance of mission statement
Mean importance of organizational structure
5 78
4.42
6.09
4.50
5JI
4.89
5.23
5 38
5.47
4.00
5 52
5.61
4J7
5.70
4.13
4.7«
4.84
5.03
513
5 30
3.96
540
0 631
2.M7
1.516
1.071
2.223
0 145
0 749
0995
0.695
0.130
0409
0 510
0.04«
0.1.W
0.288
COM
0885
0456
0.324
0490
0897
0684
Significant values arc in hold
There is evidence that management control system characteristics are different between the
contrasting strategics that we compared. Therefore we find some support tor hypothesis HI.
The higher importance attached to non-financial performance measures by differentiators can
probably be explained from their focus on innovation and distinguishing product characteris-
tics. These cannot be measured easily using financial performance measures. In contrast, cost
leaders can be expected to put more focus on cost prices and margins and can therefore be
expected to find non-financial performance measures less important. This outcome is in ac-
cordance with earlier findings from Inner et al. (1997) with respect to performance measures
used in bonus contracts. That cost leaders also score lower, although not significantly, on fi-
nancial performance measures appears to contradict the above reasoning, but that is not nec-
essarily the case. Differentiators will typically encounter higher risks and uncertainties in
their business, which can be expected to result in a higher importance being attached to man-
agement controls across the board. This is illustrated by the fact that differentiators attach a
higher importance to all 11 controls. Most probably differentiators experience higher uncer-
tainty that they want to compensate by higher attention paid to management controls in gen-
eral. The higher importance attached to company culture is less obvious.
The Mann-Whitney test produced similar results and is therefore not reported here.
The same analysis was also performed for the four management control factors developed in
chapter 6. The outcome of this comparison showed significant differences for factor 2 and
factor 4 controls, confirming the above findings.
In summary we can conclude that our data provide some, but limited, support for hypotheses
HI.
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When we relate the strategy of the companies in our sample to the adoption of VBM we find
that 18 (51.4 %) cost leaders had adopted VBM by the year 2000. Out of the total group of 32
differentiators, 16 (50 %) have adopted VBM. At first glance this does not indicate a much
higher preference for the application of value-based management in the group of cost leaders
in our sample, which is against the expectation posited by Lovata and C'ostigan (2002). To
investigate this further we compared the scores for the strategic position of companies that
had adopted VBM by the year 2000 and companies that had not done so. The comparison is
reported in table 7.6.
Table 7.6 Test of the difference in score for strategic position between companies that applied VBM bv the year
2000 and companies thai did not (l-lcsl)
position 4.69 4 60 0 469 0,641
The adoption of VBM appears to be unrelated to the strategic position of the companies in
our sample. We have to reject hypothesis 112 and conclude that we cannot corroborate the
earlier findings of l.ovata and C'ostigan (2002) who found a significantly higher adoption of
MVA Performance measures in defender companies. The adoption of VBM does not appear to
differ significantly between companies with different strategies in our empirical data.
To be able to determine whether the observed differences in importance attached to certain
elements of management control find their reflection in economic performance, we compared
the companies that rcali/.ed a below median RTSR and those that realized an equal to or
above median RTSR. The response group was split at the median cumulative RTSR for the
four-year period IW7 2000. The importance attached to the 11 elements of management
control were compared between cost leaders and differentiators that produced below median
RTSR on the one hand and those that produced above median RTSR on the other, to deter-
mine whether there was support for hypothesis H2. The outcome of the comparison is pre-
sented in the following table.
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Table 7.7 Test of the difference in importance attached to elements of management control systems for cost
leaders and differentiators with below median and equal or above median RTSR (1-lcsi. N - 47)
Oi/Hr« «iris/or» (
«Wo»-
«wvftojf
Ä7X*
atoiv
mnttM Ä7XÄ
Mean importance of financial performance measures
Mean importance of non-financial performance
measures
Mean importance of budgeting
Mean importance of codes of conduct
Mean importance of company culture
Mean importance of cost and variance analysis
Mean importance of incentives
Mean importance of internal controls
Mean importance of management style
Mean importance of mission statement
Mean importance of organizational structure
5.86
I-O.I47
4.45
t--0.085
6.55
t-l.6J0
5.00
1=1 108
S.73
t-2.279
4.77
I--0.04I
5.14
t=-0.376
5.77
1=1.716
5.86
r=l.865
3.82
t=-0 313
6.00
r=2.l6l
5.80
p-0.885
4.50
p-0.933
5.85
p-0.125
4.25
p-0.282
4.75
p-0.034
480
p-0.968
5.35
p=0.71l
5.00
p=0.l02
5.15
p=fl.O78
4.00
p=0.758
5.05
p=0.044
6.00
t—1.175
4.62
t-0479
6.62
r-2.SU
4.96
t-1.493
S.6S
t-2.S«5
488
t-0.439
5.12
t=-0.182
5.81
1=2.364
5.58
t=1.384
3.96
t=0.398
6.00
t-2.682
$.50
p-0.252
4.38
p-0.636
5.67
p-fl.023
4.08
p-0.149
4.58
4.63
p-0.665
5.21
p-0.857
4.88
p-0.027
5.00
p-0.180
3.75
p=0.694
4.92
p-0.013
Significant values are in bold.
The analysis appears to provide support for hypothesis H3. Successful differentiators attach
significantly greater importance to company culture, management style and organizational
structure in comparison to unsuccessful differentiators. On the other hand, successful cost
leaders attach significantly higher importance to budgeting, company culture, internal con-
trols and organizational structure compared to unsuccessful cost leaders. Significant differ-
ences were also found (not reported here) when the four management control factors were
analyzed. What is unclear is to what extent these differences arc significant for the explana-
tion of inter-firm differences in value creation. We address that question in the next section.
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7.4.2. / A/örttf£eme/tf r««/ro/ .«j-5/ei
To investigate the relation between the importance attached by the CFOs to the 11 elements
of management control, the strategy pursued by their company and the creation of value for
shareholders.
We estimated the following regression equation:
R T S R W = ßo+ßi I I IMPMC, ,, + ß,;POSITIONoo + ßuLNSALES + ß,4MB«w>7 +
ßi5 BETAoo-»7 "*• 6
The new independent variable was defined as:
POSITION,,,,: strategy variable measuring the strategic position at the end of 2000 on a scale
of I to 7 in accordance with the distinction between cost leaders and differ-
entiators introduced by Porter (1980), see section 7.3.1
The results of the regression analysis are presented in table 7.8.
Table 7.8 Mullivariale results with importance ranking for control system elements and strategic position as
independent variables and cumulative RTSR as dependent variable
Constant
Mean importance of financial performance measures
Mean importance of non-financial performance
measures
Mean importance of budgeting
Mean importance of codes of conduct
Mean importance of company culture
Mean importance of cost and variance analysis
Mean importance of incentives
Mean importance of internal controls
Mean importance of management style
Mean importance of mission statement
Mean importance of organisational structure
POSITION
LNSAl.HS
MIW
BETA,»,,
sign
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)(+)
(?)
t'a/it«
-3.803
0.508
0.014
0.103
0.080
0.406
-0.211
•0.528
0.073
-0.034
-0.061
-0.080
-0.039
0080
0.067
1.148
S7anaW
1.635
0.204
0.202
0.228
0.178
0.199
0.122
0.170
0.200
0.169
0.132
0.168
0.257
0.055
0.030
0.417
r-va/uf
-2.326
2.492
0.068
0.452
0.450
2.046
-1.730
-3.106
0.364
-0.203
-0.462
-0.477
-0.154
1.449
2.203
2.751
0.028
0.028
0.946
0.655
0.656
0.051
0.095
0.005
0.719
0.841
0.648
0.637
0.879
0.159
0.037
0.011
R'-0 .590, N-41, I5df. K-4 927. Sign, two-tailed = 0.000 Significant effects are in bold
Contrary to our expectation and the postulated relevance of strategy to the explanation of
control system differences, we did not find a significant contribution of the strategy variable
to the explanation of differences in RTSR, across the companies in our sample. The impor-
tance attached to financial performance measures, as well as the importance attached to in-
centives (negative), remain significant for the explanation of value creation. These results
lead us to reject hypothesis H3, because strategic position did not contribute significantly to
the explanation of RTSR differences.
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A similar regression analysis with the four management control factors as independent vari-
ables instead of the 11 elements of management control produced comparable results.
7.4.2.2 FOCJM OH lu/wt- rraj/io«
To determine whether a management control system that is focused on shareholder value
creation contributes to the creation of RTSR in certain strategic settings, we return to the ini-
tial analysis of chapter 5, adding strategic position as an additional explanatory variable. It
needs to be pointed out that the adoption of VBM is a specific characteristic of management
control that was measured per year. Consequently, the regression equation needs be estimated
separately for each year. To remain parsimonious, we only report the results lor the year 2000
and comment on the other years when discussing these results. We estimated the following
regression equation:
RTSR«, = ßo + ß,VBMoo + ß:POSITIONoo + ßtLNSALES + ß, MB«, + ß^ BETA«, + E
The results that were obtained are reported in table 7.9.
Table 7.9 Multivariatc results with adoption of value-based management and strategic position as independent
variables and RTSR as dependent variable
RTSR 2000
rar/aWr £.v/>rrm/ Wjjn (<x'/J7r<wi/ .V/arx/aro* error f-va/ur >V'#n.
v/Mf
Constant (?)
VBM (+)
POSII ION (7)
LNSALES (+)
MB (+)
BETA £?}
R- = 0.181. N=63. 5df. F=3.788, Sign, two-tailed = 0.005. Significant effects are in bold.
Both strategic position and relative risk measured in terms of BETA contribute to the expla-
nation of RTSR in the year 2000. The adoption of VBM is not significant. When we investi-
gated RTSR 1 and 2 years after adoption of VBM we also found no significant contribution
from the adoption of VBM and therefore we have to conclude that it docs not contribute sig-
nificantly to the explanation of RTSR.
The analysis was also performed for RTSR in 1999 and 1998, which produced results that
were comparable to those reported in chapter 5. In 1999 the overall regression was not sig-
nificant, while in 1998 the only factor that contributed significantly to the explanation of
RTSR was the market-to-book ratio. Again we have to conclude that there is no support for
hypothesis H3.
7.4.2. j /Hteracrion a/>/>roacA
In accordance with early research that pursued similar research questions (Govindarajan &
Fisher 1990, Abemethy & Guthrie 1994, Hartmann 1997, Davilla 2000, Lovata & Costigan
2002), moderated regression analysis (Hartmann & Moers 1999) was applied to determine
whether variations in the performance of companies could be explained from the interaction
between variables, in our case the interaction between strategy and a focus on shareholder
value creation in management control.
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-0.326
0.194
0.150
0.014
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To perform the analysis the following regression equation was used:
RTSRoo = Po + ßi VBMOO + P;POSITIONoo+ P JLNSALES + P« MB« + ps BETA« +
ß»VBM«,*POSITIONoo + e
The new interaction variable that was added was coded VBMno*POSITIONno and measured
the interaction between strategic position and the adoption of VBM. Using a binary coded
variable (VBMo« is coded 0 or I to identify the adoption of VBM) is appropriate for this kind
of analysis according to Hartmann (1997, p. 167). The new regression produced the same ad-
justed R-square (0.1X1) as the previous model, and an interaction term that was not signifi-
cant. The results are presented in table 7.10.
Table 7.10 Mullivuriatc results wnh adoption of value-based management and strategic position, including their
interaction, as independent variables and KISR as dependent variable
RTSK 2000
Constant
VMM
POSH ION
l.NSAl.fcS
MB
ni iA
VIIM*POSIIION
£.¥pf c/wf* £^Jf
(?)
( • )
(+)
(+)
C)
(•')
va/n«
0226
-0560
0043
0.009
0.007
-0.405
0 1<>7
.SVan Jorrf error
0.718
0.756
0.130
0.022
0005
0.110
0 165
Mo/ue
0.315
-0.740
0.329
0.416
1305
-3.666
1.010
.V/jf/i.
0.754
0.462
0.743
0.679
0.197
0.001
0J17
K - 0.181, N-63, 6df. 1-3 328, Sign. I wo-tailed - 0.007. Significant ellecls are in bold.
The fact that the interaction term is positive but not significant indicates that the interaction
between the application of VBM and the strategic position of the company does not explain
the differences in RTSR between companies. Consequently we have to conclude that the
main effect of strategic position on the explanation of RTSR is significant but that this is not
influenced by the adoption of VBM by the companies concerned either as a main effect or
through interaction.
7.5 Summary and conclusions
In this chapter the relation between management controls and business strategy was investi-
gated and both exploratory and confirmatory analyses were performed to understand the con-
tingency relationship between the two. Three different strategy dimensions were used, based
on earlier empirical work by others: strategic position, strategy type and strategic mission.
The data obtained on these different dimensions were compared with other empirical studies
to test their plausibility. In addition the scores on the three dimensions were validated against
each other, which resulted in concern with regard to the reliability of the mission data that
were available. In itself this is an area for further research because the measurement instru-
ments that were used for the three dimensions are replications of earlier research. That the
postulated internal consistency in the three dimensions is not found in practice raises ques-
tions with regard to the reliability of the measurement instrument for strategic mission.
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The CFOs of companies pursuing different strategies rate the importance of certain manage-
ment controls differently. Differentiators attach greater importance to non-financial perform-
ance measures and company culture and they also rate the overall importance of the 11 man-
agement control elements higher. The same applies to factor 2 and 4 controls and the overall
importance attached to the management control factors. All in all, this confirms that the im-
portance attached to management controls is somewhat dependent on the strategy of the
company.
The adoption of shareholder value focused management controls appears to be unrelated to
the strategic position of the companies in the response group. The expected preference for
VBM in companies that pursue a cost leadership strategy was not continued.
Successful differentiators that create above median RTSR were found to attach higher impor-
tance to company culture, management style and organizational structure when compared to
unsuccessful differentiators. Successful cost leaders distinguished themselves from their less
successful colleagues by attaching higher importance to budgeting, company culture, internal
controls and organizational structure. One can read this as an indication that successful dif-
ferentiators have more focus on behavior/input controls, whereas successful cost leaders
place more reliance on output-related controls.
Multiple regression analysis showed that the differences in strategy in combination with
management control characteristics did not contribute significantly to the explanation of in-
ter-firm differences in RTSR. In that respect the expected impact on performance of the rela-
tion between management control characteristics and business strategy could not be sup-
ported. Differences in importance attached to certain management controls partly explain
value creation, but these are not dependent on the strategy that is followed by the company.
The findings with regard to the relation between company strategy, the adoption of VBM,
and the creation of RTSR are not conclusive and are contrary to the empirical findings of oth-
ers. This leaves room for future research. It is clear that a contingency relation between strat-
egy and management control exists. Additional research is needed to obtain a belter under-
standing of the nature of this relationship and why it appears not to contribute to differences
in the creation of value for shareholders.
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8.
Overall summary and conclusions
8.1 Introduction
The goal of this dissertation is to obtain a better understanding of the relation between man-
agement control systems (MCS) and the creation of value for shareholders. Value creation is
the stated objective of many companies and in view of the fact thai management control sys-
tems are used to guide organizations and their members towards (he realization »I their objec-
tives, we assumed that it would be possible to find a relation between MI'S and value crea-
tion. In this chapter an overview of the empirical findings is provided with discussion of the
conclusions and implications that arise from these findings. Limitations of the study and di-
rections for future research will also be addressed. The results of the three empirical studies
that were performed are first summarized and commented upon. Subsequently a discussion of
the limitations of the study will be provided. The conclusions and implications are discussed
together with areas for future research in the last section.
8.2 Summary of empirical findings
In essence three research questions have been addressed in this dissertation. All dealt with the
relation between management control and the creation of value for shareholders, measured in
terms of relative total shareholder return (RTSR). In the first study it was determined whether
a management control system that is focussed on the creation of value for shareholders con-
tributes to the creation of RTSR. It can be argued that the implementation of value-based
management is in fact the introduction of a specific focus into an organization's management
control system. This assertion is the cornerstone of the first study. As a second step the re-
search question was generalized and it was investigated whether management control system
characteristics in general explain the creation of value for shareholders. In that case it was not
important whether companies had introduced a value-based management focus, but the actual
importance attached to elements of management control was studied. The third study ad-
dressed the relation between management control system characteristic and company strat-
egy, again in relation to the creation of value for shareholders.
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The empirical material used for the studies was obtained from a questionnaire that was sub-
mitted by 68 companies listed in the Netherlands. The companies that cooperated were identi-
fied in the questionnaires and consequently financial information and stock market perform-
ance of the companies could be obtained and related to the questionnaire results. This distin-
guishes our research approach from most survey-based studies in this particular area that rely
on the perception of survey participants for the measurement of performance.
Ä. 2.2 Ko/we-Aav«/ mawajfe/ne«/ybri/5«/ ron/ro/ jyj/emj
To test whether companies that applied value-based management (VBM) were actually
achieving superior performance in terms of value creation for their shareholders, four hy-
potheses were developed. The performance of companies that adopted VBM was compared
with the performance of non-adopters in the sample. Performance was measured on three dif-
ferent levels: (I) stock-market performance in terms of RTSR, (2) accounting performance
measured by return on equity and earnings per share, and (3) managers' perception of per-
formance. Contrary to the predictions of value-based management theory, the empirical data
did not provide support for the assumption that performance improves as a result of the adop-
tion of VHM. These findings were corroborated when lagged performance was measured al-
lowing tor a one or two-year learning period after the initial adoption of VBM.
Explanations for the lack of evidence that VBM actually enhances value creation can be that
the companies applying the concept arc not doing so properly. It may be that the objective is
stated but not properly communicated and translated into performance measures and objec-
tives lor employees al various levels of the organization. It can also be that VBM is simply
not effective and thai traditional management controls are just as effective for the achieve-
ment of value creation. When we assume that VBM is only appropriate for certain companies
under specific circumstances, there may be a problem because of the endogenous nature of
choice for VBM. In case only those companies adopt VBM for which it is a suitable man-
agement technique, there will be no association between performance and the application of
VBM (see on this Ittner et al. 2002. p. 723, with respect to the adoption of Activity Based
Costing). Lastly, other independent variables that were not measured may impact share prices
and affect our findings.
iS.2. .f Aft/Mrtj^t'mt'M/ <•«»/«>/.vv.vfem
To be able to measure management control systems, a set of 11 management control system
characteristics was developed on the basis of Simons' four levers of control (Simons 1995 ),
and input from an expert panel. The analysis of the answers regarding these characteristics
showed that the measurement instrument had an acceptable level of reliability. From these 11
elements a unique set of four management control system factors was developed using factor
analysis. Both the 11 elements and the 4 factors were used for our subsequent investigation of
the relation between management control and shareholder value creation.
Two hypotheses were tested in this study. First, it was investigated whether companies that
were more successful in creating value for their shareholders attached a different importance
to management controls compared to companies that were less successful. The second en-
quiry addressed the question whether companies that applied VBM rated the importance of
certain management controls differently from companies that did not apply the concept.
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We found that successful value creators attached significantly more importance to certain
management controls compared to less successful companies and that this was also the case
for certain management control factors. When additional control variables were introduced in
the analysis, the existence of differences was confirmed. It emerged that companies thai cre-
ated value for their shareholders attached significantly higher importance to financial per*
formance measures and a significantly lower importance to incentives. The fact that impor-
tance attached to incentives had a negative contribution to the explanation of inter-firm dif-
ferences in the creation of value for shareholders is contrary to the recommendations ot VMM
theorists (Stewart 1991 and others) who attach high importance to incentives as an element of
VBM.
The companies that applied VBM were not found to differentiate their management control
system from companies that did not apply VBM. This can possibly be an explanation why a
beneficial impact of VBM application on the creation of value for shareholders could not be
found in the first study. Apparently the adoption of VBM does not lead to changes in the
management control system of the companies in our sample, which can be an indication that
the concept is acknowledged but not effectively translated into management control.
The third study introduced company strategy into our investigation, in accordance with the
notion that there is a contingent relationship between company strategy and management con-
trol systems (Langfield-Smith 1997 and others). This relationship could be expected to huvc
had influence in the first two studies, which could impair the validity ol the conclusions from
those studies. Consequently the scope of the investigation was expanded to include company
strategy, more specifically the strategic position of the companies in the sample, in accor-
dance with the distinction between cost leaders and differentiators that was introduced by
Porter (1980).
First, it was investigated whether management control systems of the companies in the sam-
ple differed according to the strategy of the companies. Subsequently the question was ad-
dressed whether the adoption of value-based management was associated with the strategy of
the companies in the sample. As a final step, the question was addressed whether differences
in performance could be explained from different combinations of management control and
strategy.
Confirmation was found for the expected differences in management control between cost
leaders and differentiators, in line with previous empirical studies. Differentiators were found
to attach greater importance to non-financial performance measures and company culture. In
addition they were found to attach a higher overall importance to management controls in
comparison with cost leaders.
No evidence was found that the adoption of VBM, as a specific form of management control,
was related to the strategic position of the companies in the sample.
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Successful differentiators were found to attach higher importance to behavior/input controls
like company culture, management style and organizational structure, whereas successful cost
leaders additionally focused on budgeting and internal controls. Although these differences
could be identified within the two groups of companies that employed different strategies, an
overall relation between business strategy and management control that explained the crea-
tion of value for shareholders could not be established. However, it was established that, in
addition to Financial performance measures and incentives, also company culture and cost
and variance analysis were areas that contributed significantly to the explanation of differ-
ences in KTSR.
The findings from this third study are not conclusive and in some instances are contrary to the
empirical findings of others that addressed similar research questions.
8.3 Limitation* of the studies
The use of survey data in management accounting research has frequently been criticized
(e.g. Young IW6) and therefore can be seen as a weakness. The criticism points towards the
limited use of sampling techniques and lack of examination of non-response bias, to small
sample sizes, the use of self-reported performance measures and the common-method prob-
lem.
The use of sampling techniques was not an issue in our study because all companies listed on
the Amsterdam slock exchange were actually invited to participate in me research, with the
exception of those that were not comparable in view of their business. The 40.2 % response
that was obtained was adequate and compared favorably with other studies that approached a
similar audience. Due to the mixed research design that used survey data, stock market per-
formance and financial information of the companies that participated, it was furthermore
possible to determine the extent to which the response group mirrored the market. This
showed that the participants were larger in size than the average company listed in Amster-
dam. No evidence of non-response bias was found in the surveys that were returned.
The sample was small, with 68 useable responses. This could be expected as a consequence
of the research design. C'FOs of listed companies were asked to reply to the survey and they
were expected to have a limited willingness to participate. This was accepted in view of the
expectation that this disadvantage would be counterbalanced by the fact that the CFOs were
the most knowledgeable with respect to their companies" application of value-based man-
agement and the design of the management control system. However, this also entailed the
risk that the information obtained measured the opinion of the CFO with respect to VBM and
MCS, and not necessarily how these concepts were employed and perceived to function by
other members of the organization.
As a function of the research design, independent market-based performance measures could
be used in addition to self-perceived performance. Therefore this criticism of survey-based
research is not applicable in our case.
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Lastly the measurement of VBM and MCS can be impacted by the common-method problem
that results from the fact that survey respondents are likely to provide consistent and socially
desirable answers. This nsk cannot be argued away with respect to our studs, notably with
respect to value-based management. At the time that the survey was conducted VBM was
regarded as an innovative management technique that received widespread support. Some
CF()s may therefore have been inclined to state that they apply the concept simply to avoid
appearing old-fashioned. Although the application of VBM was measured through a number
of questions to prevent companies that merely applied lip service to the concept from being
classified as applicants of VBM. it cannot be ruled out that this occurred in some cases. Due
to the fact that an a priori preference for certain management controls is not very likely and
that a comprehensive set of questions was used lo measure MCS, the risk of the common-
method problem for these data is deemed to be much lower.
A specific limitation of our study is related to the use of slock market performance to deter-
mine value creation. Although this is an objective measure that is not biased, it has the inher-
ent disadvantage that it is impacted by numerous factors. Conclusive models thai fully ex-
plain the di(Terences in share price performance between companies are not available and
many variables have been identified that impact these differences. Although a number of con-
trol variables have been used that are known to influence the average return of shares, it is by
no means certain that all relevant control variables were included (l-'ama & I'rench 1992,
1993), and therefore our findings may be influenced by variables that were not included in
our research. It cannot be ruled out that an omitted variable problem is present in our study.
Another specific limitation of the study is that the choice of value-based management may be
endogenous and that only those companies that will benefit from the concept actually adopt
it. If that is the case there is no difference to be expected between companies that apply VBM
and companies that do not do so. Trie endogenous nature of the choice of certain management
control concepts has been mentioned as a possible explanation for the absence of perform-
ance differences between adopters and non-adopters (Ittner et al. 2002), and this could also be
the case in our study.
In summary we have to conclude that our study is subject to limitations and therefore our in-
ferences need to be judged with some reservation. The fact that only very limited empirical
research is available with regard to the research questions we pursued outweighs these con-
cerns in our view and means that our works contributes to the understanding of management
control.
8.4 Conclusions, implications and directions for future research
Value-based management is a relatively new concept that was expected to have implications
for management control in organizations. The combination of survey data and stock market
returns has proved to be a worthwhile research approach that enhances our understanding of
the consequences and results of the application of value-based management. However, our
studies only provide partial understanding and, to some extent, evidence that is conflicting
with the empirical findings of other researchers or the views expressed in the value-based
management literature. In itself this contributes to the scientific discourse and therefore adds
value, certainly in view of the fact that this area of research has not been widely explored to
date.
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Overall we did not find that the application of value-based management results in a better
performance in terms of shareholder value creation. Companies that apply the concept should
therefore consider whether they have translated the concept into a true value-based manage-
ment culture, as recommended by Haspeslagh et al. (2001). The fact that we did not find dis-
tinctive differences in management control systems between companies that applied value-
based management and those that did not, can be read as a sign that insufficient steps are
taken to deploy value-based management and integrate it in management control on various
levels of the organizations. It can also be that the successful application of VBM requires
learning and therefore only becomes apparent after a number of years. We did not find evi-
dence for this when we investigated the one and two year lagged performance of the compa-
nies in our sample, but that could be due to the limited time window that was used. Two areas
for future research emerge from these observations. It would be worthwhile to investigate the
understanding and awareness of value-based management on different levels within the com-
panies that adopted VBM, to learn whether lack of deployment of the concepts is an explana-
tion for the failure of VBM to contribute to value creation. Case studies in companies that
employ VBM can certainly contribute to our understanding in this respect. Long-interval re-
turn studies comparing the performance of VBM-adopters with the performance of a matched
sample of non-adopters can be used to obtain more pertinent evidence on the effectiveness of
VBM and the question whether this effectiveness depends on a certain period of learning.
That differences in importance attached to certain management controls are found to partially
explain the creation of value for shareholders is a confirmation of earlier empirical work into
the relation between management control and economic performance. For companies that arc
niirsimw value crcaiinn nbiectives. these findings indicate that a focus on certain manage-
ment controls, notably attaching a high importance to financial performance measures and
company culture and attaching less importance to cost and variance analysis and incentives
can contribute to the creation of value for shareholders. Although not directly the subject of
our study, our findings with respect to incentives can be read as an indication that a high im-
portance attached to incentives is detrimental to shareholder value creation. Such a conclu-
sion is contrary to the findings of others (e.g. Wallace 1997, 1998) and therefore future re-
search into the importance of incentives for the creation of shareholder value is certainly de-
sirable.
The evidence that was found of the differences in management control as a function of the
strategy pursued is in accordance with earlier empirical work. However, these differences do
not contribute to a better explanation of the creation of shareholder value. That is contrary to
other contingency studies into the relation between management control systems and strategy
and warrants further investigation. The same applies to the fact that we did not find a signifi-
cant difference in the adoption of VBM between companies with different strategic positions.
Our research design differs from other studies in this area in view of the fact that we can use
survey data to determine whether companies apply VBM, whereas other studies (performed
in the United States) use publicly disclosed information with respect to incentive plans to de-
termine this. It would be worthwhile to replicate our investigation in a US setting to be able
to determine whether both ways to measure adoption of VBM produce comparable results.
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Further investigation of the correlation between the three strategy dimensions: (I) :
mission, (2) strategy type, and (3) strategic position is also warranted. The postulated correla-
tion between these dimensions could only be partially confirmed, which raises questions with
respect to the reliability of the data that were found. Further work in this area is needed to
confirm the reliability of the instruments used to measure the constructs and to validate the
theory that they are conceptually related.
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Appendix 1. A. Target audience and response
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
Com/Mini'
as'.?
Aalbcrs Industries NV
Accell Group NV
AFC Ajax NV ^ „,
AinoNV ^-...j. •-.,:,
Airspra> NV * , ,
Akzo Nobel NV ^ .
AlanhcriNV
Amstelland NV
Apothekers Cooperatic OPG U.A.
Arcadis NV
ASM International NV
ASM lithograph) Holding NV
Athlon Uroep NV
Axa Stenman Industries NV
AXXICON Group NV
Ballast Nedam NV
Batenburg Beheer NV
BE Semiconductor Industries NV . ,
Beers NV ^ . . .
Beter Bed Holding NV
Blue Fox Enterprises NV ....-.,•••
Blydenstein-Willink NV . . *
Brunei International NV
Buco NV
Buhrmann NV , ^  ,.
Elofer NV ,'y
CH"AC-Align NV
Cap Gemini NV ^ ,
Cardio Control NV
CMG pic
Computer Services Solutions Holding NV
Copaco NV
Corus Group pic
CrucellNV
CSMNV
De Drie Electronics Beheer NV
De Vries Robbe Groep NV
Delft Instruments NV
Devote NV
DNC De Nederlanden Compagnie NV
farm </*«<•</
V - M
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
/.«•irrajfc
U V f t f ft»
Yes
Yes
Yes
, v '••' ^ '•''.= ' ' -^- - I ' '
. , • ( / ; : ; •
' • / J^ ' , , . . * - . . - . - .
' * '
/)«/r » *<•»
22.6.01 ,„
6.4.01
1.6.01 j .
11.5.01 ^
6.4.01 ,
6.4.01 ^
-
20.4.01
11.5.01
6.4.01
20.4.01
11.5.01
6.4.01
6.4.01 ;:
6.4.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
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41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
IXXdataNV
DPA Holding NV
Draka Holding NV
DSM NV
1 MHA Technick üroep NV
1 RIKS Holding NV
European Marketing Information Services NV
Ixact Holding NV
1 ornix HioScicnces NV
r-'ox Kid» l-uropc NV
1 rec Record Shop Holding NV
1 ugro NV
(iamma Holding NV
(Jclronics NV
(»evekc NV
Oouda Vuurvast Holding NV
(irontmii NV
(iroolhandcUgcbou wen NV
( i l l NV
H I S »cheer NV
llagcmcycr NV
HAI. Holding NV.
llcijnians NV
HcinckcnNV
llclvocl Holding NV
H U I NV
1 lolland Colours NV
Hollandschc Beton (iroep NV
Huhtamaki Van l.ccrOyi
Hunter Douglas NV
K l Automatiscring NV
II IC Caland NV
InnoConccpts NV
Intcrnalio-Mullcr NV
ISOTISNV
KNSI- NV
Koninklijkc Ahold NV
Koninklijkc Ahrcnd NV
Koninklijkc »AM (iroep NV
Koninklijkc Bcgcmann Oroup (RBCi) NV
Koninklijkc Boskalis Westminster NV
Koninklijkc »rill NV
Koninklijkc l'conoslo NV
Koninklijkc Irans Maas Oroep NV
Koninklijkc (irolsch NV
Koninklijkc KPN NV
Koninklijkc 1 uchtvaart Maalschappij NV
Koninklijkc Ncdllo\dNV
Koninkli|kc Ncdschrocf Holding NV
/V-M
¥A2 %
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
^ T
/wrricipa/jo«
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
response
was
ro/fcetof
11.5.01
15.6.01
6.4.01
8.6.01
20.4.01
6401
>22.6.01
20.4 01
11.5.01
6401
20.4.01
11.5.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
20.4.01
11.5.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
15.6.01
6.4.01
20.401
1.6 01
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90
91
92
93
94
95
%
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
123
122
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
Koninklijke Numico NV
Koninklijke Ten Cate NV
Koninklijke Tcxtielgroep Twenthe NV
Koninklijke Volker Wessels Stevin NV
Koninklijke Vopak NV
Koninklijke Wessanen NV
Koninklijke/Shell Group NV
KPNQwest NV
KSI International NV
Kühne + Hcitz NV
Landis Group NV
Lauras NV
LCI Technology Group NV
Libertcl NV
Macintosh Retail Group NV
Magnus Holding NV
Management Share NV
McGregor Fashion Group NV
NaclTNV
NAGRON Nationaal Grondbe/it NV
Ncdcon Groep NV
NedGraphics Holding NV
New Skies Satellites NV
Neways Electronics International NV
Newconomy NV
Nutreco Holding NV
NV Dico International
NV Gemeenschap. Bezil Crown Van Gelder
NV Holdingmaatschappij De Telegraaf
NV Koninklijke Porceleyne Fles anno 1653
NV Nederlandsche Apparatenl'abriek NEDAP
NV Twentsche Kabel Holding
OceNV
Nyloplast NV
Ordina NV
Petroplus International NV
Pharming Group NV
Philips Electronics NV
PinkRoccadc NV
Polynorm NV
Prolion NV
Randstad Holding NV
Reed Elsevier
Reesink NV
RING!ROSA Products NV
Rood Testhouse International NV
Roto Smeets De Boer NV
Rubber Cultuur Maatschappij Amsterdam NV
Samas-Groen NV
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
6.4.01
20.4.01
6.4.01
Yes >22.6.0l
>22.6.0l
20,4.01
6.4.01
11.5.01
20.4.01
>22.6.0l
20.4.01
6.4.01
II. 5.01
11.5.01
11.5.01
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pa/ticipafion
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
ISH
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
Schuitcma NV
Schuttcnvcld NV
Seagull Holding NV
Simac Icchmck NV
Sligro »cheer NV
Smil Internationale NV
SNT (irocp NV
Sophcon pic
Stern (irocp NV
Stork NV
Til Molding NV
TNI Po»l (irocp NV
Toolcx International NV
Tulip Computer» NV
IK'C (iroep NV
Unilever NV
Unil4NV
1 Initcd Pun-Huropc Communications NV
1 Initcd Services (iroup NV
Van 1 )orp 1 >c»pcc (irocp NV
Van Heck-lwckaNV
Van Mcllc NV
Vcdior NV
Vcndcx KB» NV
VersaTel Telecom Industries NV
Vilcnzo International NV
VNUNV
Vredeslein NV
Wegcncr NV
Wcwelcr NV
Wolters Kluwcr NV
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
1.6.01
20.4.01
22.6.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
6.4.01
11.5.01
11.5.01
6.4.01
11.5.01
22.6.01
Yes 115.01
6.4.01
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Appendix 1. B. Companies excluded from
target audience
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
g
9
!()
I I
12
1.1
14
15
16
17
18
19
(bm/Mfii fiamf
ABN AMRO Holding NV
AegonNV
AM) Imcmational Publishers NV
Antonm pic
AOT NV
ATAG Group NV
Bc\er Holding
Chicago Hridge & Iron Company NV
i:vc Imcrnalional NV
Fortis
Gucci Group NV
ING Grocp NV
lspal Internalional NV
Kas-Associatie NV
Kempen & Co. NV
Scala Business Solutions NV
Van der Hoop EITektenbank NV
Van der Moolcn Holding NV
Van [.ansehet NV
Financial institution
liiianci.il institution
H.inkniplo in 2001
1 orcign coinpam
1 inaneuil institution
Hanlrvipic) in 2(MM
1 inancial institution
1 orcign conipan>
Foreign compun>
1 inancial instituiion
1 orcign compam
1 inancial insiitulion
(»reign coinpam
I-inancial institution
1 inancial institution
Foreign company
Financial institution
Financial institution
Financial institution
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Appendix 2. Summary of the research
instrument
The research instrument consisted of 52 questions that addressed various aspects of manage-
ment control, shareholder value creation and company strategy. The questions arc summa-
rized below. The summary also indicates the scoring range thai was used und. where the
question replicates previous studies, contains a reference to the source of the question. The
questions are numbered in accordance with the research instrument, and these question num-
bers are used as reference in the study. In some questions CT'Os were asked to indicule the
importance they attached to certain aspects of management control. For these questions a
7 point Likert-like scale was provided that was anchored at three points (I = not important, 4
= average importance, 7 = very important). A score was asked for both the current (end of
2000) importance and for the importance four years earlier. In this summary we will refer to
this scale as the 7-point importance scale. A number of questions were introduced with a brief
explanation of the concept that was addressed in the question, for example u brief explanation
of the balanced storecard preceded question 3. These descriptions arc not reproduced in this
summary.
Overview of the questions
1. According to 7bw Cope/awd (Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Compa-
nies, J. Wiley, 1995, page 166) "Performance measurement systems to support value-based
management may require significant changes from a company's traditional approach. In par-
ticular, performance measurement has to move away from being accounting driven to being
management driven". What is your opinion about his point of view? (5-point anchored scale,
strongly agree/strongly disagree).
2. a. Please indicate the importance of financial performance measures for management con-
trol in your company. (7-point importance scale).
2. b. Same question for non-financial performance measures. (7-point importance scale)
3. Does your organization use balanced scorecards? (No, yes since year).
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4. To what extent do superiors rely on accounting information such as budgets, spending lim-
its, and financial targets in judging managerial performance?
4.a. Accounting numbers play an important role when the performance of managers is
judged.
4.b. Activities are principally controlled through periodic reporting of accounting informa-
tion,
4.c. Superiors are principally preoccupied with the ability of managers to meet their financial
targets expressed in accounting numbers.
(Scored on 7-point scale anchored at three points from definitely false to definitely true).
S.a. I)ocs your organization systematically measure (quantify) shareholder value (creation)?
(No, yes since year).
S.b. Indicate the type of value creation mcasure(s) that your organization uses. (ROE on book
value. KOi; on market value. RONA, LPS, Growth in l-l'S. TSR. liVA/SVA, CFROI, other).
6. Please indicate the importance of budgeting for management control in your company.
(7-pomt importance scale).
7. Mow often arc budgets (including rolling forecasts) updated in your organization?
(Annually, twice a year, quarterly, monthly or more frequently).
X. Mow high is the likelihood that the budget will actually be met or exceeded in your organi-
zation'.^ 7-point scale anchored at three points: very low, neither high nor low and very high).
9. Over the last 4 years, how large has the average difference between budgeted and actual
profitability been, in your estimation? (< 5 %, 5 - 15 %, 1 5 - 2 5 %, 25 - 50%, > 50 %).
10. To what degree are profit center managers (budget holders) in your organization involved
in setting their own budget targets? (7-point scale anchored at two points, I = not at all, and
7 - very high).
11. How often do you review the actual performance of your businesses in relation to budgets
and/or forecasts in formal review meetings? (Annually, quarterly, monthly, more frequent).
12. Please indicate the importance of codes of conduct for management control in your com-
pany. (7-point importance scale).
13. Does your organization have a formal code of conduct that describes how the organiza-
tion wants to act as a corporate citizen and what behavior of the organization and its employ-
ees is deemed to be inappropriate and undesirable? (Yes, no).
14. If yes, in your view how widely is the content of the code of conduct known inside your
organization (across all employees)? (< 5 %, 5 - 15 %, 15 - 25 %, 25 - 50 %, > 50 %).
15. Please indicate the importance of company culture for management control in your com-
pany. (7-point importance scale).
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16. Please indicate the importance of cost and variance analysis for management control in
your company. (7-point importance scale).
17. Please indicate the importance of incentives for management control in your company.
(7-point importance scale).
18. Are any of the following value-based performance measures tied to incentives in your
organization? (ROE. RON A. EPS. growth of EPS, TSR. EVA/SVA. CFROI).
Derart/im
19. In the previous question a number of value-based performance measures were mentioned.
Down to which level are they used to evaluate and reward performance in your organization?
(Board of management, senior management, subsidiary or business unit, supervisory and line
manager, employee).
Dei/art/;/«
20. Are any of the following performance measures tied to incentives for managers in your
organization? (Sales (growth), customer satisfaction, market share, quality, production clli-
ciency improvements, innovation, none of the above).
21. Incentives for managers are based on: (objective measures of output performance, subjec-
tive estimates of the efforts of the executives, a combination of the two).
22. Criteria for incentives can be based on the performance of the business that an employee
works in but they can also be based to some extent on the performance of the whole group or
a combination of businesses. Are incentives in your organization principally based on the
performance of the own business or is there a considerable (25 % or more) dependence on the
performance of the total group/combination of businesses? (own business or total
group/combination of businesses). ; . •*,•- •-.. * '
23. What is the most important benchmark for setting performance goals for managers' in-
centives (both value-based and others) in your organization? (Budget, past performance,
competitor's performance, stock market expectations).
24. What portion of executive compensation is tied to performance (both value-based and/or
other)? In answering this question please read executive compensation as the compensation
of members of the Board of Management and the next lower management level reporting to
the Board of Management. (None, < 10 %, 10 - 25 %, 25 - 50 %, > 50 %)
25. Please indicate the importance of internal controls for management control in your com-
pany. (7-point importance scale).
26. Please indicate the importance of management style for management control in your
company. (7-point importance scale).
27. Do senior managers in your organization, including yourself, rely heavily on formal
documents or do they prefer conversations and informal contacts for management control?
(7-point scale anchored on two points, 1 = very formal and 7 = very informal).
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28. Do managers prefer to use tight or loose control? (7-point scale anchored on two points,
1 ~ very tight and 7 = very loose).
29. Please indicate the importance of a mission statement for management control in your
company. (7-point importance scale).
30. Does your organization have a written mission statement (or strategy or vision state-
ment)? (Yes, no).
31. If yes, how widely do you think this statement is known among the employees of your
organization (across all employees)? (< 5 %, 5 - 15 %, 15 - 25 %, 25 - 50 %, > 50 %).
32. If yes, which, if any, of the following groups arc explicitly identified in your organiza-
tion's mission statement? (Customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, the public
/community).
33.a. Docs your organization explicitly refer to "creating shareholder value" as one of its key
corporate objectives in external communications? (Yes, no).
33.b. Same question for internal communications? (Yes, no).
v /9WJ.
34. If yes, when did "creating shareholder value" become one of the key corporate objec-
tives? Fiscal year
35. When the concept of shareholder value was introduced in your company, did you use the
support of any of the following advisors? (Value-based management consultants, manage-
ment consultants, (investment) banks, academics providing consulting services, academics
providing training, none of the above).
36. Organizational structure is the way in which work units are arranged to form an organiza-
tion. The organizational structure determines accountability. Accountability can be allocated
to dill'erent types of responsibility centers (revenue, cost, profit or investment centers). Please
indicate the importance of organizational structure for management control in your company.
(7-point importance scale).
37. To what extent is authority delegated to business unit managers to make each of the fol-
lowing classes of decisions in your organization? Rate the extent of delegation from 1 (ex-
tremely low) to 7 (extremely high). (Development of new outputs, purchase of capital equip-
ment, hiring and firing of personnel, sourcing of inputs, operating procedures and schedules,
pricing of outputs, distribution of outputs, making tradeoffs within the unit's current period
budget).
C7IOH> er a/. 7999.
38. Which control is used interactively in your organization? (Financial performance meas-
ures, non-fmuncial performance measures, budgeting system, code of conduct, company cul-
ture, cost and variance analysis, incentives, internal control, management style, mission
statements, organizational structure, none, other).
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39.a. In organizations that comprise of different businesses (serving different product-market
combinations), management control systems can be differentiated to take into account the
different characteristics of these businesses. Docs your organization comprise of different
businesses? (No. yes).
39b. Please indicate to what degree management control systems are differentiatcd across
these businesses. (7-point scale anchored on two points 1 ^  not at all and 7 very much).
40. Which of the following metrics do you believe correlates best with the share price of your
organization? (ROE. RON A. EPS, growth in EPS. TSR. K VA/SV A. CFRO1. none).
Des/cin/i/u
41. Down to which level in your organization do you measure value-based performance?
(Corporate, division/subsidiary/business unit, individual product-market, customer, not
measured).
42. Are shareholder value measures explicitly considered while making strategic and major
operational decisions? (Yes, no).
ßus«/o/i ßuAr <$ Des/anft/u V09Ä.
43. Does your organization calculate a weighted-average cost of capital for the determination
of shareholder value creation? (Yes, no).
Saw/ wi ßw/ir <$ D
44. Does your organization use different costs of capital for different business activities or
investment opportunities? (Yes, no),
ßora/o/i ßw/ir cS Des/arc/ms /99«.
45. What is the current estimate (in nominal terms) of the weighted average cost of capital for
your organization as a whole? ( % ).
799#.
46. In calculating invested capital, which of the following adjustments to book value do you
make within your organization? (Capitalize operating leases, deferred taxes, cumulative
goodwill amortization, addition for unrecorded goodwill, current value of property, plant and
equipment, bad debt reserves, restructuring cost provisions, warranty provisions/liabilities,
others, non, invested capital is not used).
ßo.?e</ow ßu/i/- <$ Des/W/«s 799S.
47. Over the past 4 years, have you been: (very, somewhat, neither satisfied or somewhat,
very dissatisfied) with your organization's performance in creating shareholder value?
7998.
48. Are you, in general: (very, somewhat, neither satisfied or somewhat, very dissatisfied)
with the pricing of your shares in the market place?
799Ä.
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49. Please indicate what percentage of your company's current sales is accounted for by
products represented by each of the strategies described. Your answers should total 100 %.
(Products sold to increase sales and market share, for which you are willing to accept low re-
turns on investment in the short-to-medium term, if necessary. Products sold to maintain
market share and obtain reasonable return on investment. Products sold to maximize profit-
ability and cash flow in the short-to-medium term, for which you are willing to sacrifice mar-
ket share if necessary. Products from activities that you are preparing for sale or liquidation.
None of the above (please specify)). , . . - : • -,
Gw/>ta/0Ä5.
50. Which one of the following descriptions most closely fits your company compared to
other companies in the industry? (Please consider your company as a whole and note that
none of the types listed below is inherently "good" or "bad").
(Type I. This type of company attempts to locate and maintain a secure niche in a relatively
•table product or service area. The company tends to offer a more limited range of products
or services than its competitors, and it tries to protect its domain by offering higher quality,
superior services, lower prices, and so forth. Often this type of company is not at the forefront
of developments in the industry it tends to ignore industry changes that have no direct in-
fluence on current areas of operation and concentrates instead on doing the best possible in a
limited urea.
Type 2. This type of company typically operates within a broad product-market domain that
undergoes periodic redefinition. The company values being "first in" in new product and
market areas even if not all of these efforts prove to be highly profitable. The company re-
sponds rapidly to early signals concerning areas of opportunity, and these responses often
lead to a new round of competitive actions. However, this type of company may not maintain
market strength in all of the areas it enters.
Type 3. This type ol company attempts to maintain a stable, limited line of products or ser-
vices, while at the same time moving out quickly to follow a carefully selected set of the
more promising new developments in the industry. The company is seldom "first in" with
new products or services. However, by carefully monitoring the actions of major competitors
in areas compatible with its stable product-market base, the company can frequently be
"second in" with a more efficient product or service.
Type 4. This type of company combines different product-market orientations. The company
is less aggressive in maintaining established products and markets than some of its competi-
tors, and does not take as many risks as other competitors. The company responds in those
areas where it is forced by environmental pressures to do so).
Save«/ <>w S/um' <$ //rt'/>/'w/a* / 9Ä0.
51. Please indicate how your products are positioned relative to the products of leading com-
petitors in the following six areas: product selling price, percent of sales spent on research
and development, percent of sales spent on marketing expenses, product quality, brand im-
age, product features. (1 significantly lower. 4 at par, 7 significantly higher).
Govi/k/uruyan
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52. In this question, a business unit means a set of activities associated with a single prod-
uct/service or a line of closely related products/services (examples of business units: Auto-
mobiles. Photographic supplies. Shaving supplies, Hlectnc power generating equipment.
Soap, detergents and cleaning preparations). According to this definition, what is the degree
of diversity of your company?
(Type 1: SINGLE business (more than 95 % of the company revenues ore attributable to one
single business unit).
Type 2: DOMINANT business (70 % to 95% of the company revenues are attributable to
one single business unit).
Type 3: RELATED business (70 % or more of the company revenues are attributable to one
group of related business units). A business unit is part of a group ol related business units us
long as it is tangibly related to at least one other business unit in the group. Examples of
group of related business units: Photographic film, cameras, dyes, pigments and textile
chemicals: Tape, adhesives, coated paper and film).
Type 4: UNRELATED business (less than 70 % of the company revenues arc attributable to
any one group of related business units)).
ßu.vt'</ o« CAru/ie « «/. 2WWJ.
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Summary in Dutch
The Relation Between Management Control Systems and Shareholder Value Creation.
Dit proefschritt bevat een drietal empirische onderzoeken naar dc relatie tussen de creatie van
aandeelhouderswaarde en de inhchting van het management control syslccm van hedrijven.
Het bespreekt de opzet, uitvoering en resultaten van een ondcrzock dat begin 2(H)I werd uit-
gevoerd bij Nederlandse beursfondsen.
Hoofdstuk I gee ft een inleiding in het proefschnft en beschnjft hoc dc onder/oeksvragen him
oorsprong vinden in - enerzijds - concepten die in het management control viikgcbcid /ijn
ontvvikkeld en - ander/ijds - in theorie met hetrekking tot ondcrncmingstratcgic en tot liiuin-
cienng. Het proefschrift onder/oekt de cITectcn van het tocpassen van 'valiie-hused
management' (VBM), een formeIc en systematische management aanpak die crop gericht is
de docstelling van maximale waardecreatic voor aandcclhoudcrs te rcalisercn. VMM i.s ccn
concept met een achtcrgrond in de finaneieringstheorie. in dit proefschnft word! VHM ge/icn
als een bijzondere vorm van management control. Management control Systemen zijn alle
acties en maatregelen (processen) die de ondernemingsleiding gebruikt om zcker te stellen
dat de Strategie van de onderneming wordt gerealiseerd of, indien en voor zover nodig. wordt
bijgesteld. Waar management control zieh bezighoudt met de vraag hoe de ondememinglei-
ding de realisatie van strategisch doestellingen kan waarborgen, rieht ondernemingstrategie
zieh op de vraag wat deze doelstellingen moeten zijn en hoe zij totstandkomen, evenals de
vraag hoe die doestellingen uiteindelijk gerealiseerd gaan worden en welke middelen daar-
voor nodig zijn. Vanuit deze concepten zijn een drietal kemvragen ontwikkeld die in het
proefschrift centraal staan. Deze vragen zijn: (1) of de toepassing van VHM bijdraagt lot een
verbetering van de creatie van waarde voor aandeelhouders; (2) of er een relatie bestaat tus-
sen kenmerken van het management control systeem en de creatie van waarde voor aandeel-
houders; en (3) in hoeverre de afstemming van de kenmerken van het management control
systeem op de Strategie van de onderneming bijdraagt tot creatie van waarde voor aandeel-
houders?
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De voor dit procfschrift relevante concepten en theoriefn komen in hoofdstuk 2 aan de orde.
Ten aan/icn van VBM is de aandacht gericht op de definitie van het concept en de daaruit
afgeleidc prestatiemaatstaven. De diverse, door management consultants ontwikkelde, VBM
aanpakken worden niet uitgebreid besproken. Wei komt de inbedding van VBM in de theorie
met hvtrekking tot ondernemingsfinancienng en relatie met het reeds lang in de economie
bekendc 'residual income' begrip aan de orde. I)e oorspronkelijke, op cybernetische princi-
pes gebasccrde, normatieve benadcring van management control krijgt de aandacht evenals
de verdcre ontwikkeling in het denken over management control, waarbij gedragsaspecten
van werknemcrs en managers, 'empowerment' en de invlocd van externe onzekerheid en ver-
andering aan de orde komen. Ook contingentic onder/oek naar de relatie tussen de indenting
van hel management control systeem en diverse omgevingsfactoren wordt besproken. De in-
houd van het begrip ondernemingstrategie wordt verder uitgewerkt op twee niveaus:
(I) 'corporate' strategic die beschrijft hoe het hoofdkantoor individuele business units aan-
stuurt en keuzes maakt ten aan/icn van de samenstell ing van de portefeuille van business
units; en (2) business Strategie die besehrijft hoe individuele business units opereren in de
markt en welke concurrentiestrategie zij volgen. Ken drietal classificaties voor Strategie wordt
geprcsenteerd: (I) strategische positie volgens het model van Porter (1980); (2) strategische
typologie volgens Miles en Snow (1978); en (3) strategische missie zoals beschreven door
(iuptu en (iovindarajan (1984).
lloofdstuk 3 gaat in op ccrdcrc empirische studies die voor dit proefschrift relevant zijn. Naar
dc efTectcn van de toepassing van VBM is met name ondcr/oek gedaan door management
consultants, (lit dat onder/oek hinkt dat VBM inderdaad bijdraagt tot waardecreatie.
Inlerpretutic van de/.e uitkomsten is echter lastig omdat de wetensehappelijke onderbouwing
van de conclusies /wak is of ontbreekt. Studies naar de relatie tussen aandelenrendementen
en de ontwikkeling van bepaaldc value-based prestatiemaatstaven, met name Kconomic
Value Added (KVA), wijst uit dat de/.e maatstaven wel additionele informatiewaarde voor de
kapilaulmarkt hebben, maar dat ze traditionele boekhoudkundige prestatiemaatstaven in dit
op/.icht niet overtreffen. Onderzoek naar de toepassing van value-based prestatiemaatstaven
voor de vaststelling van prestatieafhankelijke beloning toont aan dat hierdoor het gedrag van
managers wordt beVnvloed. Daarbij is echter niet vastgesteld of de/.e gedragsverandering
meer waarde voor de aandeelhouders oplevert. Onderzoek naar de relatie tussen management
control en business strategic heeft aangetoond dat aspecten als de toepassing van objectieve
of subjectieve maatstaven. het belang dat wordt toegekend aan kostenbeheersing en de mate
waarin 'tight' of Moose' controls worden toegepast, afhankelijk zijn van de gevolgde strate-
gic
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Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de opzet en uitvoering van het empirische onder/oek dat gebruik
maakte van een enquete onder de Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) van bedrijven die eind
2000 aan de Amsterdamse beurs waren genoteerd (met uitzondenng van financiele mstellin-
gen en buitenlandsc bedrijven). In het voorjaar van 2001 zijn I<>*> hednjxen aangeschrcven
waarvan cr uiteindelijk 68 de enquete retoumecrden. Naast de enquetegegevens /ijn voor dc
betreffende bedrijven tevens gegevens over financic'lc prestatics en over kocrsontwikkcling
van de aandelen verzameld. Aange/.ien de enquete met anomem was, hestotui de mogcli|k-
heid de enquetegegex ens te relatercn aan dc prestatie op beurs. wat nodig was voor dc heant-
woording van dc ondcr/oeksvragen. Onderzock naar dc represcntativiteil van dc rcsnons-
groep voor de gehele beurs geeft aan dat de bedrijven die meewerktcn groter van omvang wa-
ren dan het gcmiddelde van de aan dc Amsterdamse beurs genoteerde bedrijven. V'crdcr blijkt
uit onder/oek van dc tcrugontvangen enquctes dat cr geen aanwij/ingen /ijn dat dc daarin
opgenomen antwoorden afwijken van de antwoorden die gegeven /ouden /.ijn door bedrijven
die niet aan het onder/.oek hebben meegewerkt.
In hoofdstuk 5 worden vier hypotheses ontwikkeld met betrekking tot dc vraag of het hinte-
ren van waardecrcatic als centralc docstcllmg. met andere woorden VHM toepasscn. bijdrugt
aan de crcatic van waarde voor aandeclhouders. Waardecrealie wordt daarbij primair gemcten
in termen van "Relative Total Shareholder Return" (RTSR), dc rclaticve waardestijging van
het aandeel (koersverandenng en dividend) van dc ondememing ten op/ichtc v.ui dc bcursin-
dex. Het blijkt dat meer dan 50 % van de ondcr/ochlc bedrijven VHM toepasscn, m;iar dut
die bedrijven met bcter preslcren dan dc groep die geen VBM tocpast. Daarnaast is onder-
zocht of een verbetenng van het rendement op cigenvermogen en van de winsl per aandeel,
afhangt van de toepassing van VBM. Ook hier was geen sprakc van aantoonbaar bctcrc pres-
taties bij bedrijven die VBM toepassen. In dc laatste plaats is ondcr/ocht in hoeverre dc
CFOs van de bedrijven die VBM toepassen meer tevrcden zijn over de prestatics van bun on-
dememing, op het gebied van waardecreatie, dan hun collega's bij bedrijven die geen VDM
toepassen. Dat blijkt voor een deel het geval te zijn. In zijn algemecnheid blijkt dat het toe-
passen van VBM bij de onderzochte bedrijven geen prestatievcrbctcring heert opgeleverd. Dit
kan duiden op een onjuiste toepassing van het concept, of op het feit dat CFOs weliswaar
zeggen VBM toe te passen maar dit onvoldoende doorvoeren op lagere organisaticnivcaus.
Het kan ook zijn dat VBM gewoon niet werkt.
In hoofdstuk 6 komt het onderzoek naar de vraag of de inrichting van het management con-
trol systeem invloed heeft op de creatie van waarde voor de aandeelhoudcr aan dc orde. Ken
tweetal onderzoeksvragen op dit gebied is geformuleerd. De inrichting van het management
control systeem wordt gemeten aan de hand van het belang dat de CFOs toekennen aan 11
verschillende elementen van management contol. De informatie hieromtrent is gcrclatccrd
aan de waardecreatie van de onderzochte ondememingen. Daaruit blijkt dat bedrijven die
succesvol zijn in het creeren van waarde voor hun aandeelhouders meer belang hechten aan
financiele prestatiemaatstaven en aan prestatieafhankelijkc bcloning. Bedrijven die VBM toe-
passen hechten echter geen grotere waarde aan die specifieke aspecten van management
control. Hierin kan een verklaring liggen voor het feit dat in de eerste Studie geen hogere
waardecreatie aangetoond kon worden voor bedrijven die VBM toepassen, blijkbaar vertalen
die bedrijven het concept onvoldoende naar een op aandeelhouderswaarde gerichte inrichting
van het management control systeem.
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In de laatste, in hoofdstuk 7 besproken, Studie is de relatie tussen de inheriting van het mana-
gement control systeem en de Strategie van de betrokJcene ondememing onderzocht. De on-
derzochtc bedrijven ztjn mgedeeld op basis van strategische positie, waarbij eveneens de door
de CFOs ingevulde enqueues als informatiebron dienden. Het blijkt dat de Strategie inderdaad
invloed hecft op he I rclatieve belang dat CFOs aan bepaalde management controls toekennen.
Meer specifick, wanneer cen differentiatiestrategie wordt gevolgd wordt een hoog belang ge-
hecht aan nict-financie'le prcslatiemaatstaven en ondernemingscultuur. Geen relatie werd ge-
vonden lusscn dc gevolgdc strategic en de adoptie van VBM. Op basis van de door de ondcr-
nemingen gercalisecrdc RTSR is verder vastgesteld dat succesvolle bedrijven met een difle-
rcnliuticslrategie meer belang hechten aan ondernemingscultuur, stijl van management en or-
ganisatiestructuur tenvijl succesvolle bedrijven met een op kostenleiderschap gerichte strate-
gic veel belang hechten aan budgettcring, ondernemingcultuur, interne controle en organlsa-
liestructuur. De afsluitende regressicanalyses hebben echter aangetoond dat de relatie tussen
strategic en de kenmerken van het management control systeem geen significante bijdrage
levert lot de verklar ing van vcrschillen tussen ondernemingen in gercalisecrdc RTSR, waar-
mcc dc concludes uit dczc studic nict eensluidend zijn en cen gebied voor verder onderzoek
oplcvcrcn.
lloofdstuk 8 bevat een samenvatting van de in het voorafgaande gepresenteerde conclusies,
aanbevchngen voor verder ondcrzock en een bespreking van een aantal beperkingen van het
empirische onder/ock.
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